
Glass. 
Book. 



THE TWO BOOKS 

OF FRANCIS BACON, 

OF THE PROFICIENCE 
AND ADVANCEMENT 

OF LEARNING, 

DIVINE AND HUMAN. 



Em -red 

5+*J» q^THE KING. 



LONDON: 

PRINTED BY J. M<CREERY ? 
FOR T. PAYNE, PALL MALL, 

1808. 



{? 



^ 



W est. Bob. H^.Soc. 









CONTENTS. 



BOOK 1. 



Page 
LEARNING, HOW DISCREDITED ... 9 

1 Objections of Divines ...... — 

2 Objections of Statesmen ...... 18 

3 Objections from Learned Men .... 31 
THREE DISTEMPERS OF LEARNING . 45 

1 Of Delicate Learning, or Vain affecta- 

tions 47 

2 Of Contentious Learning, or Vain alter- 

cations .... 51 

3 Of fantastical Learning, or Vain Imagi- 

nations . 56 

VARIOUS ERRORS IN THE PURSUIT 

OF LEARNING .62 

OF THE DIGNITY OF KNOWLEDGE . 72 

Divine Proofs . 73 

Human Proofs 85 

1 It's influence on Martial Virtues ... 97 

2 It's importance to the Moral and private 
Virtues . . . . 111 



BOOK II. 

DEFECTS OF LEARNED INSTITUTIONS 128 

Distribution of the parts of Learning . 139 

HISTORY 140 

1 Literary History — — 

2 Natural History 142 

S Civil History 148 

4 Ecclesiastical History • 162 

POESY 166 

PHILOSOPHY .... 172 
I. DIVINE PHILOSOPHY, OR NATURAL 

THEOLOGY . ... 179 



PREFACE. 



In the year 1605 Francis Bacon revealed to the 
world his great scheme for rebuilding the Sciences, 
in these two books dedicated to James I. 

He was now in the 44th year of his age ; and it 
appears by some of his imperfect pieces, and by his 
letters, that he had long conceived the design of thi3 
work : for in a letter to the Lord Treasurer Burghley, 
in 159 J, he thus solicits his patronage. — " Again 
the meanness of my estate doth somewhat move 
me : for though I cannot accuse myself that I am 
either prodigal or slothful, yet my health is not to 
spend, nor my course to get : Lastly, I confess that 
I have as vast contemplative ends as I have mode- 
rate civil ends : for I have taken all knowledge to 
be my province j and if I could purge it of two sorts 
of rovers, whereof the one with frivolous disputa- 
tions, confutations, and verbosities, the other with 
blind experiments, and auricular traditions and im- 
postures, hath committed so many spoils, I hope I 
should bring in industrious observations, grounded 
conclusions, and profitable inventions and disco- 
veries, — the best state of that province. This, 
whether it be curiosity, or vain-glory, or nature, 
or, if one take it favourably, philanihropia, is so 
fixed in my mind as it cannot be removed. And I 
do easily see that place of any reasonable counte- 
nance doth bring commandment of more wits than 
a man's own ; which is the thing I greatly affect." (a) 
— and in a letter to Lord Essex, in 1596, he 
declares his purpose not to follow the practice of 

(a J Birch's Edit. 1765. pa. 178. vol. Hi. 

b 



the law — u because it drinketh too much time, 
which I have dedicated to better purposes." (a) 

Yet under Elizabeth he never ceased to aspire to 
civil honors ; for which he exhausted in vain all the 
arts of obsequiousness and adulation. His abilities 
were thought too great for high place ; they were 
commended with envy, and employed without pro- 
motion. 

Even after the accession of James I. he seems 
disposed to abandon the pursuit of power : as ap- 
pears by a letter, dated July 1603, the very year of 
his knighthood : — " My ambition now I shall only 
put upon my pen, whereby I shall be able to main- 
tain memory and merit of the times succeeding." ( b) 
— This work however, appearing two years after, 
was too well calculated to please a pedant King : 
and Bacon, by his unrivalled talents and unexampled 
servility, deserved and obtained the favor of his 
master. In the course of 17 years he wound his way, 
by nine successive steps in dignity and office, to 
the highest place of a subject, (c) 

During all this time, though immersed in civil 
business, he applied himself to Philosophy with un- 
abated vigour. Wishing to publish his work to all 
nations, and to perpetuate it through all ages, he 
desired a Latin version of it; and some time before 
the year 1608, (for the letter is not dated) sent the 
following request to his friend, the Margaret Pro- 
fessor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge. 



Mr. Dr. Playfere. (d) 



A great desire will take a small occasion to hope 
and put in trial that which is desired. It pleased 
you a good while since, to express unto me the good 
liking which you conceived of my Book of the 
Advancement of Learning; and that more signifi- 
cantly, (as it seemed to me) than out of courtesy 

(a) Vol. iii. p. 194. (b) Vol. Hi. p. 401. 

(c) Letter to the King, vol, iii. p. 406. 

(d) Vol. iii. p. 230. 



¥ 

or civil respect. Myself, as I then took content- 
ment in your approbation thereof, so I should esteem 
and acknowledge not only my contentment in- 
creased, but my labours advanced, if I might obtain 
your help in that nature which I desire. Wherein 
before I set down in plain terms my request unto 
you, I will open my self what it was which I chiefly 
sought and propounded to my self in that work • 
that you may perceive that which I now desire to 
be pursuant thereupon. If I do not much err, (for 
any judgment that a man maketh of his own doings 
had need be spoken with a Siniinquam fallit Imago,) 
I have this opinion, that if I had sought mine own 
commendation, it had been a much fitter course for 
me to have done as Gardeners used to do, by taking 
their seed and slips, and rearing them first into 
plants, and so uttering them in pots, when they are 
in flower, and in their best state. But for as much 
as my end was Merit of the State of Learning (to 
my power) and not Glory ; and because my purpose 
was rather to excite other men's wits than to magnify 
mine own, I was desirous to prevent the uncertain- 
ness of mine own life and times, by uttering rather 
seeds than plants ; nay and further, (as the Proverb 
is) by sowing with the basket, rather than with the 
hand : wherefore, since I have only taken upon me 
to ring a bell, to call other wits together, (which is 
the meanest office) it cannot but be consonant to 
my desire to have that bell heard as far as can be. 
And since they are but sparks which can work but 
upon matter prepared, I have the more reason to 
wish that those sparks may fly abroad, that they 
may the better find and light upon those minds and 
spirits which are apt to be kindled. And therefore, 
the privateness of the language considered, wherein 
it is written, excluding so many readers ; as on the 
other side, the obscurity of the argument in many 
parts of it excludeth many others ; I must account 
it a second birth of that work, if it might be 
translated into Latin, without manifest loss of the 
sense and matter. For this purpose I could not re- 
present to my self any man into whose hands I do 

b 2 



more earnestly desire that work should fall than 
your self; for by that I have heard and read, T know 
no man a greater master in commanding words to 
serve matter. Nevertheless, I am not ignorant of 
the worth of your labours, whether such as your 
place and profession imposeth, or such as your own 
virtue may upon your voluntary election take in 
hand. But I can lay before you no other persuasions 
than either the work it self may affect you with ; or 
the honour of his Majesty, to whom it is dedicated ; 
or your particular inclination to my self; who, as I 
never took so much comfort in any labours of mine 
own, so I shall never acknowledge my self more 
obliged in any thing to the labours of another, than 
in that which shall assist it. Which your labour, if 
I can by my place, profession, means, friends, travel, 
work, deed, requite unto you, I shall esteem my self 
so straitly bound thereunto, as I shall be ever most 
ready both to take and seek occasion of thankful- 
ness. So leaving it, nevertheless Salva Amicitia, as 
reason is, to your good liking, I remain. 

Archbishop Tenison informs us, in his Baconiana, 
that Playfere sent a specimen of such superfine 
Latinity, that Bacon did not encourage him to pro- 
ceed. Still he did not relinquish his purpose ; 
though too much occupied with civil affairs, and 
with the other parts of his great plan to accomplish 
it himself: but he repeats his wish in a letter to his 
friend Tobie Matthew — " I must confess my desire 
to be that my writings should not court the present 
time, or some few places, in such sort as might 
make them either less general to persons, or less 
permanent to future ages." (a) — and in another to 
the same, dated 1609, on sending him part of the 
Instauratio Magna, he says—" It doth more fully 
lay open that the question between me and the an- 
tients is not of the virtue of the race, but of the 
Tightness of the way." (b) — In his letter to Casau* 
bon, Oct. 1609, he says — " magis videor cum anti- 
quis versari quam cum his quibuscum vivo, (c) 

(a) Vol. iii. p. 247. (b) Vol. iii. p. 245. 

(c) Vol. iii. p. 462, 



vii 

Before the Latin version of this work appeared, 
he presented to the King, in 1620, the second part 
of his Instauratio Magna, entitled Novum Organum, 

with a letter, in which he says- " I hear my 

former book of the Advancement of Learning is 
well tasted in the Universities here, and the English 
Colleges abroad ; and this is the same argument 
sunk deeper." (a) 

The next year, in the full sunshine of reputation 
and power, he was suddenly overclouded with dis- 
grace. In his malpractices originates the jurisdic- 
tion of the House of Lords in Appeals. The first 
petition preferred, and the first heard and deter- 
mined, were both levelled against the Lord Chan- 
cellor Bacon, for corruption and other misbehaviour. 
(b) He made no defence against the charge of having 
sold the decrees of equity. In his memorial of access 
to the King, in 1622, his confession is full — " of 
my offences far be it from me to say — dat veniani 
corns, vexat censura columbas — but I will say that I 
have good warrant for — u they were not the 
greatest offenders in Israel, on whom the wall of 
Shilo fell." (c) — As he had been the willing tool, he 
was now the unpitied victim of a capricious tyrant 
and an insolent minion ; from whom he was reduced 
to beg the remission of a just sentence. 

To estimate the severity of his punishment, we 
must remember not only his exalted place, but his 
great name, — " who can see w r orse days than he that 
yet living doth follow at the funerals of his own 
reputation." (d ) 

He fell, like Antaeus, only to renew his strength : 
and the labours of the last five years of his life, 
under ignominy and want, have almost obliterated 
the memory of his misdeeds. 

He quitted a dangerous authority to become 
indeed the " Servant of Posterity," and to perfect 
for their lasting benefit his immortal works. In a 
letter to Tobie Matthew, he says, — " It is true my 



(a) Vol. iii. p. 584. (b) Blackstone. Chap. 27- Book iii* 
(c) Vol. iii. p,630. (d) Bacons Essay on Death. 



viii 

labours are wow most set to have those works which 
I had formerly published, as that of Advancement 
of Learning, that of Henry VII. that of the Essays, 
being retractate and made more perfect, well trans- 
lated into Latin by the help of some good pens^ 
which forsake me not: for these modern languages 
will at one time or other play the bankrupt with 
books; and since I have lost much time with this 
age, 1 would be glad, as God shall give me leave, 
to recover it with posterity." (a) 

Accordingly in 1623 came out the De Augmentis 
Scientiarum, being a Latin Version of these Two 
Books, much enlarged; in which he was assisted by 
Mr. George Herbert, and the famous Philosopher of 
Malmesbnry. (b) It consists of nine books: the first 
is nearly a literal translation of the first book of 
this work; the other eight, divided into 46 Chapters, 
comprise the second book : but great additions are 
made throughout, especially to the subjects of Rhe- 
toric, Laws, and Government. 

In 1640, was published a translation of the De 
Augmentis by Dr. Gilbert Wats, at Oxford ; which, 
Dr. Tenison tells us, was considered by many as 
so defective and spiritless a performance, that Dr. 
Rawley, Lord Bacon's chaplain, was solicited to 
give a better. No other appeared till Dr. Shaw, in 
1733, published his abridgment of Bacon's Philoso- 
phical works; in which he professes to give not a 
" direct translation, but a kind of open version in 
modern English," and to omit "certain personal 
addresses, compliments, exordiums, and the fi&ef, 1 ' 
in order to shorten the works: yet he encumbers 
his translation with frivolous notes.— He does not 
observe the method of the original; but divides the 
introductory matter, the first book, and the proem 
to the second book, into four preliminary sections, 
and the eight remaining books into 28 sections. 

While the De Augmentis Scientiarum spreads the 
fame of Bacon among the learned of all nations, this 
the original draught of that immortal work is almost 

(a) Vol. iii. p. 642. (b) See Tenison's Baconiana 

and the Life of Hobbes. 



IX 

neglected; and the illustrious Author is known to 
the greater part of his own countrymen only by 
his Essays. — We find but three separate editions of 
this work ; — the 1st at London, in 1605 :— the 2d 
at London, in 1629, (three years after the death 
of Bacon,) and the 3d at Oxford, in 1633. 

This is corrected from the original edition of 1605 ; 
numerous errors having crept into many of the later 
editions, especially in the Latin quotations. 

In the first edition, the subjects are distinguished 
by Capitals or Italics introduced into the text, with 
a few marginal notes in Latin : in this, the more 
convenient method of General Titles and a per- 
petual marginal Index will facilitate a comparison 
with the Latin Version and the Translations. 

An important interval of 18 years preceded it's re- 
publication in Latin ; during which the author fell 
from the height of prosperity into the abyss of 
wretchedness ; and in which he found leisuf e to 
make many improvements. Yet does he say (in 
his memorial of access to the King,) " My story is 
proud. I may thank your Majesty: — for I heard 
him note of Tasso, that he could know which poem 
he made when he was in good condition, and which 
w ? hen he was a beggar. I doubt he could make no 
such observation of me." — Nor do the subsequent 
alterations much diminish the value of this work ; 
which will ever be esteemed as a composition of 
extraordinary elegance, at an early period of our 
literature ; and as the first production of so great a 
genius, in his native tongue, and in the maturity 
of his years ; every page of which is stamped with 
the character of it's author— of a man of wondeiful 
endowments, uniting in a rare degree experience 
with learning, the active with the contemplative 
life. 

Conscious of great failings and great performances, 
in humility mixed with dignity, he thus puts himself 
upon posterity — " for my name and memory, I 
leave it to men's charitable speeches, and to foreign 
nations, and the next ages." (a) — The consenting 

(a) See his Will. 



voice of all the studious and the wise justifies the 
noble confidence of this appeal. We cite only 
the learned and witty Ben Jonson, the elegant 
and judicious Addison, the scientific and ingenuous 
d'Alembert. 

u One, though he be excellent, and the chief, is 
not to be imitated alone : for never no imitator ever 
grew up to his author : Likeness is always on this 
side Truth. Yet there happened in my time one 
noble Speaker, who was full of gravity in his speak- 
ing, (a) His language, (where he could spare or 
pass by a jest) was nobly censorious. No man ever 
spake more neatly, more prestly, more weightily, or 
suffered less emptiness, less idleness in what he 
uttered. No member of his speech but consisted 
of his own graces. His hearers could not cough, 
or look aside from him without loss. He command- 
ed where he spoke ; and had his judges angry and 
pleased at his devotion. No man had their affec- 
tions more in his power. The fear of every man that 
heard him was lest he should make an end. 

Cicero is said to be the only wit that the people of 
Rome had equalled to their empire : — ingenium par 
imperio. — We have had many ; and in their several 
ages, (to take \a but the former seculum) Sir Thomas 
More, the elder Wyat, Henry Earl of Surrey, 
Chaloner, Smith, Eliot, B. Gardiner, were for their 
times admirable ; and the more, because they began 
eloquence with us. Sir Nic. Bacon was singular, 
and almost alone, in the beginning of Q. Elizabeth's 
time. Sir Philip Sidney and Mr. Hooker, in dif- 
ferent matters, grew great masters of wit and lan- 
guage; and in whom all vigour of invention and 
strength of judgment met : the Earl of Essex noble and 
high ; and Sir Walter Raleigh not to be contemned 
cither for judgment or style: Sir Henry Savile grave 
and truly lettered; Sir Edwin Sands excellent in 
both; Lord Egerton, the Chancellor, a grave and 
great orator, and best when he was provoked. But 
his learned and able, though unfortunate successor, 
h he who hath filled up all numbers ; and performed 

(a) Lord Verulam. 



that in our tongue which may be compared or pre« 
ferred either to insolent Greece, or haughty Rome. 
In short, within his view, and about his times, were 
all the wits born that could honour a language, or help 
study. Now things daily fall : wits grow downward, 
and Eloquence grows backward : so that he may be 
named and stand as the mark and ax^n of our 
Language. — 

I have ever observed it to have been the office of 
a wise patriot, among the greatest affairs of the 
state, to take care of the Commonwealth of Learn- 
ing. For schools, they are Seminaries of state ; and 
nothing is worthier the study of a statesman, than 
that part of the republic which we call the Advance- 
ment of Letters. Witness the care of Julius Caesar, 
who in the heat of the civil war writ his books of 

Analogy, and dedicated them to Tully. This 

made the late Lord St. Albans entitle his work 
Novum Organum : which though by the most of 
superficial men, who cannot get beyond the title of 
Nominate, it is not penetrated or understood, it really 
openeth all defects of Learning whatsoever, and is a 
book Qui longum noto scriptori prorogat avum. — 

My conceit of his person was never increased 
toward him by his place or honours ; but I have and 
do reverence him for the greatness that was only 
proper to himself; in that he seemed to me ever, 
by his work, one of the greatest men, and most 
worthy of admiration, that had been in many ages. 
In his adversity I ever prayed that God would give 
him strength; for greatness he could not want: 
neither could I condole in a word or syllable for 
him; as knowing no accident could do harm to 
Virtue, but rather help to make it manifest." 

Ben. Jonson. Discoveries, p. 701. 



" I shall, in this paper, only instance Sir Francis 
Bacon, a man who, for greatness of genius, did 
honour to his age and country ; I could almost say to 
human nature itself. He possessed at once all those 
extraordinary talents, which were divided amongst 



the greatest Authors of Antiquity. He had the 
sound, distinct, comprehensive knowledge of Aris- 
totle, with all the beautiful lights, graces, and em- 
bellishments of Cicero. One does not know which 
to admire most in his writings, the strength of reason, 
force of style, or brightness of imagination." 

Tatler, No. c 267. 

a One of the most extensive and improved geniuses 
we have had instance of in our own nation, or in any 
other, was that of Sir Francis Bacon, Lord Verulam. 
This great man, by an extraordinary force of nature, 
compass of thought, and indefatigable study, had 
amassed to himself such stores of knowledge as we 
cannot look upon without amazement. His capacity 
seemed to have grasped all that was revealed in 
books before his time • and, not satisfied with that, 
he began to strike out new tracks of science, too 
many to be travelled over by any one man, in the 
compass of the longest life. These therefore he 
could only mark down, like imperfect coastings on 
maps, or supposed points of land, to be further 
discovered and ascertained by the industry of 
after-ages, who should proceed upon his notices or 
conjectures." 

Spectatw, No. 554. 



Pendant que des adversaires pen instruits on mal- 
intentionnes faisoient ouvertement la guerre a la Phi- 
losophic, elle se refugioit, pour aiusi dire, dans les 
ouvrages de quelques grands hommes, qui sans avoir 
Pambition dangereuse d'arracher le bandeau des yeux 
de leurs contemporains preparoient de loin dans 
l'ombre et le silence la lumiere dont le monde devoit 
etre eclaire peu a peu et par degres insensibles. A 
la tete de ces iilustres personnages doit etre place 
rimmortel Chancelier d'Angleterre, Francois Bacon, 
dont les ouvrages si justement estirnes, et p'us estimes 
pourtant qu'ils ne sont connus, meritent encore plus 
notre lecture que nos eloges. A considerer les vuei 



xiii 

sanies et 6tendues de ce grand homme, la multitude 
d'objets sur lesquels son esprit s'est porte, la hardiesse 
de son style, qui reunit par-tout les plus sublimes 
images avec la precision la plus rigoureuse, on seroit 
tente de le regarder comme le plus grand, le plus 
universel, et le plus eloquent des Pirilosophes. Bacon, 
ne dans le sein de la nuit la plus profonde, sentit que 
la Philoscphie n'etoit pas encore, quoique bien des 
gens sans doute se flattassent d'y exceller ; car plus 
un siecle est grossier, plus ii se croit instruit de tout 
ce qu'il peut savoir. II commenca done par envisage? 
d'une vue generate les divers objets de toutes les 
Sciences naturelles : il partagea ces Sciences en dif- 
ferentes branches, dont il tit l'enumeration la plus 
exacte qu'il lui rut possible : il examina ce que Ton 
savoit deja sur chacun de ces objets ; et fit le cata- 
logue immense de ce qui restoit a deeouvrir; e'est 
le but de son ouvrage, — De la dignite et de l'accroisse- 
ment des connoissances humaines. Dans son Nouvel 
Organe des Sciences il perfectionne les vues qu'il avoit 
donnees dans le premier ouvrage ; il les porte plus 
loin, et fait connoitre la necessite de la Physique ex- 
perimentale, a laquelle on ne pensoit point encore. 
Ennemi des systemes, il n'envisage la Pliilosophie que 
comme cette partie de nos connoissances qui doit 
contribuer a nous rendre meilleurs ou plus heureux : 
il semble la borner a la science des choses utiles, et 
recommande pai-tout Petude de la nature. Ses autres 
Merits sont formes sur le meme plan ; tout, jusqu'a leurs 
titres, y annonce l'homme de genie, l'espiit qui voit 
en grand. II y recueille des faits, il y compare des ex- 
periences, il en indique un grand nombre a faire ; il 
invite les savans a etudier et a perfectionner les arts, 
qu'il regarde comme la partie la plus releveeetla 
plus essentielle de la Science humaine : il expose 
avec une simplicity noble ses conjectures et ses 
pensees sur les differens objets dignes d'interesser les 
hommes ; et il eut pu dire, comme ce vieillard de 
Terence, que rien de ce qui touche l'humanite ne lui 
etoit etranger. Science de la nature, morale, poli- 
tique, oeconomique, tout semble avoir ete du ressort de 
cet esprit lumineux et profond ; et Ton ne sait ce qu'on 



doit le plus admirer, ou des richesses qu'il repand 
sur tous les sujets qu'il traite, ou de Ja dignite avec 
laquelle il en parle. Ses ecrits ne peuvent etre 
mieux compares qu'a ceux d'Hippocrate sur la m£de- 
cine ; et ils ne ser6ient ni moins admires ni moins lus, 
si la culture de Pesprit 6toit aussi cher aux hommes 
que la conservation de la sante\ Mais il n'y a que les 
chefs de secte en tout genre, dont les ouvrages puis- 
sent avoir un certain eclat : Bacon n'a pas ete du 
nombre ; et la forme de sa Philosophic s'y opposoit : 
elle 6toit trop sage pour £tonner personne. La Scho* 
lastique qui dominoit de son terns ne pouvoit £tre 
renvers£e que par des opinions hardies et nouvelles ; 
et il n'y a pas d'apparence qu'un Phiiosophe qui se 
contente de dire, aux hommes, " Voila le peu que 
vous avez appris." — " Voici ce qui vous reste a cher- 
cher"— soit destine a faire beaucoup de bruit parmi 
ses contemporains. Nous oserions meme faire quel- 
que reproehe au Chancelier Bacon d'avoir et6 peut- 
£tre trop timide, si nous ne savions avec quelle re- 
tenue, et pour ainsi dire, avec quelle superstition, 
on doit juger un genie si sublime ; Quoiqu'il avoue 
que les Scholastiques ont 6nerve les Sciences parleurs 
questions minutieuses, et que l'esprit doit sacrifler 
l'£tude des £tres gene>aux a celle des objets particu- 
liers, il semble pourtant par l'emploi frequent qu'il 
fait des termes de l'6cole, quelque fois meme par 
celui des principes Scholastiques, et par des divisions 
et subdivisions dont l'usage etoit alors fort a la mode, 
avoir marque un peu trop de management ou de 
deference pour le gout dominant de son siecle, Ce 
grand homme, apres avoir brise tant de fers, £toit 
encore retenu par quelques chaines qu'il ne pouvoit 
ou n'osoit rompre. 

Discours Priliminaire de V Encyclopidie* 



XV11 

II. NATURAL PHILOSOPHY .... 183 
1 Of Natural Science, or Speculative Phi- 
losophy 185 

g Of Natural Prudence, or Operative Phi- 
losophy 203 

III. SELF KNOWLEDGE, OR HUMA- 

NITY 215 

1 Of Discovery . ; 217 

2 Of Impression 219 

PHILOSOPHY OF THE BODY .... 222 

1 Medicine 223 

2 Cosmetic 237 

3 Athletic 

4 Sensuality 238 

PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND .... 239 

1 Of the nature of the Soul or Mind . . 

2 Of the faculties of the Soul or Mind . . 244 
RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY ..... 247 

1 Art of Enquiry, or Invention .... 249 

2 Art of Examination, or Judgment . . . 262 

3 Art of Custody, or Memory .... 273 

4 Art of Elocution, or Tradition .... 275 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY 307 

1 Of the nature of Good 310 

The Christian Law determines most of 

the Controversies in Morals .... 314 
Of Good with respect to Society, or of 

Duty 326 

2 Of the Culture of the Mind . . . . 334 
CIVIL KNOWLEDGE . 353 

1 Of Conversation 360 

2 Of Negotiation, or Business .... 362 
Of Prudential Wisdom, or the Art of 

rising in Life 37 6 

Of marshalling our pursuits ..... 400 

3 Of Government 409 

DIVINITY 417 

1 The nature of the Revelation .... 425 

2 The Matter revealed ....... 437 

Conclusion of this General Survey of 

Learning 441 

c 



TO SIR THOMAS BODLEY. 



SlK, 



I think no man may more truly say, with the 
Psalm, Multum incola fuit anima mea, than myself; 
for I do confess since I was of any understanding, 
my mind hath in effect been absent from that I have 
done : and in absence are many errors, which I do 
willingly acknowledge ; and amongst the rest, this 
great one that led the rest ; that knowing myself by 
inward calling to be fitter to hold a book than to 
play a part, I have led my life in civil causes ; for 
which I was not very fit by nature, and more unfit 
by the preoccupation of my mind. Therefore calling 
myself home, I have now for a time enjoyed myself; 
whereof likewise I desire to make the world partaker. 
My labours (if I may so term that which was the 
comfort of my other labours) I have dedicated to the 
King ; desirous if there be any good in them, it may 
be as the fat of a sacrifice, incensed to his honour : 
and the second copy I have sent unto you, not only 
in good affection, but in a kind of congruity, in 
regard of your great and rare desert of learning. 
For Books are the Shrines where the Saint is, or 
is believed to be : and you having built an Ark to save 
Learning from Deluge, (a) deserve propriety in any 
new instrument or engine, whereby Learning should 
be improved or advanced. 1605. 



(a) The Bodleian Library. 



XIX 



TO THE EARL OF SALISBURY. 



It may please your Good Lordship, 

I present your Lordship with a work of my vacant 
time ; which if it had been more, the work had been 
better. It appertained to your Lordship (besides 
my particular respects) in some propriety ; in regard 
you are a great Governour in a province of Learn- 
ing, (a) And (that which is more) you have added to 
your place affection towards Learning; and to your 
affection, judgment. Of which, the last I could be 
content were (for the time) less, that you might the 
less exquisitely censure that which I offer unto you. 
But sure I am, the argument is good, if it had lighted 
upon a good author. But I shall content myself to 
awake better spirits ; like a bell-ringer, which is first 
up to call others to church. So with my humble 
desire of your Lordship's good acceptation, I re- 
main. 1605. 



(«) Chancellor of the University of Cambridge. 



THE TWO BOOKS 

OF FRANCIS BACON, 

OF THE PROFICIENCE 

AND ADVANCEMENT 

OF LEARNING, 

DIVINE AND HUMAN. 

TO THE KING. 



THE 

FIRST BOOK OF FRANCIS BACON: 

OF THE 

PROFICIENCE AND ADVANCEMENT 
OF 

LEARNING, DIVINE AND HUMAN. 
TO THE KING 



There were under the law, excellent king, 
both daily sacrifices, and freewill offerings \ 
the one proceeding upon ordinary observ- 
ance, the other upon a devout chearfulness : 
in like manner there belongeth to kings from 
their servants both tribute of duty, and pre- 
sents of affection. In the former of these! 
hope I shall not live to be wanting, accord- 
ing to my most humble duty, and the good 
pleasure of your majesty's employments : for 
the latter, I thought it more respective to 
make choice of some oblation, which might 
b 2 



rather refer to the propriety and excellency 
of your individual person, than to the business 
of your crown and state. 

Wherefore representing your majesty many 
times unto my mind, and beholding you not 
with the inquisitive eye of presumption, to 
discover that which the Scripture telleth me 
is inscrutable, but with the observant eye of 
duty and admiration ; leaving aside the other 
parts of your virtue and fortune, I have been 
touched, yea, and possessed with an extreme 
wonder at those your virtues and faculties, 
which the philosophers call intellectual ; the 
largeness of your capacity, the faithfulness 
of your memory, the swiftness of your ap- 
prehension, the penetration of your judg- 
ment, and the facility and order of your 
elocution : and I have often thought, that of 
all the persons living that I have known, your 
majesty were the best instance to make a 
man of Plato's opinion, that all knowledge is 
but remembrance, and that the mind of man 
by nature knoweth all things, and hath but 
her own native and original notions (which 
by the strangeness and darkness of this ta- 
bernacle of the body are sequestered) again 



revived and restored : such a light of nature 
I have observed in your majesty, and such a 
readiness to take flame, and blaze from the 
least occasion presented, or the least spark of 
another's knowledge delivered. And as the 
Scripture saith of the wisest king, That his 
heart tuas as the sands of the sea; which though 
it be one of the largest bodies, yet it con- 
sisteth of the smallest and finest portions ; so 
hath God given your majesty a composition 
of understanding admirable, being able to 
compass and comprehend the greatest mat- 
ters, and nevertheless to touch and apprehend 
the least ; whereas it should seem an impos- 
sibility in nature, for the same instrument 
to make itself fit for great and small works. 
And for your gift of speech, I call to my 
mind what Cornelius Tacitus saith of Augus- 
tus Caesar ; August o prqfluens^ et quw prin- 
cipem deceret, eloquentia fait : For, if we note 
it well, speech that is uttered with labour 
and difficulty, or speech that savoureth of 
the affectation of art and precepts, or speech 
that is framed after the imitation of some 
pattern of eloquence, though never so excel- 
lent ; all this has somewhat servile, and hold- 



ing of the subject. But your majesty's man* 
ner of speech is indeed prince-like, flowing 
as from a fountain, and yet streaming and 
branching itself into nature's order, full of 
facility and felicity, imitating none, and ini- 
mitable by any. And as in your civil estate 
there appeareth to be an emulation and con- 
tention of your majesty's virtue with your 
fortune ; a virtuous disposition with a fortu-^ 
nate regiment ; a virtuous expectation, when 
time was, of your greater fortune, with a 
prosperous possession thereof in the due 
time ; a virtuous observation of the laws of 
marriage, with most blessed and happy fruit 
of marriage ; a virtuous and most christian 
desire of peace, with a fortunate inclina- 
tion in your neighbour princes thereunto : 
so likewise, in these intellectual matters, 
there seemeth to be no less contention be- 
tween the excellency of your majesty's gifts 
of nature, and the universality and perfec- 
tion of your learning. For I am well as- 
sured that this which I shall say is no am- 
plification at all, but a positive and measur- 
ed truth ; which is, that there hath not been 
since Christ's time any king or temporal 



monarch, which hath been so learned in all 
literature and erudition, divine and human. 
For let a man seriously and diligently revolve 
and peruse the succession of the emperors 
of Rome ; of which Caesar the dictator* who 
lived some years before Christ, and Marcus 
Antonjus, were the best learned ; and so de- 
scend to the emperors of Graecia, or of the 
West ; and then to the lines of France* Spain, 
England* Scotland and the rest, and he shall 
find this judgment is truly made* For it 
seemeth much in a king, if, by the com- 
pendious extractions of other men's wits and 
labours, he can take hold of any superficial 
ornaments and shews of learning ; or if he 
countenance and prefer learning and learned 
men : but to drink indeed of the true foun- 
tains of learning, nay, to have such a foun- 
tain of learning in himself, in a king, and 
in a king born, is almost a miracle. And 
the more because there is met in your ma- 
jesty a rare conjunction, as well of divine 
and sacred literature, as of profane and 
human ; so as your majesty standeth invest- 
ed of that triplicity, which in great venera- 
tion was ascribed to the ancient Hermes ; 
the power and fortune of a king, the know- 



ledge and illumination of a priest, and the 
learning and universality of a philosopher. 
This propriety, inherent and individual at- 
tribute in your majesty, deserveth to be ex- 
pressed not only in the fame and admiration 
of the present time, rior in the history or 
tradition of the ages succeeding;' but^also in 
some solid work, fixed memorial, and im- 
mortal monument, bearing a character or 
signature both of the power of a king, and 
the difference and perfection of such a 
king. 
object of this Therefore I did conclude with myself, that 

work. . 

1 could not make unto your majesty a better 
oblation, than of some treatise tending to 
that end, whereof the sum will consist of 
these two parts ; the former, concerning the 
excellency of learning and knowledge, and 
the excellency of the merit and true glory in 
the augmentation and propagation thereof: 
the latter, what the particular acts and works 
are, which have been embraced and under- 
taken for the advancement of learning; and 
again, what defects and undervalues I find in 
such particular acts : to the end, that though 
I cannot positively or affirmatively advise 
your majesty, or propound unto you framed 



particulars ; yet I may excite your princely 
cogitations to visit the excellent treasure of 
your own mind, and thence to extract parti- 
culars for this purpose, agreeable to your 
magnanimity and wisdom. 



LEARNING, HOW DISCREDITED. 

In the entrance to the former of these, to 
clear the way, and, as it were, to make si- 
lence, to have the true testimonies concern- 
ing the dignity of learning to be better heard, 
without the interruption of tacit objections \ 
I think good to deliver it from the discredits 
and disgraces which it hath received, all from 
ignorance, but ignorance severally disguised ; 
appearing sometimes in the zeal and jea- 
lousy of divines, sometimes in the severity 
and arrogancy of politicians, and sometimes 
in the errors and imperfections of learned 
men themselves. 

I hear the former sort say, that knowledge objections of 
is of those things which are to be accepted 
of with great limitation and caution ; that 
the aspiring to overmuch knowledge, was 



,10 

the original temptation and sin, whereupon 
ensued the fall of man ; that knowledge hath 
in it somewhat of the serpent, and therefore 
where it entereth into a man it makes him 
swell; Scientia inflat : that Solomon gives a 
censure, That there is no end of making books* 
and that much reading is a iveariness of the 
flesh) and again in another place, That in 
spacious knowledge there is much contristation, 
and that he that increaseth knoivledge increaseth 
anxiety ; that St. Paul gives a caveat, That 
we be not spoiled through vain philosophy ; that 
experience demonstrates how learned men 
have been arch-heretics, how learned times 
have been inclined to atheism, and how the 
contemplation of second causes, doth dero- 
gate from our dependance upon God who is 
the first cause, 
No danger To discover then the ignorance and error 
quantity of of this opinion, and the misunderstanding in 
the grounds thereof, it may well appear these 
men do not observe or consider, that it was not 
the pure knowledge of nature and universali- 
ty, a knowledge by the light whereof man 
did give names unto other creatures in para-- 
dise, as they were brought before him, ac- 



11 



cording unto their proprieties, which gave 
occasion to the fall; but it was the proud 
knowledge of good and evil, with an intent 
in man to give law unto himself, and to de- 
pend no more upon God's commandments, 
which was the form of the temptation* Nei- 
ther is it any quantity of knowledge, how 
great soever, that can make the mind of man 
to swell ; for nothing can .fill, much less ex* 
tend the soul of man, but God, and the con- 
templation of God ; and therefore Solomon, 
speaking of the two principal senses of inqui- 
sition, the eye and the ear, affirmeth that the 
eye is never satisfied with seeing, nor the ear 
with hearing ; and if there be no fulness, then 
is the continent greater than the content: so 
of knowledge itself, and the mind of man, 
whereto the senses are but reporters, he de- 
fineth likewise in these words, placed after 
that calendar or ephemerides, which he 
maketh of the diversities of times and sea- 
sons for all actions and purposes ; and con- 
cludeth thus : God hath made all things beau+ 
tiful, or decent, in the true return of their sea- 
sons: Also he hath placed the world in man's 
heart, yet cannot man find out the work which 



12 



God ivorketk from the beginning to the end: 
declaring, not obscurely, that God hath fram- 
ed the mind of man as a mirror, or glass, ca- 
pable of the image of the universal world, and 
joyful to receive the impression thereof, as 
the eye joyeth to receive light; and not only 
delighted in beholding the variety of things, 
and vicissitude of times, but raised also to 
find out and discern the ordinances and de- 
crees, which throughout all those changes are 
infallibly observed. And although he doth 
insinuate, that the supreme or summary law 
of nature, which he calleth, The ivork which 
God worketh from the beginning to the end, is 
not possible to be found out by man ; yet that 
doth not derogate from the capacity of the 
mind, but may be referred to the impedi- 
ments, as of shortness of life, ill conjunction 
of labours, ill tradition of knowledge over 
from hand to hand, and many other incon- 
veniencies, whereunto the condition of man 
is subject. For that nothing parcel of the 
world is denied to man's inquiry and inven- 
tion, he doth in another place rule over, 
when he saith, The spirit of man is as the 
lamp of God, wherewith he searcheth the in- 



13 



wariness of all secrets. If then such be the 
capacity and receipt of the mind of man, it is 
manifest, that there is no danger at all in the 
proportion or quantity of knowledge, how 
large soever, lest it should make it swell or 
out compass itself; no, but it is merely the 
quality of knowledge, which be it in quan- 
tity more or less, if it be taken without the 
corrective thereof, hath in it some nature of 
venom or malignity, and some effects of that 
venom, which is ventosity or swelling. This 
corrective spice, the mixture whereof maketh 
knowledge so sovereign, is charity, which the 
apostle immediately addeth to the former 
clause ; for so he saith, knowledge bloiveth up, 
but charity buildeth up; not unlike unto that 
which he delivereth in another place : If I 
spake, saith he, with the tongues of men and an- 
gels, and had not charity, it voere but as a tink- 
ling cymbal; not but that it is an excellent 
thing to speak with the tongues of men and 
angels, but because, if it be severed from 
charity, and not referred to the good of men 
and mankind, it hath rather a sounding and 
unworthy glory, than a meriting and sub- 
stantial virtue. And as for that censure of 



14 

Solomon, concerning the excess of writing 
and reading books, and the anxiety of spirit 
which redoundeth from knowledge ; and that 
admonition of St. Paul, That we be not seduced 
hy vain philosophy ; let those places be rightly 
understood, and they do indeed excellently 
set forth the true bounds and limitations, 
whereby human knowledge is confined and 
circumscribed; and yet without any such 
contracting or coarctation, but that it may 
comprehend all the universal nature of things ; 
The proper f or these limitations are three ; the first, that 

bounds of 

knowledge. W e do not so place our felicity in knowledge, 
as to forget our mortality. The second, that 
we make application of our knowledge, to 
giye ourselves repose and contentment, and 
not distaste or repining. The third, that we 
do not presume by the contemplation of na- 
ture to attain to the mysteries of God. For 
as touching the first of these, Solomon doth 
excellently expound himself in another place 
of the same book, where he saith ; / satv well 
that knowledge recedeth as far from Ignorance, 
as light doth from darkness ; and that the wise 
man's eyes keep watch in his head, whereas the 
fool roundeth about in darkness : but withal I 



15 

learned, that the same mortality involveth them 
both. And for the second, certain it is, there, 
is no vexation or anxiety of mind, which re- 
sulteth from knowledge, otherwise than mere- 
ly by accident; for all knowledge, and won- 
der (which is the seed of knowledge) is an im- J 
pression of pleasure in itself: but ...when men 
fall to framing conclusions out of their know- 
ledge, applying it to their particular, and mi- 
nistring to themselves thereby weak fears, 
or vast desires, there groweth that carefulness 
and trouble of mind which is spoken of: for 
then knowledge is no more Lumen siccum, 
whereof Heraclitus, the profound, said, Lu-. 
men siccum optima anima; but it becometh 
Lumen madidum, or maceratum, being steeped 
and infused in the humours of the affections; 
And as for the third point, it deserveth to be The contem- 

,.-,-, t iTii plation of se- 

a little stood upon, and not to be lightly pass- cond causes 

does not lea<l 

ed over : for if any man shall think by view to atheism. 
and inquiry into these sensible and material 
things to attain that light, whereby he may 
reveal unto himself the nature or will of God, 
then indeed is he spoiled by vain philoso- 
phy: for the contemplation of God's crea- 
tures and works produceth (having regard to 



16 



the works and creatures themselves) know- 
ledge ; but having regard to God, no perfect 
knowledge, but wonder, which is broken 
knowledge. And therefore it was most aptly 
said by one of Plato's school, — " That the 
" sense of man carrieth a resemblance with 
" the sun, which, as we see, openeth and 
" revealeth all the terrestrial globe; but 
<* then again it obscureth and concealeth the 
" stars and celestial globe: so doth the sense 
" discover natural things, but it darkeneth 
<f and shutteth up divine." And hence it is 
true, that it hath proceeded, that divers great 
learned men have been heretical, whilst they 
have sought to fly up to the secrets of the 
Deity by the waxen wings of the senses : and 
as for the conceit that too much knowledge 
should incline a man to atheism, and that 
the ignorance of second causes, should make 
a more devout dependence upon God who is 
the first cause ; Firsts it is good to ask the 
question which Job asked of his friends: 
Will you lie for God, as one man will do for 
another, to gratify him ? For certain it is, that 
God worketh nothing in nature but by se- 
cond causes ; and if they would have it other- 



17 



wise believed, it is mere imposture, as it were 
in favour towards God ; and nothing else but 
to offer to the author of truth the unclean 
sacrifice of a lie. But farther, it is an as- 
sured truth, and a conclusion of experience, 
that a little or superficial knowledge of phi- 
losophy may incline the mind of man to 
atheism, but a farther proceeding therein 
doth bring the mind back again to religion ; 
for in the entrance of philosophy, when the 
second causes, which are next unto the 
senses, do offer themselves to the mind of 
man, if it dwell and stay there, it may in- 
duce some oblivion of the highest cause ; but 
when a man passeth on farther, and seeth the 
dependence of causes, and the works of pro- 
vidence; then, according to the allegory of 
the poets, he will easily believe that the 
highest link of nature's chain must needs be 
tied to the foot of Jupiter's chair. To con- 
clude therefore: let no man, upon a weak 
conceit of sobriety, or an ill-applied modera- 
tion, think or maintain, that a man can 
search too far, or be too well studied in the 
book of God's word, or in the book of God's 
works; divinity or philosophy; but rather 



18 

let men endeavour an endless progress, or 
proficience in both; only let men beware 
that they apply both to charity, and not to 
swelling; to use, and not to ostentation ; and 
again, that they do not unwisely mingle or 
confound these learnings together. 
ob ecdons of ^ n< ^ as ^ or tne disgraces which learning 
Teamhf 11 10 rece ^ vetn from politicians, they be of this na- 
ture ; that learning doth soften mens minds, 
and makes them more unapt for the honour 
and exercise of arms ; that it doth mar and 
pervert mens dispositions for matter of go- 
vernment and policy, in making them too 
curious and irresolute by variety of reading, 
or too peremptory or positive by strictness 
of rules and axioms, or too immoderate and 
overweening by reason of the greatness of 
examples, or too incompatible and differing 
from the times, by reason of the dissimili- 
tude of examples ; or at least, that it doth 
divert mens travels from action and business, 
and bringeth them to a love of leisure and 
privateness; and that it doth bring into states 
a relaxation of discipline, whilst every man 
is more ready to argue, than to obey and ex- 
ecute. Out of this conceit, Cato, surnamed 



19 

the Censor, one of the wisest men indeed Jjjj^yj 
that ever lived, when Carneades the philoso- and Socrates - 
pher came in embassage to Rome, and that 
the young men of Rome began to flock about 
him, being allured with the sweetness and 
majesty of his eloquence and learning, gave 
counsel in open senate, that they should give 
him his dispatch with all speed, lest he should 
infect and inchant the minds and affections 
of the youth, and at unawares bring in an 
alteration of the manners and customs of the 
state. Out of the same conceit, or humour, 
did Virgil, turning his pen to the advantage 
of his country, and the disadvantage of his 
own profession, make a kind of separation 
between policy and government, and be- 
tween arts and sciences, in the verses so 
much renowned, attributing and challenging 
the one to the Romans, and leaving and yield- 
ing the other to the Grecians ; Tu revere im- 
perio populos, Romane, memento, Hce tibi erunt 
artes, etc. So likewise we see that Anytus, 
the accuser of Socrates, laid it as an article 
of charge and accusation against him, that 
he did, with the variety and power of his dis- 
courses and disputations, withdraw young 
c2 



20 

men from due reverence to the laws and cus- 
toms of their country ; and that he did pro- 
fess a dangerous and pernicious science, 
which was, to make the worse matter seem 
the better, and to suppress truth by force of 
eloquence and speech. 
Arms and But these, and the like imputations, have 

letters flourish 

together. rather a countenance of gravity, than any 
ground of justice : for experience doth war- 
rant, that both in persons and in times, there 
hath been a meeting and concurrence in 
learning and arms, flourishing and excelling 
in the same men, and the same ages. For, 
as for men, there cannot be a better, nor the 
like instance, as of that pair, Alexander the 
Great and Julius Caesar the dictator ; whereof 
the one was Aristotle's scholar in philosophy, 
and the other was Cicero's rival in eloquence : 
or if any man had rather call for scholars that 
were great generals, than generals that were 
great scholars, let him take Epaminondas the 
Theban, or Xenophon the Athenian ; whereof 
the one was the first that abated the power of 
Sparta, and the other was the first that made 
way to the overthrow of the monarchy of Per- 
sia. And this concurrence is yet more visible 



21 

in times than in persons, by how much an age 
is a greater object than a man. For both in 
iEgypt, Assyria, Persia, Grsecia, and Rome, 
the same times that are most renowned for 
arms, are likewise most admired for learn- 
ing ; so that the greatest authors arid philo- 
sophers, and the greatest captains and gover- 
nors, have lived in the same ages. Neither 
can it otherwise be: for as, in man, the ripe- 
ness of strength of the body and mind cometh 
much about an age, save that the strength of 
the body cometh somewhat the more early ; 
so in states, arms and learning, whereof the 
one corresponded to the body, the other to 
the soul of man, have a concurrence or near 
sequence in times. 

And for -matter of policy and government, ^ eaT ^s 

r J ° * equally use- 

that learning should rather hurt, than enable ful in Go r 

° vernment as 

thereunto, is a thing very improbable : we ^ a11 other 
see it is accounted an error to commit a na- 
tural body to empiric physicians, which com- 
monly have a few pleasing receipts, where- 
upon they are confident and adventurous, but 
know neither the causes of diseases, nor the 
complexions of patients, nor peril of acci- 
dents, nor the true method of cures : we see 



m 



it is a like error to rely upon advocates or 
lawyers which are only men of practice, and 
not grounded in their books, who are many 
times easily surprised, when matter falleth 
out besides their experience, to the prejudice 
of the causes they handle: so, by like rea- 
son, it cannot be but a matter of doubtful 
consequence, if states be managed by em- 
piric statesmen, not well mingled with men 
grounded in learning. But contrariwise, it 
is almost without instance contradictory, that 
ever any government was disastrous that was 
in the hands of learned governors. For how- 
soever it hath been ordinary with politic men 
to extenuate and disable learned men by the 
names of pedants ; yet in the records of time 
it appeareth, in many particulars, that the 
governments of princes in minority (not- 
withstanding the infinite disadvantage of that 
kind of state) have nevertheless excelled the 
government of princes of mature age, even 
for that reason which they seek to traduce, 
which is, that by that occasion the state hath 
been in the hands of pedants : for so was the 
state of Rome for the first five years, which 
are so much magnified, during the minority 



## 



of Nero, in the hands of Seneca, a pedant: 
so it was again, for ten years space or 
more, during the minority of Gordianus the 
younger, with great applause and contenta- 
tion in the hands of Misitheus, a pedant: so 
was it before that, in the minority of Alex- 
ander Severus, in like happiness, in hands 
not much unlike, by reason of the rule of the 
women, who were aided by the teachers and 
preceptors. Nay, let a man look into the 
government of the bishops of Rome, as by 
name, into the government of Pius Quintus, 
and Sextus Quintus, in our times, who were 
both at their entrance esteemed but as pe- 
dantical friers, and he shall find that such 
popes do greater things, and proceed upon 
truer principles of state, than those which 
have ascended to the papacy from an educa- 
tion and breeding in affairs of state and 
courts of princes ; for although men bred in 
learning are perhaps to seek in point of con- 
venience, and accommodating for the pre- 
sent, which the Italians call ragioni di stato, 
whereof the same Pius Quintus could not 
hear spoken with patience, terming them in- 
ventions against religion and the moral vir- 



24 

tues; yet on the other side, to recompense 
that, they are perfect in those same plain 
grounds of religion, justice, honour, and mo- 
ral virtue, which if they be well and watch- 
fully pursued, there will be seldom use of 
those other, no more than of physic in a 
sound or well- dieted body. Neither can the 
experience of one man's life furnish exam- 
ples and precedents for the events of one 
man's life : for as it happeneth sometimes 
that the grandchild, or other descendent, re- 
sembleth the ancestor more than the son ; so 
many times occurrences of present times may 
sort better with ancient examples, than with 
those of the latter or immediate times : and 
lastly, the wit of one man can no more coun- 
tervail learning, than one man's means can 
hold way with a common purse. 
Learning af And as for those particular seducements, 

fords greater . t ... r».i • -1 •» t t 

strength of or indispositions ol the mind tor policy and 
cause of in- government, which learning is pretended to 
insinuate; if it be granted that any such 
thing be, it must be remembered withal, that 
learning ministreth in every of them greater 
strength of medicine or remedy, than it of- 
fereth cause of indisposition or infirmity ; for 



25 



if, by a secret operation, it makes men per- 
plexed and irresolute, on the other side, by 
plain precept, it teacheth them when and 
upon what ground to resolve ; yea, and how 
to carry things in suspense without prejudice, 
till they resolve ; if it makes men positive 
and regular, it teacheth them what things 
are in their nature demonstrative, and what 
are conjectural ; and as well the use of dis- 
tinctions and exceptions, as the latitude of 
principles and rules. If it misleads by dis- 
proportion, or dissimilitude of examples, it 
teacheth men the force of circumstances, 
the errors of comparisons, and all the cau- 
tions of application ; so that in all these it 
doth rectify more effectually than it can per- 
vert. And these medicines it conveyeth into 
mens minds much more forcibly by the quick- 
ness and penetration of examples. For let a 
man look into the errors of Clement the 
seventh, so lively described by Guicciardine, 
who served under him, or into the errors of 
Cicero, painted out by his own pencil in his 
epistles to Atticus, and he will fly apace from 
being irresolute. Let him look into the er- 
rors of Phocion, and he will beware how he - 



26 



Learning 
does not in- 
duce sloth- 
fulness. 



be obstinate or inflexible. Let him but read 
the fable of Ixion, and it will hold him from 
being vaporous or imaginative. Let him 
look into the errors of Cato the second, and 
he will never be one of the Antipodes, to 
tread opposite to the present world. 

And for the conceit, that learning should 
dispose men to leisure and privateness, and 
make men slothful; it were a strange thing 
if that, which accustometh the mind to a 
perpetual motion and agitation, should in- 
duce slothfulness ; whereas contrariwise it 
may be truly affirmed, that no kind of men 
love business for itself, but those that are 
learned ; for other persons love it for profit, as 
an hireling, that loves the work for the wages ; 
or for honour, as because it beareth them up 
in the eyes of men, and refresheth their re- 
putation, which otherwise would wear ; or 
because it putteth them in mind of their 
fortune, and giveth them occasion to plea- 
sure and displeasure ; or because it exer- 
ciseth some faculty wherein they take pride, 
and so entertaineth them in good humour and 
pleasing conceits towards themselves ; or be- 
cause it advanceth any other their ends. So 



27 
that, as it is said of untrue valours, that some 
mens valours are in the eyes of them that 
look on; so such mens industries are in the 
eyes of others, or at least in regard of their 
own designments : only learned men love bu- 
siness, as an action according to nature, as 
agreeable to health of mind, as exercise is to 
health of body, taking pleasure in the action 
itself, and not in the purchase : so that of all 
men they are the most indefatigable, if it 
be towards any business which can hold or 
detain their mind. 

And if any man be laborious in reading 
and study, and yet idle in business and ac- 
tion, it groweth from some weakness of body, 
or softness of spirit ; such as Seneca speaketh 
of : Quidam tarn sunt umbratiles, ut putent in 
turbido esse quicquid in luce est; and not of 
learning : well may it be, that such a point 
of a man's nature may make him give him- 
self to learning, but it is not learning that 
breedeth any such point in his nature. 

And that learning should take up too much ah men have 

, . T .. . leisure for 

time or leisure : I answer ; the most active some learn, 
or busy man that hath been or can be, hath, 
no question, many vacant times of leisure, 



28 

while he expecteth the tides and returns' of 
business (except he be either tedious and of 
no dispatch, or lightly and unworthily ambi- 
tious to meddle in things that may be better 
done by others :) and then the question is 
but, how those spaces and times of leisure 
shall be filled and spent ; whether in pleasures 
or in studies; as was well answered by De- 
mosthenes to his adversary iEschines, that 
was a man given to pleasure, and told him, 
that his orations did smell of the lamp : " In- 
" deed," said Demosthenes, " there is a great 
" difference between the things that you and 
" I do by lamp-light." So as no man need 
doubt that learning will expulse business ; but 
rather it will keep and defend the possession 
of the mind against idleness and pleasure, 
which otherwise at unawares may enter, to 
the prejudice of both. 
Learning Again, for that other conceit, that leam- 

does not ° 

favor sedi; j n g should undermine the reverence of laws 

tion. ° 

and government, it is assuredly a mere de- 
pravation and calumny, without any shadow 
of truth. For to say, that a blind custom of 
obedience should be a surer obligation than 
duty taught and understood ; it is to affirm, 



<29 
that a blind man may tread surer by a guide 
than a seeing man can by a light. And it is 
without all controversy, that learning doth 
make the minds of men gentle, generous, 
amiable and pliant to government ; whereas mjuuailc 
ignorance makes them churlish, thwarting, 
and mutinous : and the evidence of time doth 
clear this assertion, considering that the most 
barbarous, rude, and unlearned times have 
been most subject to tumults, seditions, and 
changes. 

And as to the judgment of Cato the Cen- Conjunction 

•I ° or power 

sor, he was well punished for his blasphemy ? vi ^ h learn ~ 
against learning, in the same kind wherein 
he offended ; for when he was past three- 
score years old, he was taken with an ex- 
treme desire to go to school again, and to 
learn the Greek tongue, to the end to peruse 
the Greek authors ; which doth well demon- 
strate, that his former censure of the Grecian ' 
learning was rather an affected gravity, than 
according to the inward sense of his own 
opinion. And as for Virgil's verses, though 
it pleased him to brave the world in taking 
to the Romans the art of empire, and leaving 
to others the arts of subjects; yet so much 



30 



is manifest, that the Romans never ascended 
to that height of empire, till the time they 
had ascended to the height of other arts. 
For in the time of the two first Caesars, which 
had the art of government in greatest per- 
fection, there lived the best poet, Virgilius 
Maro ; the best historiographer, Titus Livius ; 
the best antiquary, Marcus Varro ; and the 
best, or second orator, Marcus Cicero, that 
to the memory of man are known. As for 
the accusation of Socrates, the time must be 
remembered when it was prosecuted; which 
was under the thirty tyrants, the most base, 
bloody, and envious persons that have govern- 
ed; which revolution of state was no sooner 
over, but Socrates, whom they had made a 
person criminal, was made a person heroical, 
and his memory accumulate with honours 
divine and human ; and those discourses of 
his, which were then termed corrupting of 
manners, were after acknowledged for sove- 
reign medicines of the mind and manners, 
and so have been received ever since till this 
day. Let this therefore serve for answer to 
politicians, which, in their humorous seve- 
rity, or in their feigned gravity, have pre- 



31 

sumed to throw imputations upon learning ; 
which redargution, nevertheless, (save that 
we know not whether our labours may ex- 
tend to other ages) were not needful for the 
present, in regard of the love and reverence 
towards learning, which the example and 
countenance of two so learned princes, queen 
Elizabeth, and your majesty, being as Cas- 
tor and Pollux, lucida sidera, stars of excel- 
lent light and most benign influence, hath 
wrought in all men of place and authority in 
our nation. 

Now therefore we come to that third sort 0b j ect ^ ns 
of discredit, or diminution of credit, that f° mYearne& 
groweth unto learning from learned men men ' 
themselves, which commonly cleaveth fastest : 
it is either from their fortune, or from their 
manners, or from the nature of their studies. 
For the first, it is not in their power ; and 
the second is accidental; the third only is 
proper to be handled : but because we are 
not in hand with true measure, but with 
popular estimation and conceit, it is not- 
amiss to speak somewhat of the two former. 
The derogations therefore, which grow to 
learning from the fortune or condition of 



m 

learned men, are either in respect of scarcity 
of means, or in respect of privateness of life, 
and meanness of employments. 
Poverty of Concerning want, and that it is the case of 

learned men. . 

learned men usually to begin with little, and 
not to grow rich so fast as other men, by rea- 
son they convert not their labours chiefly to 
lucre and increase : It were good to leave 
the common place in commendation of po- 
verty to some frier to handle, to whom much 
was attributed by Machiavel in this point; 
when he said, " That the kingdom of the 
" clergy had been long before at an end, 
tc if the reputation and reverence towards 
" the poverty of friers had not borne out 
"'the scandal of the superfluities and ex- 
" cesses of bishops and prelates." So a man 
might say, that the felicity and delicacy of 
princes and great persons had long since 
turned to rudeness and barbarism, if the 
poverty of learning had not kept up civi- 
lity and honour of life : but, without any 
such advantages, it is worthy the observa- 
tion, what a reverend and honoured thing 
poverty of fortune was, for some ages, in 
the Roman state, which nevertheless was a 



53 



state without paradoxes : for we see what 
Titus Livius saith in his introduction : Ccete- 
rum aut me amor negotii suscepti failit, aut 
nulla unquam respublica nee major, nee sane- 
tior, nee bonis exemplis ditior fuit; nee in 
-quam lam serce avaritia luxuriaqus immigra- 
verint ; nee ubi tantus ac tarn diu paupertati 
ac parsimonies honos fuerit. We see like- 
wise, after that the state of Rome was not 
itself, but did degenerate, how that person, 
that took upon him to be counsellor to Julius 
Csesar after his victory, where to begin his 
restoration of the state, maketh it of all 
points the most summary to take away the 
estimation of wealth: Verum hcee, et omnia mala 
pariter cum honore pecunice desinent, si neque ma~ 
gistratus, neque alia vulgocupienda, venalia erunt. 
To conclude this point, as it was truly said, 
that rubor est virtutis color, though sometimes 
it comes from vice ; so it may be fitly said 
that paupertas est virtutis fortuna; though 
sometimes it may proceed from misgovern - 
ment and accident. Surely Solomon hath 
pronounced it both in censure, Qui festinat 
ad divitias non erit insons ; and in precept; 
Buy the truth; and sell it not ; and so of wis- 

D 



34 

dom and knowledge ; judging that means 
were to be spent upon learning, and not 
learning to be applied to means. And as for 
the privateness, or obscureness (as it may 
be in vulgar estimation accounted) of life 
of contemplative men; it is a theme so com- 
mon, to extol a private life not taxed with 
sensuality and sloth, in comparison and to 
the disadvantage of a civil life, for safety, 
liberty, pleasure, and dignity, or at least 
freedom from indignity, as no man handleth 
it, but handleth it well : such a consonancy 
it hath to mens conceits in the expressing, 
and to mens consents in the allowing. This 
only I will add, that learned men forgotten 
in states, and not living in the eyes of men, 
are like the images of Cassius and Brutus 
in the funeral of Junia; of which not be- 
ing represented, as many others were, Ta- 
citus saith, Eo ipso pratfulgehant, quod non 
visebantur. 
Meanness of And for meanness of employment, that 

their iroploy-. 

meat. which is most traduced to contempt is that 

the government of youth is commonly al- 
lotted to them; which age, because it is 
the age of least authority, it is transferred 



35. 



to the disesteeming of those employments 
wherein youth is conversant, and which are 
conversant about youth. But how unjust 
this traducement is (if you will reduce things 
from popularity of opinion to measure of 
reason) may appear in that, we see men are 
more curious what they put into a new ves- 
sel, than into a vessel seasoned; and what 
mould they lay about a young plant, than 
about a plant corroborate ; so as the weakest 
terms and times of all things use to have the 
best applications and helps. And will you 
hearken to the Hebrew Rabbins? Your young 
men shall see visions, and your old men shall 
dream dreams: say they, youth is the wor- 
thier age, for that visions are nearer appari- 
tions of God than dreams. And let it be 
noted, that howsoever the condition of life of 
pedants hath been scorned upon theatres, as 
the ape of tyranny; and that the modern 
looseness or negligence hath taken no due 
regard to the choice of school-masters and 
tutors ; yet the ancient wisdom of the best 
times did always make a just complaint, that 
states were too busy with their laws, and too 
negligent in point of education : which ex- 
d2 



36 

cellent part of ancient discipline hath been 
in some sort revived of late times by the col- 
leges of the Jesuits; of whom, although in 
regard of their superstition I may say, quo 
meliores, eo deter tores; yet in regard of this, 
and some other points concerning human 
learning and moral matters, I may say, as 
Agesilaus said to his enemy Pharnabasus, 
Talis quum sis, utinam noster esses. And thus 
much touching the discredits drawn from the 
fortunes of learned men. 
Manners of ^ s touching the manners of learned men, 

learned men. & 

it is a thing personal and individual : and no 
doubt there be amongst them, as in other 
professions, of all temperatures : but yet so 
as it is not without truth, which is said, that 
abeunt studia in mores, studies have an influ- 
ence and operation upon the manners of 
those that are conversant in them. 

But upon an attentive and indifferent re- 
view, I for my part cannot find any dis- 
grace to learning can proceed from the man- 
ners of learned men not inherent to them as 
they are learned ; except it be a fault (which 
was the supposed fault of Demosthenes, 
Cicero, Cato the second, Seneca, and many 



37 



more) that, because the times they read of 
•are commonly better than the times they 
live in, and the duties taught better than the 
duties practised, they contend sometimes too 
far to bring things to perfection, and to re- 
duce the corruption of manners to honesty 
of precepts, or examples of too great height. 
And yet hereof they have caveats enough in 
their own walks. For Solon, when he was 
asked whether he had given his citizens the 
best laws, answered wisely, "Yea, of such 
as they would receive :" and Plato, finding 
that his own heart could not agree with the 
corrupt manners of his country, refused to 
bear place or office ; saying, " That a man's 
f country was to be used as his parents were, 
" that is, with humble persuasions, and not 
ff with contestations." And Caesar's counsel- 
lor put in the same caveat, Non ad Vetera 
instituta revocans quce jampridem corruptis mo- 
ribus ludibrio sunt : and Cicero noteth this 
error directly in Cato the second, when he 
writes to his friend Atticus; Cato optime 
sentit, sed nocet interdum reipublicce; loquitur 
enim tanquam in republica Platonis, non tan- 
quam in face Romuli. And the same Cicero 



aotii excuse and expuga- the philosophers for 
going too far, and being too exact in their 
prescripts, when he saith, Isti ipsi pmceptores 
■virtutis et magistri viderdur fines qfficiorum paulo 
longius quam natura vellet protulisse, ut cum 
ad ultimum animo contendissemus, ibi tamen, 
ubi oportet, consisteremus : and yet himself 
might hav r e said, Monitis sum minor ipse meis; 
for it was his own fault, though not in so ex* 
treme a degree. 
disinterested Another fault likewise much of this kind 

counsels of 

learned men. hath been incident to learned men ; which 
is, that they have esteemed the preservation, 
good and honour of their countries or masters 
before their own fortunes or safeties. For 
so saith Demosthenes unto the Athenians: 
" If it please you to note it, my counsels 
" unto you are not such whereby I should 
c< grow great amongst you, and you become 
<* little amongst the Grecians : but they be 
" of that nature, as they are sometimes not 
€t good for me to give, but are always good 
<e for you to follow." And so Seneca, after 
he had consecrated that Quinquennium Nero- 
nis to the eternal glory of learned governors, 
held on his honest and loyal course of good 



39 



and free counsel, after his master grew ex- 
tremely corrupt in his government. Neither 
can this point otherwise be ; for learning en- 
dueth mens minds with a true sense of the 
frailty of their persons, the casualty of their 
fortunes, and the dignity of their soul and 
vocation : so that it is impossible for them to 
esteem that any greatness of their own for- 
tune can be a true or worthy end of their be- 
ing and ordainment ; and therefore are de- 
sirous to give their account to God, and so 
likewise to their masters under God (as kings 
and the states that they serve) in these words; 
Ecee tibi lucrefeci, and not Ecce mihi lucrefeci: 
whereas the corrupter sort of mere politicians, 
that have not their thoughts established by 
learning in the love and apprehension of duty, 
nor ever look abroad into universality, do refer 
all things to themselves, and thrust themselves 
into the centre of the world, as if all lines 
should meet in them and their fortunes; 
never caring, in all tempests, what becomes 
of the ship of state, so they may save them- 
selves in the cockboat of their own fortune : 
whereas men that feel the weight of duty, 
and know the limits of self-love, use to make 
good their places and duties, though with 



40 

peril; and if they stand in seditious and 
Violent alterations, it is rather the reverence 
which many times both adverse parties do 
give to honesty, than any versatile advantage 
of their own carriage. But for this point of 
tender sense, and fast obligation of duty, 
which learning doth endue the mind withal, 
howsoever fortune may tax it, and many in 
the depth of their corrupt principles may de- 
spise it, yet it will receive an open allowance, 
and therefore needs the less disproof or ex- 
cusation. 

Learned men Another fault incident commonly to learn- 
not sycophan- J 

tlc * ed men, which may be more probably de- 

fended than truly denied, is that they fail 
sometimes in applying themselves to particu- 
lar persons : which want of exact application 
ariseth from two causes ; the one, because 
the largeness of their mind can hardly con- 
fine itself to dwell in the exquisite observa- 
tion or examination of the nature and cus- 
toms of one person : for it is a speech for a 
lover, and not for a wise man : Satis magnum 
alter alteri iheatrum sumus. Nevertheless I 
shall yield, that he that cannot contract the 
sight of his mind, as well as disperse and 
dilate it, wanteth a great faculty. But there 



41 

is a second cause, which is no inability, but 
a rejection upon choice and judgment; for 
the honest and just bounds of observation, 
by one person upon another, extend no far- 
ther but to understand him sufficiently, 
whereby not to give him offence, or whereby 
to be able to give him faithful counsel, or 
whereby to stand upon reasonable guard and 
caution in respect of a man's self: but to 
be speculative into another man, to the end 
to know how to work him or wind him or 
govern him, proceedeth from a heart that is 
double and cloven, and not entire and inge- 
nuous ; which as in friendship it is want of 
integrity, so towards princes or superiors is 
want of duty. For the custom of the Levant, 
which is, that subjects do forbear to gaze or 
fix their eyes upon princes, is in the outward 
ceremony barbarous, but the moral is good : 
for men ought not by cunning and bent ob- 
servations to pierce and penetrate into the 
hearts of kings, which the scripture hath de- 
clared to be inscrutable. 

There is vet another fault (with which I } e f rned m ™ 

J v fail 111 small 

will conclude this part) which is often noted j^ 8 of con ' 
in learned men, that they do many times fail 



42 



to observe decency and discretion in their 
behaviour and carriage, and commit errors 
in small and ordinary points of action, so as 
the vulgar sort of capacities do make a judg- 
ment of them in greater matters by that 
which they find wanting in them in smaller. 
But this consequence doth often deceive men, 
for which I do refer them over to that which 
was said by Themistocles, arrogantly and 
uncivilly being applied to himself out of his 
own mouth ; but, being applied to the gene- 
ral state of this question, pertinently and 
justly ; when, being invited to touch a lute, 
he said, " he could not fiddle, but he could 
" make a small town a great state." So, no 
doubt, many may be well seen in the pas- 
sages of government and policy, which are 
to seek in little and punctual occasions. I 
refer them also to that which Plato said of 
his master Socrates, whom he compared to the 
gallypots of apothecaries, which on the out- 
side had apes and owls and antiques, but con- 
tained within sovereign and precious liquors 
and confections; acknowledging that to an 
external report he was not without superficial 
levities and deformities, but was inwardly re- 



43 

plenished with excellent virtues and powers* 
And so much touching the point of manners 
of learned men. 

But in the mean time I have no purpose Morigeratiaa 

of the leam- 
tO give allowance to some conditions and ed to the 

great, how 

courses base and unworthy, wherein divers fer allowable. 
professors of learning have wronged them- 
selves* and gone too far ; such as were those 
trencher philosopers, which in the later age 
of the Roman state were usually in the houses 
of great persons, being little better than so- 
lemn parasites ; of which kind, Lucian maketh 
a merry description of the philosopher that the 
great lady took to ride with her in her coach, 
and would needs have him carry her little 
dog, which he doing officiously and yet un- 
comely, the page scoffed, and said, " That 
" he doubted, the philosopher of a Stoic 
" would turn to be Cynic." But above all 
the rest> the gross and palpable flattery, 
whereunto many not unlearned have abased 
and abused their wits and pens, turning, as 
Du Bartas saith> Hecuba into Helena, and 
Faustina into Lucretia, hath most diminished 
the price and estimation of learning. Nei- 
ther is the modern dedication of books and 



44 



writings, as to patrons, to be commended: 
for that books, such as are worthy the name 
of books, ought to have no patrons but truth 
and reason. And the ancient custom was, 
to dedicate them only to private and equal 
friends, or to intitle the books with their 
names ; or if to kings and great persons, it 
was to some such as the argument of the 
book was fit and proper for : but these and 
the like courses may deserve rather repre- 
hension than defence. 

Not that I can tax or condemn the mori- 
geration or application of learned men to 
men in fortune. For the answer was good 
that Diogenes made to one that asked him in 
mockery, " How it came to pass that philo- 
" sophers were the followers of rich men, 
" and not rich men of philosophers?" He 
answered soberly, and yet sharply, " Be- 
" cause the one sort knew what they had 
" need of, and the other did not/' And of 
the like nature was the answer which Ari- 
stippus made, when having a petition to 
Dionysius, and no ear given to him, he fell 
down at his feet 5 whereupon Dionysius staid, 
and gave him the hearing, and granted it ; 



45 



and afterward some person, tender on the 
behalf of philosophy, reproved Aristippus, 
that he would offer the profession of philo- 
sophy such an indignity, as for a private suit 
to fall at a tyrant's feet : but he answered, 
" It was not his fault, but it was the fault of 
Dionysius that he had his ears in his feet." 
Neither was it accounted weakness, but dis- 
cretion in him that would not dispute his 
best with Adrianus Csesar; excusing him- 
self, " That it was reason to yield to him 
" that commanded thirty legions." These 
and the like applications, and stooping to 
points of necessity and convenience, cannot 
be disallowed : for though they may have 
some outward baseness, yet in a judgment 
truly made, they are to be accounted submis* 
sions to the occasion, and not to the person. 

THREE DISTEMPERS OF LEARNING. 

Now I proceed to those errors and vani- 
ties which have intervened amongst the stu- 
dies themselves of the learned, which is that 
which is principal and proper to the present 
argument ; wherein my purpose is not to 



4G 



make a justification of the errors, but, by a 
censure and separation of the errors, to make 
a justification of that which is good and 
sound, and to deliver that from the asper- 
sion of the other. For we see, that it is the 
manner of men to scandalize and deprave 
that which retaineth the state and virtue, by 
taking advantage upon that which is corrupt 
and degenerate : as the heathens in the pri- 
mitive church used to blemish and taint the 
Christians with the faults and corruptions of 
hereticks. But nevertheless I have no mean- 
ing at this time to make any exact animad- 
version of the errors and impediments in 
matters of learning, which are more secret 
and remote from vulgar opinion, but only to 
speak unto such as do fall under or near 
unto a popular observation. 

There be therefore chiefly three vanities in 
studies, whereby learning hath been most 
traduced. For those things we do esteem 
vain, which are either false or frivolous, those 
which either have no truth, or no use : and 
those persons we esteem vain, which are either 
credulous or curious ; and curiosity is either 
iu matter or words : so that in reason, as well 



47 

as in experience, there fall out to be these 
three distempers, as T may term them, of 
learning ; the first, fantastical learning ; the 
second, contentious learning ; and the last, 
delicate learning ; vain imaginations, vain 
altercations, and vain affectation ; and with 
the last I will begin, 

Martin Luther, conducted no doubt by an of de ^' cate 
higher providence, but in discourse of reason, ^^affecS 
finding what a province he had undertaken Uons * 
against the bishop of Rome and the degene- 
rate traditions of the church, and finding his 
own solitude, being no ways aided by the 
opinions of his own time, was enforced to 
awake all antiquity, and to call former times 
to his succour, to make a party against the 
present time. So that the ancient authors, 
both in divinity and in humanity, which had 
long time slept in libraries, began generally 
to be read and revolved. This by conse- 
quence did draw on a necessity of a more 
exquisite travel in the languages original, 
wherein those authors did write, for the bet- 
ter understanding of those authors, and the 
better advantage of pressing and applying 
their words. And thereof grew again a delight 



48 

in their manner of style and phrase, and an 
admiration of that kind of writing ; which 
was much furthered and precipitated by the 
enmity and opposition that the propounders 
of those primitive, but seeming new opi- 
nions had against the schoolmen ; who were 
generally of the contrary part, and whose 
writings were altogether in a differing stile 
and form, taking liberty to coin and frame" 
new terms of art to express their own sense, ^ 
and to avoid circuit of speech, without regard^ -o 
to the pureness, pleasantness, and, as I may 
call it, lawfulness of the phrase or word. 
The study And again, because the great labour then was 

of eloquence 

promoted by w ith the people, (of whom the Pharisees were 

four causes. A 

wont to say, Execrabilis ista turba, quiz non 
novit legem } ) for the winning and persuading 
of them, there grew of necessity in chief 
price and request eloquence and variety of 
discourse, as the fittest and forciblest access 
into the capacity of the vulgar sort : so that 
these four causes concurring, the admiration 
of ancient authors, the hate of the school- 
men, the exact study of languages, and the 
efficacy of preaching, did bring in an affect- 
aftfectionxte ed study of eloquence and copia of speech, 



49 

which then began to flourish. This grew 
speedily to an excess ; for men began to hunt 
more after words than matter ; and more 
after the choiceness of the phrase, and the 
round and clean composition of the sen- 
tence, and the sweet falling of the clauses, 
and the varying and illustration of their 
works with tropes and figures, than after the 

^> weight of matter, worth of subject, sound- 
ness of argument, life of invention, or depth 

^ of judgment. Then grew the flowing and 
watry vein of Osorius, the Portugal bishop, 
to be in price. Then did Sturm ius spend 
such infinite and curious pains upon Cicero 
the orator, and Hermogenes the rhetorician, 
besides his own books of periods, and imi- 
tation, and the like. Then did Car of Cam- 
bridge, and Ascham, with their lectures and 
writings, almost deify Cicero and Demosthe- 
nes, and allure all young men, that were 
studious, unto that delicate and polished kind 
of learning. Then did Erasmus take occasion 
to make the scoffing echo ; Decern annos con* 
sumpsi in legendo Cicerone : and the echo an- 
swered in Greek, "ovs, Asine. Then grew the 
learning of the schoolmen to be utterly de- 

E 



m 

spised as barbarous. In sum, the whole in- 
clination and bent of those times was rather 
towards copid than weight. 

Here therefore is the first distemper of 
learning, when men study words, and not 
matter : whereof though I have represented 
an example of late times, yet it hath been, 
and will be secundum majus et minus in all 
time. And how is it possible but this should 
have an operation to discredit learning, even 
with vulgar capacities, when they see learn- 
ed men's works like the first letter of a pa- 
tent or limned book ; which though it hath 
large flourishes, yet it is but a letter? It 
seems to me that Pygmalion's frenzy is a 
good emblem or portraiture of this vanity : 
for words are but the images of matter; and 
except they have life of reason and inven- 
tion, to fall in love with them is all one as 
to fall in love with a picture. 
How far eio« But yet, notwithstanding, it is a thing not 
fee useful. hastily to be condemned, to clothe and adorn 
the obscurity, even of philosophy itself, with 
sensible and plausible elocution ; for hereof 
we have great examples in Xenophon, Cicero, 
Seneca, Plutarch, and of Plato also in some 



51 

degree; and hereof likewise there is great use : 
for surely, to the severe inquisition of truth, 
and the deep progress into philosophy, it is 
some hindrance ; because it is too early satis- 
factory to the mind of man, and quencheth 
the desire of farther search, before we come 
to a just period: but then if a man be to 
have any use of such knowledge in civil oc- 
casions, of conference, counsel, persuasion, 
discourse, or the like ; then shall he find it 
prepared to his hands in those authors which 
write in that manner. But the excess of this 
is so justly contemptible, that as Hercules, 
when he saw the image of Adonis, Venus' s 
minion, in a temple, said in disdain, Nil 
sacri es ; so there is none of Hercules's fol- 
lowers in learning, that is, the more severe 
and laborious sort of inquirers into truth, but 
will despise those delicacies and affectations, 
as indeed capable of no divineness, And thus 
much of the first disease or distemper of 
learning. 

The second, which followeth, is in nature $• 

^ Of content!- 

worse than the former : for as substance of °us learning, 

or vain alter 

matter is better than beauty of words, so, cations. 
contrariwise, vain matter is worse than vain 



52 

words; wherein it seemeth the reprehen- 
sion of St. Paul was not only proper for those 
times, but prophetical for the times follow- 
ing ; and not only respective to divinity, but 
extensive to all knowledge : Demta profanas 
vocum novitates, et oppositiones falsi nominis 
scientice. For he assigneth two marks and 
Marks of badges of suspected and falsified science : the 

raise science. 

one, the novelty and strangeness of terms ; 
the other, the strictness of positions, which 
of necessity doth induce oppositions, and so 
questions and altercations. Surely, like as 
many substances in nature, which are solid, 
do putrify and corrupt into worms; so it is 
the property of good and sound knowledge, 
to putrify and dissolve into number of subtle, 
idle, unwholesome, and, as I may term them, 
vermiculate questions, which have indeed a 
kind of quickness, and life of spirit, but no 
soundness of matter, or goodness of quality. 
This kind of degenerate learning did chiefly 
reign amongst the schoolmen ; who having 
sharp and strong wits, and abundance of lei- 
sure, and small variety of reading, (but their 
wits being shut up in the cells of a few au- 
thors, chiefly Aristotle their dictator, as their 



53 

persons were shut up in the cells of monas- 
teries and colleges,) and knowing little history, 
either of nature or time, did out of no great 
quantity of matter, and infinite agitation of 
wit, spin out unto us those laborious webs 
of learning, which are extant in their books. 
For the wit and mind of man, if it work 
upon matter, which is the contemplation of 
the creatures of God, worketh according to 
the stuffy and is limited thereby : but if it 
work upon itself, as the spider worketh his 
web, then it is endless, and brings forth in- 
deed cobwebs of learning, admirable for the 
fineness of thread and work, but of no sub- 
stance or profit. 

The same unprofitable subtilty or curiosity Two kinds 

r J J of unprofit- 

is of two sorts; either in the subject itself able subtlety. 
that they handle, when it is a fruitless specu- 
lation or controversy, whereof there are no 
small number both in divinity and philosophy ; 
or in the manner or method of handling of a 
knowledge, which amongst them was this ; 
upon every particular position or assertion 
to frame objections, and to those objec- 
tions, solutions ; which solutions were for the 
most part not confutations, but distinctions ; 



54 



whereas indeed the strength of all sciences 
is, as the strength of the old man's faggot* 
in the band* For the harmony of a science* 
supporting each part the other, is and ought 
to be the true and brief confutation and sup- 
pression of all the smaller sort of objections. 
But> on the other side, if you take out every 
axiom, as the sticks of the faggot, one by 
one, you may quarrel with them, and bend 
them, and break them at your pleasure : so 
that as was said of Seneca, Verhorum minutiis 
rerum frangit ponder a : so a man may truly 
say of the schoolmen, Qucestionum minutiis 
scientiarum frangunt soliditatem. For were it 
not better for a man in a fair room to set 
up one great lights or branching candlestick 
of lights* than to go about with a small watch 
candle into every corner ? And such is their 
method, that rests not so much upon evi- 
dence of truth proved by arguments* author 
rities, similitudes> examples, as upon parti- 
cular confutations and solutions of every scru- 
ple, cavillation, and objection ; breeding for 
the most part one question, as fast as it solveth 
another ; even as in the former resemblance, 
when you carry the light into one corner* 



you darken the f est : so that the fable and 
fiction of Scylla seemeth to be a lively image 
of this kind of philosophy or knowledge ; who 
was transformed into a comely virgin for the 
upper parts ; but then, Candida succinctam, 
latrantibus inguina monstris: so the generali- 
ties of the schoolmen are for a while good and 
proportionable ; but then, when you descend 
into their distinctions and decisions, instead 
of a fruitful womb, for the use and benefit of 
man's life, they end in monstrous altercations 
and barking questions. So as it is not possible 
but this quality of knowledge must fall under 
popular contempt, the people being apt to 
contemn truth upon occasion of controversies 
and altercations, and to think they are all out 
of their way which never meet : and when 
they see such digladiation about subtilties, 
and matters of no use or moment, they 
easily fall upon that judgment of Dionysius 
of Syracuse, Verba ista sunt senum otiosorum* 

Notwithstanding, certain it is that if those 
schoolmen, to their great thirst of truth 
and unwearied travel of wit, had joined va- 
riety and universality of reading and con- 
templation, they had proved excellent lights, 



56 

to the great advancement of all learning and 
knowledge ; but as they are, they are great 
undertakers indeed, and fierce with dark 
keeping t but as in the inquiry of the divine 
truth, their pride inclined to leave the oracle 
of God's word, and to vanish in the mixture 
of their own inventions ; so in the inquisi* 
tion of nature, they ever left the oracle of 
God's works, and adored the deceiving and 
deformed images, which the unequal mirror 
of their own minds, or a few received authors 
or principles, did represent unto them. And 
thus much for the second disease of learn- 
ing, 
s. For the third vice or disease of learning, 

Of fantastical > m 

learning or which concerneth deceit or untruth, it is of 

vain imagina- 
tions, all the rest the foulest; as that which doth 

destroy the essential form of knowledge, 

which is nothing but a representation of 

truth ; for the truth of being and the truth 

of knowing are one, differing no more than 

the direct beam and the beam reflected. 

This vice therefore brancheth itself into two 

sorts ; delight in deceiving, and aptness to be 

deceived; imposture and credulity; which, 

although they appear to be of a diverse na- 



57 

txire, the one seeming to proceed of cun* 
ning, and the other of simplicity, yet cer- 
tainly they do for the most part concur : for 
as the verse noteth, 

Percontatorem fugito, nam garrulus idem est : 
an inquisitive man is a prattler : so upon the 
like reason, a credulous man is a deceiver t 
as we see it in fame, that he that will easily 
believe rumours, will as easily augment ru- 
mours, and add somewhat to them of his 
own ; which Tacitus wisely noteth, when he 
saith, Fingunt simul creduntque : so great an 
affinity hath fiction and belief. 

This facility of credit, and accepting or Two kinds of 

, . . -, . , , , . f credulity. 

admitting things weakly authorized or war* 
ranted, is of two kinds, according to the sub- 
ject: for it is either a belief of history, as the 
lawyers speak 3 matter of fact ; or else of mat- 
ter of art and opinion. As to the former, we 
see the experience and inconvenience of this 
error in ecclesiastical history ; which hath too 
easily received and registered reports and 
narrations of miracles wrought by martyrs, 
hermits, or monks of the desart, and other 
holy men, and their relicks, shrines, chapels, 
and images: which though they had a pas- 



58 

sage for time, by the ignorance of the peo* 
pie, the superstitious simplicity of some, and 
the politic toleration of others holding them 
but as divine poesies ; yet after a period of 
time, when the mist began to clear up, they 
grew to be esteemed but as old wives' fables, 
impostures of the clergy, illusions of spirits, 
and badges of antichrist, to the great scan- 
dal and detriment of religion* 

So in natural history, we see there hath 
not been that choice and judgment used as 
ought to have been ; as may appear in the 
writings of Plinius, Cardanus, Albertus, and 
divers of the Arabians, being fraught with 
much fabulous matter, a great part not only- 
untried, but notoriously untrue* to the great 
derogation of the credit of natural philosophy 
with the grave and sober kind of wits: 
Diligence and wherein the wisdom and integrity of Aris- 
Aristotie. totle is worthy to be observed, that, having 
made so diligent and exquisite a history of 
living creatures, hath mingled it sparingly 
with any vain or feigned matter: and yet, 
on the other side, hath cast all prodigious 
narrations, which he thought worthy the re- 
cording, into one book : excellently discern- 



59 

ing that matter of manifest truth, (such, 
whereupon observation and rule was to be 
built,) was not to be mingled or weakened 
with matter of doubtful credit; and yet 
again, that rarities and reports that seem in- 
credible are not to be suppressed or denied 
to the memory of men. 

And as for the facility of credit which is Undue credit 

given to arts. 

yielded to arts and opinions, it is likewise of 
two kinds ; either when too much belief is 
attributed to the arts themselves, or to cer- 
tain authors in any art. The sciences them- 
selves* which have had better intelligence 
and confederacy with the imagination of 
man than with his reason, are three in 
number; astrology, natural magic, and al- 
chemy; of which sciences, nevertheless, the 
ends or pretences are noble. For astrology 
pretendeth to discover that correspondence 
or concatenation, which is between the su- 
perior globe and the inferior : natural ma- 
gic pretendeth to call and reduce natural phi- 
losophy from variety of speculations to the 
magnitude of works: and alchemy pre- 
tendeth to make separation of all the unlike 
parts of bodies, which in mixtures of nature 



60 

are incorporate. But the derivations and 
prosecutions to these ends, both in the theo- 
ries and in the practices, are full of error 
and vanity ; which the great professors them-* 
selves have sought to veil over and conceal 
by enigmatical writings, and referring them* 
selves to auricular traditions and such other 
devices, to save the credit of impostors : and 
yet surely to alchemy this right is due, that 
it may be compared to the husbandman 
whereof iEsop makes the fable ; that, when 
he died, told his sons, that he had left unto 
them gold buried under ground in his vine- 
yard ; and they digged over all the ground, 
and gold they found none ; but by reason of 
their stirring and digging the mould about 
the roots of their vines, they had a great vin- 
tage the year following: so assuredly the 
search and stir to make gold hath brought to 
light a great number of good and fruitful in* 
ventions and experiments* as well for the 
disclosing of nature, as for the use of man's 
life, 
trndue credit Aftd as to the overmuch credit that hath 
Suthor^. been given unto authors in sciences, in mak- 
ing them dictators, that their words should 



61 



stand ; and not consuls, to give advice ; the 
damage is infinite that sciences have re- 
ceived thereby, as the principal cause that 
hath kept them low, at a stay, without growth 
or advancement. For hence it hath come, 
that in arts mechanical the first deviser 
comes shortest, and time addeth and per- 
fecteth: but in sciences the first author 
goeth farthest, and time loseth and cor- 
rupted]. So we see, artillery, sailing, print- 
ing, and the like, were grossly managed at 
the first, and by time accommodated and re- 
fined : but contrariwise, the philosophies and 
sciences of Aristotle, Plato, Democritus, 
Hippocrates, Euclides, Archimedes, of most 
vigour at the first, are by time degenerate 
and imbased ; whereof the reason is no other, 
butf that in the former many wits and indus- 
tries have contributed in one; and in the 
latter many wits and industries have been 
spent about the wit of some one, whom 
many times they have rather depraved than il- 
lustrated. For as water will not ascend higher 
than the level of the first spring-head from 
whence it descendeth, so knowledge derived 
from Aristotle, and exempted from liberty 



62 



of examination, will not rise again higher 
than the knowledge of Aristotle. And there- 
fore although the position be good, Oportet 
discentem credere; yet it must be coupled 
with this, Oportet edoctum judicare; for dis- 
ciples do owe unto masters only a temporary 
belief, and a suspension of their own judg- 
ment till they be fully instructed, and not 
an absolute resignation, or perpetual cap- 
tivity : and therefore, to conclude this point, 
I will say no more, but so let great authors 
have their due, as time, which is the author 
of authors, be not deprived of his due, which 
is, farther and farther to discover truth. 



VARIOUS ERRORS IN THE PURSUIT OF 
LEARNING. 

Thus I have gone over these three diseases 
of learning; besides the which, there are 
some other rather peccant humours than 
formed diseases ; which nevertheless are not 
so secret and intrinsic, but that they fall un- 
der a popular observation and traducement, 
and therefore are not to be passed over. 



63 

The first of these is the extreme affecting: „ *•. 

Affectation of 

of two extremities; the one antiquity, the antiquity; osl 
other novelty : wherein it seemeth the chil- 
dren of time do take after the nature and ma- 
lice of the father. For as he devoureth his 
children, so one of them seeketh to devour 
and suppress the other ; while antiquity en- 
vieth there should be new additions, and no- 
velty cannot be content to add, but it must 
deface : surely, the advice of the prophet is 
the true direction in this matter, State super vias 
antiquasy et videte quamam sit via recta et bona, 
et ambulate in ea. Antiquity deserveth that re- 
verence, that men should make a stand there- 
upon, and discover what is the best way; 
but when the discovery is well taken, then to 
make progression. And to speak truly, An- 
tiquitas mculi juventus mundi: These times 
are the ancient times, when the world is an- 
cient, and not those which we account an- 
cient ordine retrograde, by a computation 
backward from ourselves. 

Another error, induced by the former, is 2. 

Despair of 1 

a distrust that any thing should be now to new truths. 
be found out, which the world should have 
missed and passed over so long time ; as if the 



6i 



same objection were to be made to time, that 
Lucian maketh to Jupiter and other the hea~ 
then gods ; of which he wondereth that they 
begot so many children in old time, and begot 
none in his time ; and asketh whether they 
were become septuagenary, or whether the 
law Papia, made against old men's marriages, 
had restrained them. So it seemeth men 
doubt lest time is become past children and 
generation; wherein, contrariwise, we see 
commonly the levity and inconstancy of 
men's judgments, which till a matter be done* 
Wonder that it can be done ; and, as soon as 
it is done, wonder again that it was no 
sooner done ; as we see in the expedition 
of Alexander into Asia, which at first was 
prejudged as a vast and impossible enter- 
prise : and yet afterwards it pleaseth Livy to 
make no more of it than this ; Nil aliud qudm 
bene ausus est vanq contemnere : and the same 
Jiappened to Columbus in the western navi* 
gation. But in intellectual matters it is much 
more common ; as may be seen in most of 
the propositions of Euclid: which till they be 
demonstrated, they seem strange to our as- 
lent j but being Remonstrated, our mind ac«* 



65 

cepteth of them by a kind of relation, as the 
lawyers speak, as if we had known them 
before. 

Another error, that hath also some affinity „ ,. 3 - 

' J Reliance on 

with the former, is a conceit that of former received opi 
opinions or sects, after variety and examina- 
tion, the best hath still prevailed, and sup- 
pressed the rest : so as, if a man should be- 
gin the labour of a new search, he were but 
like to light upon somewhat formerly re- 
jected, and by rejection brought into obli^ 
vion : as if the multitude, or the wisest, for 
the multitude's sake, were not ready to give 
passage rather to that which is popular and 
superficial, than to that which is substantial 
and profound : for the truth is, that time 
seemeth to be of the nature of a river or 
stream, which earrieth down to us that which 
is light and blown up, and sinketh and 
drowneth that which is weighty and solid. 
. Another error, of a diverse nature from all 4. 

. Reducing 

the former, is the over early and peremptory knowledge 

A J into methods. 

reduction of knowledge into arts and me- 
thods ; from which time commonly sciences 
receive small or no augmentation. But as 
young men, when they knit and shape per- 



fectly, do seldom grow to a farther stature ; 
so knowledge, while it is in aphorisms and 
observations, it is in growth ; but when it 
once is comprehended in exact methods, it 
may perchance be farther polished and illus^ 
trated, and accommodated for use and prac- 
tice ; but it increaseth no more in bulk and 
substance. 
5. Another error w 7 hich doth succeed that 

TSTeglect of . 

universal phi- which we last mentioned, is, that after the 

losophy. 

distribution of particular arts and sciences, 
men have abandoned universality, or philoso- 
pliia prima; which cannot but cease and 
stop all progression. For no perfect disco- 
very can be made upon a flat or a level : nei- 
ther is it possible to discover the more re- 
mote and deeper parts of any science, if you 
stand but upon the level of the same science, 
and ascend not to a higher science. 
6. Another error hath proceeded from too 

inteiiectu- 16 great a reverence, and a kind of adoration 
of the mind and understanding of man ; by 
means whereof, men have withdrawn them- 
selves too much from the contemplation of 
nature, and the observations of experience, 
and have tumbled up and down in their own 
reason and conceits. Upon these intellect 



alists. 



67 

tualists; which are, notwithstanding, com- 
monly taken for the most sublime and divine 
philosophers, Heraclitus gave a just censure, 
saying, " Men sought truth in their own 
i( little worlds, and not in the great and com-^ 
" mon world ;" for they disdain to spell, and 
so by degrees to read in the volume of God's 
works ; and contrariwise, by continual medi^ 
tation and agitation of wit, do urge and as 
it were invocate their own spirits to divine, 
and give oracles unto them, whereby they 
are deservedly deluded. 

Another error that hath some connexion y 

. , , . , "i i t Intermixture 

wvth this latter, is tnat men have used to in- of favourite 
feet their meditations, opinions, and doc^ 
trines, with some conceits which they have 
most admired, or some sciences which they 
have most applied ; and given all things else 
a tincture according to them, utterly untrue 
and improper. So hath Plato intermingled 
his philosophy with theology, and Aristotle 
with logic ; and the second school of Plato, 
Proclus and the rest, with the mathematics, 
For these were the arts which had a kind of 
primogeniture with them severally. So have 
the alchemists made a philosophy out of a 
f2 



6S 



8. 

Bogmatism, 



Perempto- 

ffiacss. 



few experiments of the furnace ; and Gilber- 
tus, our countryman, hath made a philoso- 
phy out of the observations of a loadstone. 
So Cicero, when, reciting the several opi- 
nions of the nature of the soul, he found a 
musician that held the soul was but a har- 
mony, saith pleasantly, Hie ab arte sua non 
recessit, etc. But of these conceits Aristotle 
speaketh seriously and wisely, when he 
saith, Qui respieiunt ad pauca de facili pro* 
nunciant. 

Another error is an impatience of doubt, 
and haste to assertion without due and ma- 
ture suspension of judgment. For the two 
ways of contemplation are not unlike the two 
ways of action, commonly spoken of by the 
ancients; the one plain and smooth in the 
beginning, and in the end impassable; the 
other rough and troublesome in the entrance, 
but after a while fair and even : so it is con- 
templation ; if a man will begin with certain- 
ties, he shall end in doubts ; but if he will be 
content to begin with doubts, he shall end in 
certainties. 

Another error is in the manner of the tra- 
dition and delivery of knowledge, which is 



69 

for the most part magisterial and peremp- 
tory, and not ingenuous and faithful; in a 
sort as may be soonest believed, and not 
easiliest examined. It is true, that in com- 
pendious treatises for practice, that form is 
not to be disallowed. But in the true hand- 
ling of knowledge, men ought not to fall 
either, on the one side, into the vein of Vel- 
leius the Epicurean : Nil tain metuens, qudm 
ne dubitare aliqua de re videretur : nor, on the 
other side, into Socrates his ironical doubting 
of all things ; but to propound things sin- 
cerely, with more or less asseveration, as they 
stand in a man's own judgment proved more 
or less, 

Other errors there are in the scope that iu-judged 
men propound to themselves, whereunto they 
bend their endeavours : for whereas the 
more constant and devote kind of professors 
of any science ought to propound to them- 
selves to make some additions to their science, 
they convert their labours to aspire to cer- 
tain second prizes : as to be a profound in- 
terpreter or commentator; to be a sharp 
champion or defender; to be a methodical 
compounder or abridger ; and so the patrr* 



70 

inony of knowledge cometh t'6 be sometimes 
improved, but seldom augmented. 
Mistake of ^ ut ^ e £ reatest error of all the rest, is 
pur "scT^ 3 ^ e m i s ^ a,Km g or misplacing of the last or 
farthest end of knowledge i for men have 
entered into a desire of learning and know^ 
ledge, sometimes upon a natural curiosity, 
and inquisitive appetite ; sometimes to en- 
tertain their minds with variety and delight ; 
sometimes for ornament and reputation; and 
sometimes to enable them to victory of wit 
and contradiction ; and most times for lucre 
and profession ; and seldom sincerely to give 
a true account of their gift of reason, to the 
benefit and use of men : as if there were 
sought in knowledge a couch, whereupon to 
rest a searching and restless spirit ; or a terras, 
for a wandering and variable mind to walk 
up and down with a fair prospect ; or a tower 
of state, for a proud mind to raise itself upon ; 
or a fort or commanding ground> for strife 
and contention; or a shop* for profit or 
sale ; and not a rich storehouse, for the 
glory of the Creator, and the relief of man's 
iiowtbpur^ estate. But this is that which will indeed 

sue know- 

ledge. dignify and exalt knowledge, if contenipla- 



71 



lion and action may be more nearly and 
straitly conjoined and united together than 
they have been; a conjunction like unto 
that of the two highest planets, Saturn, the 
planet of rest and contemplation* and Jupi- 
ter, the planet of civil society and action : 
howbeit, I do not mean> when I speak of 
Use and action, that end before-mentioned 
of the applying of knowledge to lucre and 
profession ; for I am not ignorant how much 
that diverteth and interrupteth the prose- 
cution and advancement of knowledge, like 
unto the golden ball thrown before Atalanta, 
which while she goeth aside and stoopeth 
to take up, the race is hindered; 

Declinat cursus, aurumque volubile tdllit. 

Neither is my meaning, as was spoken of 
Socrates* to call philosophy down from heaven 
to converse upon the earth ; that is, to leave 
natural philosophy aside, and to apply know- 
ledge only to manners and policy. But as 
both heuven and earth do conspire and 
contribute to the use and benefit of man; 
so the end ought to be* from both philoso* 
phies to separate and reject vain speculat- 
ions, and whatsoever is empty and void^ 



n 



and to preserve and augment whatsoever .is 
solid and fruitful : that knowledge may not 
be, as a courtesan, for pleasure and vanity 
only, or as a bond-woman, to acquire and 
gain to her master's use ; but as a spouse^ 
for generation, fruit, and comfort. 



OF THE DIGNITY OF KNOWLEDGE 

Thus have I described and opened, as by 
a kind of dissection, those peccant humours, 
the principal of them, which have not only 
given impediment to the proficience of learn- 
ing, but have given also occasion to the tra- 
ducement thereof : wherein if I have been 
too plain, it must be remembered, Fidelia 
bulnera amantis, sed dohsa oscida malignantis. 

This, I think, I have gained> that I ought 
to be the better believed in that which I 
shall say pertaining to commendation; be- 
cause I have proceeded so freely in that 
which concern eth censure. And yet I have 
no purpose to enter into a laudative of learn- 
ing, or to make a hymn to the muses ; though 
I am of opinion that it is long since their 



73 



rites were duly celebrated: but my intent 
is, without varnish or amplification, justly to 
weigh the dignity of knowledge in the ba- 
lance with other things, and to take the 
true value thereof by testimonies and argu- 
ments divine and human. 



First therefore, let us seek the dignity i. 

Divine 

of knowledge in the archetype or first plat- proofs. 
form, which is in the attributes and acts of 
God, as far as they are revealed to man, and 
feisty be observed with sobriety ; wherein we 
may not seek it by the name of learning ; for 
all learning is knowledge acquired, and all 
knowledge in God is original : and therefore 
we must look for it by another name, that 
of wisdom or sapience, as the Scriptures 
call it. 

It is so then, that in the work of the crea- in the attri. 

butes and 

tion we see a double emanation of virtue acts of God. 
from God ; the one referring more properly 
to power, the other to wisdom : the one ex- 
pressed in making the subsistence of the 
matter, and the other in disposing the beauty 
of the form. This being supposed, it is to 



74 

be observed, that, for any thing which ap- 
peared! in the history of the creation, the 
confused mass and matter of heaven and 
earth was made in a moment; and the order 
and disposition of that chaos or mass was 
the work of six days ; such a note of dif- 
ference it pleased God to put upon the works 
of power, and the works of wisdom : where^ 
with concurreth, that in the former it is not 
set down that God said, Let there be heaven 
and earth, as it is set down of the works fol- 
lowing ; but actually, that God made heaven 
and earth : the one carrying the stile of a 
manufacture, and the other of a law, decree> 
or council. 
in the order To proceed to that which is next in or* 
der, from God to spirits* We find, as far as 
credit is to be given to the celestial hie- 
rarchy of that supposed Dionysius the sena- 
tor of Athens, the first place or degree is 
given to the angels of love, which are termed 
Seraphim ; the second to the angels of light, 
which are termed Cherubim ; and the third, 
and so following places, to thrones, princi- 
palities, and the rest, which are all angels 
"of power and ministry ; so as the angels of 



15 

knowledge and illumination are placed before 
the angels of office and domination. 

To descend from spirits and intellectual f" r ™ s aterial 
forms to sensible and material forms ; we 
read the first form that w T as created was light, 
which hath a relation and correspondence in 
nature and corporal things to knowledge in 
spirits and incorporal things. 

So in the distribution of days, we see, the 
day wherein God did rest, and contemplate 
his own works, was blessed above all the days 
wherein he did effect and accomplish them. 

After the creation was finished, it is set 
down unto us, that man was placed in the 
garden to work therein ; which work, so ap- 
pointed to him, could be no other than work 
of contemplation ; that is> when the end of 
work is but for exercise and experiment, not 
necessity ; for there being then no relucta- 
tion of the creature, nor sweat of the brow, 
man's employment must of consequence have 
been matter of delight in the experiment, 
and not matter of labour for the use. Again, 
the first acts which man performed in pa- 
radise consisted of the two summary parts 
of knowledge ; the view of creatures, and 



76 

the imposition of names. As for the know- 
ledge which induced the fall, it was, as was 
touched before, not the natural knowledge 
of creatures, but the moral knowledge of 
good and evil ; wherein the supposition was, 
that God's commandments or prohibitions 
w r ere not the originals of good and evil, 
but that they had other beginnings, which 
man aspired to know ; to the end to make 
a total defection from God, and to depend 
wholly upon himself. 
intiiepH- To pass on : in the first event or occur- 

mitive occu- 
pations of rence after the fall of man, we * see, (as the 

Scriptures have infinite mysteries, not vio- 
lating at all the truth of the story ot letter,) 
an image of the two estates, the contempla- 
tive state and the active state, figured in 
the two persons of Abel and Cain, and in the 
two simplest and most primitive trades of 
life; that of the shepherd, (who, by reason 
of his leisure, rest in a place, and living 
in view of heaven, is a lively image of a 
contemplative life,) and that of the husband- 
man : where we see again the favour and 
election of God went to the shepherd,, and 
ttot to the tiller of the ground. 



man. 



77 

So in the age before the flood, the holy 
records, within those few memorials which 
are there entered and registered, have vouch- 
safed to mention arid honour the name of 
the inventors and authors of music and works 
in metal. In the age after the flood, the first 
great judgment of God upon the ambition of 
man was the confusion of tongues ; whereby 
the open trade and intercourse of learning 
and knowledge was chiefly imbarred. 

To descend to Moses the lawgiver, and In the c J ia - 

° racter or 

God's first pen : he is adorned by the Scrip- Moses * 
tures with this addition and commendation, 
that he was seen in all the learning of the 
^Egyptians ; which nation, we know, was one 
of the most ancient schools of the world: 
for so Plato brings in the ^Egyptian priest 
saying unto Solon : " You Grecians are 
" ever children; you have no knowledge 
" of antiquity, nor antiquity of know- 
iC ledge." Take a view of the ceremonial 
law of Moses ; you shall find, besides the 
prefiguration of Christ, the badge or diffe- 
rence of the people of God, the exercise and 
impression of obedience, and other divine 
ajses and fruits thereof, that some of the 



7a 

most learned Rabbins have travelled profit- 
ably and profoundly to observe, some of 
them a natural, some of them a moral sense, 
or a reduction of many of the ceremonies 
and ordinances. As in the law of the le- 
prosy, where it is said, If the ivhiteness have 
overspread the flesh, the patient may pass abroad 
for clean ; hut if there he any whole flesh re* 
maining, he is to he shut up for unclean ; one 
of them noteth a principle of nature, that 
putrefaction is more contagious before matu- 
rity than after: and another noteth a posi- 
tion of moral philosophy, that men aban- 
doned to vice do not so much corrupt man- 
ners, as those that are half- good and half- 
evil. So in this, and very many other places 
in that law, there is to be found, besides 
the theological sense, much aspersion of 
philosophy. 
In the writ- ^° hkewise in that excellent book of Job, 
ingsof job, jf j t -fog revolved with diligence, it will be 
found pregnant and swelling with natural 
philosophy j as for example, cosmography, 
and the roundness of the world: Qui ex-* 
tendit aquilonem super vacuum, et appendit ter^ 
ram super nihilum ; wherein the pensileness 



79 
of the earth, the pole of the north, and 
the finiteness or convexity of heaven are 
manifestly touched: So again, matter of 
astronomy ; Spiritus ejus ornavit ccelos, et ob- 
stetricante manu ejus eductas est Coluber tor-* 
tuosus. And in another place ; Nunquid con* 
jungere valebis micantes Stellas Pleiadas, aut 
gyrum Arcturi poteris dissipare ? Where the 
fixing of the stars, ever standing at equal 
distance, is with great elegancy noted. And 
in another place, Qui facit Arcturum, et Oriona, 
et Hyadas, et interiora Austri ; where again 
he takes knowledge of the depression of the 
southern pole, calling it the secrets of the 
south, because the southern stars were in 
that climate unseen : Matter of generation ; 
Annon sicut lac mulsisti me, et sicut caseum 
coagulasti me, etc. Matter of minerals ; Habet 
argentum venarum suarum principia : et aaro 
locus est in quo corvflatur, ferritin de terra tol- 
litur, et lapis solutus colore in as vertitur ; 
and so forwards in that chapter. 

So likewise in the person of Solomon the ln the perS0J ^ 
king, we see the gift or endowment of wis- of Solomou ' 
dom and learning, both in Solomon's peti- 
tion, and in God's assent thereunto, preferred 



80 



before all other terrene and temporal feli- 
city. By virtue of which grant or donative 
of God, Solomon became enabled, not only 
to write those excellent parables, or apho- 
risms concerning divine and moral philoso- 
phy ; but also to compile a natural history of 
all verdure, from the cedar upon the moun- 
tain to the moss upon the wall, (which is 
but a rudiment between putrefaction and an 
herb,) and also of all things that breathe or 
move. Nay, the same Solomon the king, 
although he excelled in the glory of trea- 
sure and magnificent buildings, of shipping 
and navigation, of service and attendance, 
of fame and renown, and the like, yet he 
maketh no claim to any of those glories, 
but only to the glory of inquisition of truth ; 
for so he saith expressly, The glory of God 
is to conceal a tiling, hut the glory of the king 
is to find it out ; as if, according to the in- 
nocent play of children, the Divine Majesty 
took delight to hide his works, to the end to 
have them found out ; and as if kings could 
not obtain a greater honour than to be God's 
playfellows in that game ; considering the 
^jreat cornmandment of wits and i means^ 





81 

whereby nothing needeth to be hidden from 

them. 

Neither did the dispensation of God vary in the cha- 
racter of 
in the times after our Saviour came into the Jesus. 

world ; for our Saviour himself did first 
shew his power to subdue ignorance, by 
his conference with the priests and doctors 
of the law, before he shewed his power to 
subdue nature by his miracles. And the 
coming of the Holy Spirit was chiefly figured 
and expressed in the similitude and gift of 
tongues, which are but vehicula scientiw. 

So in the election of those instruments, j n the apos- 
which it pleased God to use for the planta- 
tion of the faith, notwithstanding that at the 
first he did employ persons altogether un- 
learned, otherwise than by inspiration, more 
evidently to declare his immediate work- 
ing, and to abase all human wisdom or 
knowledge ; yet, nevertheless, that counsel 
of his was no sooner performed, but in the 
next vicissitude and succession, he did send 
his divine truth into the world, waited on 
with other learnings, as with servants or 
hand-maids : for so we see St. Paul, who 
was only learned amongst the apostles, had 



fathers . 



82 

his pen most used in the Scriptures of the 
New Testament, 
in the early $0 again, we find that many of the an- 
cient bishops and fathers of the church were 
excellently read, and studied in all the learn- 
ing of the heathen ; insomuch, that the edict 
of the emperor Julianus, whereby it was 
interdicted unto Christians to be admitted 
into schools, lectures, or exercises of learn- 
ing, was esteemed and accounted a more 
pernicious engine and machination against 
the Christian faith, than were all the san- 
guinary prosecutions of his predecessors ; 
neither could the emulation and jealousy of 
Gregory the First of that name, bishop of 
Rome, ever obtain the opinion of piety or 
devotion ; but contrariwise received the cen- 
sure of humour, malignity, and pusillani- 
mity, even amongst holy men ; in that he 
designed to obliterate and extinguish the 
memory of heathen antiquity and authors. 
But contrariwise it was the Christian church, 
which, amidst the inundations of the Scy- 
thians on the one side from the north-west, 
and the Saracens from the east, did pre- 
serve, in the sacred lap and bosom thereof^ 



the precious relicks even of heathen learn- 
ing, which otherwise had been extinguished, 
as if no such thing had ever been. 

And we see before our eyes, that in the i n the re- 
age of ourselves and our fathers, when it orma 
pleased God to call the church of Rome 
to account for their degenerate manners and 
ceremonies, and sundry doctrines obnoxious, 
and framed to uphold the same abuses ; at 
one and the same time it was ordained by 
the divine providence, that there should at- 
tend withal a renovation, and new spring 
of all other knowledges : and, on the other 
side, we see the Jesuits, (who partly in them^ 
selves, and partly by the emulation and pro- 
vocation of their example, have much quick- 
ened and strengthened the state of learn- 
ing,) we see, I say, what notable service 
and reparation they have done to the Roman 
see. 

Wherefore, to conclude this part, let it be Two chief 
observed, that there be two principal duties learning to 

, . , religion. 

and services, besides ornament and illustra- 
tion, which philosophy and human learn- 
ing do perform to faith and religion. The 
g 2 



84 



one, because they are an effectual induce- 
ment to the exaltation of the glory of God. 
For as the Psalms and other Scriptures do 
often invite us to consider, and magnify the 
great and wonderful works of God ; so if 
we should rest only in the contemplation 
of the exterior of them, as they first offer 
themselves to our senses, we should do a 
like injury unto the majesty of God, as it 
we should judge or construe of the store of 
some excellent jeweller, by that only which 
is set out toward the street in his shop. 
The other, because they minister a singular 
help and preservative against unbelief and 
error : for our Saviour saith, You err, not 
knoiving the Scriptures, nor the power of God; 
laying before us two books or volumes to 
study, if we will be secured from error; 
first, the Scriptures, revealing the will of 
God ; and then the creatures expressing his 
power : whereof the latter is a key unto the 
former : not only opening our understand- 
ing to conceive the true sense of the Scrip- 
tures, by the general notions of reason and 
rules of speech ; but chiefly opening our 
belief, in drawing us into a due medita- 



85 

tion of the omnipotency of God, which is 
chiefly signed and engraven upon his works. 
Thus much therefore for divine testimony 
and evidence, concerning the true dignity 
and value of learning. 

As for human proofs, it is so large a field, ^oofs* 
as, in a discourse of this nature and brevity, 



it is fit rather to use choice of those things of an immor- 
which we shall produce, than to embrace the 
variety of them. First, therefore, in the de- 
grees of human honor amongst the heathen, 
it was the highest to obtain to a veneration 
and adoration as a God. This unto the 
Christians is as the forbidden fruit. But we 
speak now separately of human testimony; 
according to which, that which the Grecians 
call apotheosis, and the Latins, relatio inter 
divos, was the supreme honour which man 
could attribute unto man ; especially when it 
was given, not by a formal decree or act of 
state, as it was used among the Roman em- 
perors, but by an inward assent and belief. 
Which honour being so high had also a de- 
gree or middle term : for there were reckoned, 
above human honors, honors heroical and 
divine : in the attribution and distribution of 



which honors, we see, antiquity made this 
difference : that whereas founders and uniters 
of states and cities, lawgivers, extirpers of 
tyrants, fathers of the people, and other 
eminent persons in civil merit, were honor- 
ed but with the titles of worthies or demi- 
gods ; such as were Hercules, Theseus, Minos, 
Romulus, and the like : on the other side, 
such as were inventors and authors of new 
arts, endowments, and commodities towards 
man's life, were ever consecrated amongst 
the gods themselves : as were Ceres, Bacchus, 
Mercurius, Apollo, and others ; and justly : 
for the merit of the former is confined with- 
in the circle of an age or a nation ; and is 
like fruitful showers, which though they be 
profitable and good, yet serve but for that 
season, and for a latitude of ground where 
they fall; but the other is indeed like the be- 
nefits of heaven, which are permanent and 
universal. The former, again, is mixed with 
strife and perturbation ; but the latter hath 
the true character of divine presence, com- 
ing in aura leni, without noise or agitation. 
Se S pas d siin?. Neither is certainly that other merit of 
learning, in repressing the inconveniencies 



87 

which grow from man to man, much inferior 
to the former, of relieving the necessities 
which arise from nature ; which merit was 
lively set forth by the ancients in that feign- 
ed relation of Orpheus's theatre, where all 
beasts and birds assembled, and, forgetting 
their several appetites, some of prey, some 
of game, some of quarrel, stood all sociably 
together listening to the airs and accords of 
the harp ; the sound whereof no sooner 
ceased, or was drowned by some louder noise, 
but every beast returned to his own nature : 
wherein is aptly described the nature and 
condition of men, who are full of savage and 
unreclaimed desires of profit, of lust, of re- 
venge ; which as long as they give ear to pre- 
cepts, to laws, to religion, sweetly touched 
with eloquence and persuasion of books, of 
sermons, of harangues, so long is society 
and peace maintained; but if these instru- 
ments be silent, or that sedition and tumult 
make them not audible, all things dissolve 
into anarchy and confusion. 

But this appeareth more manifestly, when in its use- 

. . fulness to 

kings themselves, or persons of authority un- princes. 
der them, or other governors in common- 



wealths and popular estates, are endued with 
learning. For although he might be thought 
partial to his own profession, that said, 
" Then should people and estates be happy, 
r ? when either kings were philosophers, or 
" philosophers kings 5" yet so much is ve- 
rified by experience, that under learned 
princes and governors there have been ever 
the best times : for howsoever kings may 
have their imperfections in their passions 
and customs ; yet if they be illuminated by 
learning, they have those notions of religion, 
policy, and morality, which do preserve 
them, and refrain them from all ruinous and 
peremptory errors and excesses ; whispering 
evermore in their ears, when counsellors and 
servants stand mute and silent. And se- 
nators or counsellors likewise, which be 
learned, do proceed upon more safe and sub- 
stantial principles, than counsellors which 
are only men of experience; the one sort 
keeping dangers afar off, whereas the other 
discover them not till they come near hand> 
and then trust to the agility of their wit to 
ward off or avoid them. 

Which felicity of times under learned 



princes, (to keep still the law of brevity, by Exemplified 

•. , . in the hap- 

using the most eminent and selected exam- piest period 

_ , -i i • i of the Roman 

pies,) doth best appear in the age which empire- 
passed from the death of Domitian the em- 
peror until the reign of Commodus; com- 
prehending a succession of six princes, all 
learned, or singular favourers and advancers 
of learning; which age, for temporal re- 
spects, was the most happy and flourishing 
that ever the Roman empire, which then was 
a model of the world, enjoyed: a matter re- 
vealed and prefigured unto Domitian in a 
dream, the night before he was slain ; for he 
thought there was grown behind upon his 
shoulders a neck and a head of gold : which 
came accordingly to pass in those golden 
times which succeeded ; of which princes 
we will make some commemoration : wherein 
although the matter will be vulgar, and may 
be thought fitter for a declamation than 
agreeable to a treatise enfolded as this is, yet 
because it is pertinent to the point in hand, 
neque semper arcum tendit Apollo, and to name 
them only were too naked and cursory, I 
will not omit it altogether. 

The first was Nerva ; the excellent temper in Neiva. 



90 

of whose government is by a glance in Cor- 
nelius Tacitus touched to the life : Postquam 
divus Nerva res olim insociabiles miscuisset, im- 
perium et libertatem. And in token of his 
learning, the last act of his short reign, left 
to memory, was a missive to his adopted son 
Trajan, proceeding upon some inward dis- 
content at the ingratitude of the times, com- 
prehended in a verse of Homer's : 

Telis, Phcebe, tuis lacrymas ulciscere nostras. 
in Trajan. Trajan, who succeeded, was for his per- 

son not learned : but if we will hearken to 
the speech of our Saviour, that saith, He 
that receiveth a prophet in the name of a pro- 
phet, shall have a prophet's reward, he de- 
serveth to be placed amongst the most learn- 
ed princes ; for there was not a greater ad- 
mirer of learning, or benefactor of learning; 
a founder of famous libraries, a perpetual 
advancer of learned men to office, and a fa- 
miliar converser with learned professors and 
preceptors, who were noted to have then 
most credit in court. On the other side, how. 
much Trajan's virtue and government was 
admired and renowned, surely no testimony 
of grave and faithful history doth more lively 



91 

set forth, than that legend tale of Gregorius 
Magnus, bishop of Rome, who was noted 
for the extreme envy he bore towards all 
heathen excellency : and yet he is reported, 
out of the love and estimation of Trajan's 
moral virtues, to have made unto God pas- 
sionate and fervent prayers for the delivery 
of his soul out of hell : and to have obtained 
it, with a caveat that he should make no 
more such petitions. In this prince's time 
also, the persecutions against the Christians 
received intermission, upon the certificate of 
Plinius Secundus, a man of excellent learn- 
ing, and by Trajan advanced. 

Adrian, his successor, was the most curi- In Adnam 
ous man that lived, and the most universal 
inquirer ; insomuch as it was noted for an 
error in his mind, that he desired to compre- 
hend all things, and not to reserve himself 
for the worthiest things ; falling into the like 
humour that was long before noted in Philip 
of Macedon ; who, when he would needs 
over-rule and put down an excellent musi- 
cian, in an argument touching music, was 
well answered by him again, " God forbid, 
" Sir," saith he, " that your fortune should 



92 



" be so bad, as to know these things better 
" than I." It pleased God likewise to use 
the curiosity of this emperor as an induce- 
ment to the peace of his church in those 
days. For having Christ in veneration, not 
as a God or Saviour, but as a wonder or no- 
velty ; and having his picture in his gallery, 
matched it with Apollonius, with whom, in 
his vain imagination, he thought he had 
some conformity; yet it served the turn to 
allay the bitter hatred of those times against 
the christian name, so as the church had 
peace during his time. And for his govern- 
ment civil, although he did not attain to that 
of Trajan's in the glory of arms, or per- 
fection of justice, yet in deserving of the weal 
of the subject he did exceed him. For Tra- 
jan erected many famous monuments and 
buildings ; insomuch as Constantine the Great 
in emulation was wont to call him Parieta- 
ria, wall-flower, because his name was upon 
so many walls: but his buildings and works 
were more of glory and triumph than use 
and necessity. But Adrian spent his whole 
reign, which was peaceable, in a perambu- 
lation or survey of the Roman empire ; giv- 



93 
ing order, and making assignation where he 
went, for re-edifying of cities, towns, and 
forts decayed, and for cutting of rivers and 
streams, and for making bridges and pas- 
sages, and for policying of cities and com- 
monalties with new ordinances and consti- 
tutions, and granting new franchises and 
incorporations ; so that his whole time was 
a very restoration of all the lapses and decays 
of former times. 

Antoninus Pius, who succeeded him, was in Antoni- 
nus Pius, 
a prince excellently learned; and had the 

patient and subtle wit of a schoolman ; inso- 
much as in common speech, which leaves no 
virtue untaxed, he was called cymini sector, 
a carver, or a divider of cumin seed, which 
is one of the least seeds ; such a patience he 
had and settled spirit, to enter into the least 
and most exact diiFerences of causes, a fruit 
no doubt of the exceeding tranquillity and 
serenity of his mind ; which being no ways 
charged or incumbered, either with fears, 
remorses, or scruples, but having been noted 
for a man of the purest goodness, without 
all fiction or affectation, that hath reigned 
or lived, made his mind continually present 



94 

and intire. He likewise approached a de- 
gree nearer unto Christianity, and became, 
as Agrippa said unto St. Paul, half a Chris- 
tian; holding their religion and law in good 
opinion, and not only ceasing persecution, 
but giving way to the advancement of 
Christians. 
_ _ _ Tr There succeeded him the first dim fr aires, 

In L. C. Ve- u ' 

rus, and m. j-]^ ^- wo a( j ptive brethren, Lucius Commo- 
wus dus Verus, (son to iElius Verus, who delight- 

ed much in the softer kind of learning, and 
was wont to call the poet Martial his Virgil,) 
and Marcus Aurelius Antoninus ; whereof 
the latter, who obscured his colleague and 
survived him long, was named the philoso- 
pher : who as he excelled all the rest in learn- 
ing, so he excelled them likewise in perfec- 
tion of all royal virtues ; insomuch as Ju- 
lianus the emperor, in his book intitled 
Casares, being as a pasquin or satire to de- 
ride all his predecessors, feigned that they 
were all invited to a banquet of the gods, 
and Silenus the Jester sat at the nether end 
of the table, and bestowed a scoff on every 
one as they came in ; but when Marcus Phi- 
losophies came in, Silenus was gravelled, and 



95 

out of countenance, not knowing where to 
carp at him, save at the last he gave a glance 
at his patience towards his wife. And the 
virtue of this prince, continued with that of 
his predecessor, made the name of Antoni- 
nus so sacred in the world, that though it 
were extremely dishonoured in Commodus, 
Caracalla, and Heliogabalus, who all bore 
the name, yet when Alexander Severus re- 
fused the name, because he was a stranger 
to the family, the Senate with one acclama- 
tion said, Quo modo Augustus, sic et Antoninus. 
In such renown and veneration was the name 
of these two princes in those days, that they 
would have had it as a perpetual addition in 
all the emperor's stiles. In this emperor's time 
also the church for the most part was in 
peace ; so as in this sequence of six princes 
we do see the blessed effects of learning in 
sovereignty, painted forth in the greatest 
table of the world. 

But for a tablet, or picture of smaller vo- In Queen 
lume, not presuming to speak of your ma- Ellzabetkk 
jesty that liveth, in my judgment the most 
excellent is that of queen Elizabeth, your 
immediate predecessor in this part of Britain ; 



96 



a princess that, if Plutarch were now alive 
to write lives by parallels, would trouble 
him, T think, to find for her a parallel 
amongst women. This lady was endued with 
learning in her sex singular, and great even 
amongst masculine princes; whether we 
speak of learning, of language, or of science, 
modern or ancient, divinity or humanity r 
and unto the very last year of her life she 
accustomed to appoint set hours for reading j 
scarcely any young student in an university 
more daily, or more duly. As for her govern- 
ment, I assure myself, I shall not exceed, if 
I do affirm that this part of the island 
never had forty -five years of better times; 
and yet not through the calmness of the 
season, but through the wisdom of her re- 
gimen. 

For if there be considered of the one side, 
the truth of religion established ; the con- 
stant peace and security; the good admi- 
nistration of justice ; the temperate use of 
the prerogative, not slackened, nor much 
strained; the flourishing state of learning, 
sortable to so excellent a patroness ; the con- 
venient estate of wealth and means, both 



97 

of crown and subject ; the habit of* obedi- 
ence, and the moderation of discontents: 
and there be considered, on the other side, 
the differences of religion, the troubles of 
neighbour countries, the ambition of Spain, 
and opposition of Rome ; and then, that she 
was solitary, and of herself: these things, 
I say, considered, as I could not have chosen 
an instance so recent and so proper, so, 
I suppose, I could not have chosen one 
more remarkable or eminent to the purpose 
now in hand, which is concerning the con- 
junction of learning in the prince with feli- 
city in the people. 

Neither hath learning an influence and 1. 

i Its influence 

operation only upon civil merit and moral on martial 

virtues. 

virtue, and the arts or temperature of peace 
and peaceable government ; but likewise it 
hath no less power and efficacy in en- 
ablement towards martial and military vir- 
tue and prowess; as may be notably re- 
presented in the examples of Alexander the 
great, and Caesar the dictator, mentioned be- 
fore, but now in fit place to be resumed ; of 
whose virtues and acts in war there needs 
no note or recital, having been the wonders 

H 



9S 

of time in that kind : but of their affec- 
tions towards learning, and perfections in 
learning, it is pertinent to say somewhat. 
in Aiexan* Alexander was bred and taught under 
Aristotle the great philosopher, who dedi- 
cated divers^ophisCbooks of philosophy unto 
him : he A attended with Callisthenes and 
divers other learned persons, that followed 
him in camp, throughout his journeys and 
conquests. What price and estimation he 
had learning in doth notably appear in these 
three particulars : first, in the envy he used 
to express that he bore towards Achilles, 
in this, that he had so good a trumpet of 
his praises as Homer's verses: secondly, in 
the judgment or solution he gave touching 
that precious cabinet of Darius, which was 
found amongst his jewels; whereof question 
was made what thing was worthy to be 
put into it, and he gave his opinion for 
Homer's works : thirdly, in his letter to 
Aristotle, after he had set forth his books 
of nature, wherein he expostulate th with him 
for publishing the secrets or mysteries of 
philosophy ; and gave him to understand 
that himself esteemed it more to excel other 



£9 



men in learning and knowledge,, than in 
power and empire. And what use he had of 
learning* doth appear, or rather shine, in all 
his speeches and answers, being full of sci- 
ence and use of science, and that in all 
variety. 33^^ ' 

And here again it may seem a thing 
scholastical, and somewhat idle, to recite- 
things that every man knoweth; but yet, 
since the argument I handle leadeth me 
thereunto, I am glad that men shall per- 
ceive I am as willing to flatter, if they 
will so call it, an Alexander, or a Caesar, 
or an Antoninus, that are dead many hun- 
dred years since, as any that now liveth : 
for it is the displaying the glory of learn- 
ing in sovereignty that I propound to myself, 
and not an humour of declaiming in any 
man's praises. Observe then the speech he 
used of Diogenes, and see if it tend not 
to the true state of one of the greatest 
questions of moral philosophy ; whether the 
enjoying of outward things, or the contemn- 
ing of them, be the greatest happiness : for 
when he saw Diogenes so perfectly con- 
tented with so little, he said to those that 
h 2 



100 



mocked at his condition; "Were I not 
Alexander, I would wish to be Diogenes.'* 
But Seneca inverteth it, and saith ; Plus 
eratj quod hie nollet accipere, qudm quod 
ilk posset dare. " There were more things 
f l which Diogenes would have refused, than 
" those were, which Alexander could have 
H. given or enjoyed." 

Observe again that speech which was usual 
with him, " That he felt his mortality chiefly 
" in two things, sleep and lust;" and see 
if it were not a speech extracted out of the 
depth of natural philosophy, and liker to 
have come out of the mouth of Aristotle* 
or Democritus, than from Alexander. 

See again that speech of humanity and 
poesy ; when upon the bleeding of his 
wounds, he called unto him one of his flat- 
terers, that was wont to ascribe to him 
divine honor, and said, " Look, this is very 
" blood; this is not such liquor as Homer 
" speaketh of, which ran from VenusVhand, 
" when it was pierced by Diomedes." 

See likewise his readiness in reprehension 
of logic, in the speech he used to Cassander, 
upon a complaint that was made against 



101 



his father Antipater: for when Alexander 
happened to say/ *' Do you think these men 
" would have come from so far to complain, 
55 except they had just cause of grief?" 
And Cassander answered, f € Yea, that was 
" the matter, because they thought they 
" should not be disproved." Said Alexander 
laughing : " See the subtilties of Aristotle, 
" to take a matter both ways, pro et con- 
" tra," etc. 

But note again how well he could use 
the same art, which he reprehended, to 
serve his own humour: when bearing a se- 
cret grudge to Callisthenes, because he was 
against the new ceremony of his adoration, 
feasting one night where the same Callis- 
thenes was at the table, it was moved by 
some after supper, for entertainment sake, 
that Callisthenes, who was an eloquent man, 
might, speak of some theme or purpose, at 
his own choice : which Callisthenes did ; 
choosing the praise of the Macedonian na- 
tion for his discourse, and performing the 
same with so good manner, as the hearers 
were much ravished : whereupon Alexander, 
nothing pleased, said, " It was easy to be 



102 



46 eloquent upon so good a subject. But/* 
saith he, " turn your stile, and let us hear 
ff what you can say against us :" which 
Callisthenes presently undertook, and did 
with that sting and life, that Alexander in- 
terrupted him, and said, « The goodness of 
4C the cause made him eloquent before, and 
f* despite made him eloquent then again." 

Consider farther, for tropes of rhetoric, 
that excellent use of a metaphor or trans- 
lation, wherewith he taxed Antipater, who 
was an imperious and tyrannous governor : 
for when one of Antipater's friends com- 
mended him to Alexander for his modera- 
tion, that he did not degenerate, as his other 
lieutenants did, into the Persian pride in 
use of purple, but kept the ancient habit 
of Macedon, of black : " True," saith Alex- 
ander, " but Antipater is all purple within." 
Or that other, when Parmenio came to him 
in the plain of Arbela, and shewed him the 
innumerable multitude of his enemies, espe- 
cially as they appeared by the infinite num- 
ber of lights, as it had been a new firma- 
ment of stars, and thereupon advised him 
to assail them by night : whereupon he 



103 



answered, " That he would not steal the 
victory." 

For matter of policy weigh that significant 
distinction, so much in all ages embraced, 
that he made between his two friends, He- 
phsestion and Craterus, when he said, '* That 
" the one loved Alexander, and the other 
" loved the king : describing the principal 
difference of princes best servants, that some 
in affection love their person, and others in 
duty love their crown. 

Weigh also that excellent taxation of an 
error, ordinary with counsellors of princes, 
that they counsel their masters according to 
the model of their own mind and fortune, 
and not of their masters; when, upon Da- 
rius's great offers, Parmenio had said, " Surely 
" I would accept these offers, were I as Alex- 
" ander ;" saith Alexander, " So would I, 
" were I as Parmenio." 

Lastly, weigh that quick and acute reply, 
which he made when he gave so large gifts 
to his friends and servants, and was asked 
what he did reserve for himself, and he an- 
swered, " Hope :" weigh, I say, whether he 
had not cast up his account right, because 



104 

hope must be the portion of all that resolve 
upon great enterprises. For this was Caesar's 
portion when he went first into Gaul, his 
estate being then utterly overthrown with 
largesses. And this was likewise the portion 
of that noble prince, howsoever transported 
with ambition, Henry duke of Guise, of 
whom it was usually said, that he was the 
greatest usurer in France, because he had 
turned all his estate into obligations. 

To conclude therefore : as certain critics 
are used to say hyperbolically, <( That if all 
" sciences were lost, they might be found 
" in Virgil;" so certainly this may be said 
truly, there are the prints and footsteps of 
all learning in those few speeches which are 
reported of this prince : the admiration of 
whom, when I consider him not as Alex- 
ander the great, but as Aristotle's scholar, 
hath carried me too far. 
in Caesar. As f° r Julius Caesar, the excellency of his 

learning needeth not to be argued from his 
education, or his company, or his speeches ; 
but in a farther degree doth declare itself 
in his writings and works ; whereof some 
are extant and permanent and some unfor- 



105 



Innately perished. For, first, we see, there 
is left unto us that excellent history of his 
own wars, which he intitled only a com- 
mentary, wherein all succeeding times have 
admired the solid weight of matter, and the 
real passages and lively images of actions 
and persons, expressed in the greatest pro- 
priety of words and perspicuity of narra- 
tion that ever was ; which that it was not 
the effect of a natural gift, but of learn- 
ing and precept, is well witnessed by that 
work of his, intitled, De analogia, being a 
grammatical philosophy, wherein he did la- 
bour to make this same vox ad placitum to 
be become vox ad licitum, and to reduce 
custom of speech to congruity of speech ; 
and took, as it were, the picture of words 
from the life of reason. 

So we receive from him, as a monument 
both of his power and learning, the then 
reformed computation of the year ; well ex- 
pressing, that he took it to be as great a 
glory to himself to observe and know the 
law of the heavens, as to give law to men 
upon the earth. 

£o likewise in that book of his, Anti-^ 



106 



Cato, it may easily appear that he did as- 
pire as well to victory of wit as victory of 
war; undertaking therein a conflict against 
the greatest champion with the pen that 
then lived, Cicero the orator. 

So again in his book of Apophthegms, which 
he collected, we see that he esteemed it 
more honor to make himself but a pair of 
tables, to take the wise and pithy words 
of others, than to have every word of his 
own to be made an apophthegm or an 
oracle ; as vain princes, by custom of flat- 
tery, pretend to do. And yet if I should 
enumerate divers of his speeches, as I did 
those of Alexander, they are truly such as 
Solomon noteth, when he saith, Verba sa~ 
pientum tanquam aculei, et tanquam clavi in 
altum defixi : whereof, I will only recite 
three, not so delectable for elegancy, but 
admirable for vigour and efficacy. 

As first, it is reason he be thought a 
master of words, that could with one word 
appease a mutiny in his army, which was 
thus : The Romans, when their generals 
did speak to their army, did use the word 
Militcs, but when the magistrates spake to 



107 



to the people, they did use the word Quirites. 
The soldiers were in tumult, and seditiously 
prayed to be cashiered ; not that they so 
meant, but by expostulation thereof to 
draw Caasar to other conditions ; wherein 
he being resolute not to give way, after 
some silence, he began his speech, Ego, 
Quirites : which did admit them already 
cashiered ; wherewith they were so sur- 
prised, crossed, and confused, as they would 
not suffer him to go on in his speech, but 
relinquished their demands, and made it 
their suit to be again called by the name 
of Milites. 

The second speech was thus: Caesar did 
extremely affect the name of king ; and 
some were set on, as he passed by, in popu- 
lar acclamation to salute him king; where- 
upon, finding the cry weak and poor, he 
put it off thus, in a kind of jest, as if they 
had mistaken his sirname ; Non rex sum, 
sed C&sar ; a speech, that if it be searched, 
the life and fulness of it can scarce be ex- 
pressed : for, first, is was a refusal of the 
name, but yet not serious : again, it did 
signify an infinite confidence and magna- 



108 



nimity, as if he presumed .Caesar was the 
greater title; as by his worthiness it is come 
to pass till this day: but chiefly, it was a 
speech of great allurement toward his own 
purpose; as if the state did strive with him 
but for a name, whereof mean families were 
vested ; for Rex was a surname with the 
Romans, as well as King is with us. 

The last speech which I will mention, was 
used to Metellus ; when Caesar, after war de- 
clared, did possess himself of the city of 
Rome ; at which time entering into the inner 
treasury to take the money there accumu- 
lated, Metellus, being tribune, forbad him : 
whereto Caesar said, " That if he did not 
f desist, he would lay him dead in the 
'£ place," And presently taking himself 
up, he added, " Young man, it is harder 
" for me to speak it, than to do it ;" Ado- 
lescens, durius est mihi hoc dicere qudm fa- 
cere. A speech compounded of the greatest 
terror and greatest clemency that could pro- 
ceed out of the mouth of man. \ 

But to return, and conclude with him : it 
is evident, himself knew well his own per- 
fection in learning, and took it upon him ; 



103 

as appeared when, upon occasion that some 
spake what a strange resolution it was in 
Lucius Sylla to resign his dictature ; he scof- 
fing at him, to his own advantage, answered, 
ee That Sylla could not skill of letters, and 
ec therefore knew not how to dictate." 

And here it were fit to leave this point, Extraordinary 

instance in 

touching the concurrence of military virtue Xenophon. 
and learning, for what example would come 
with any grace after those two of Alexander 
and Caesar? were it not in regard of the 
rareness of circumstance, that I find in one 
particular, as that which did so suddenly 
pass from extreme scorn to extreme wonder ; 
and it is of Xenophon the philosopher, who 
w r ent from Socrates's school into Asia, in the 
expedition of Cyrus the younger, against 
king Artaxerxes. This Xenophon at that 
time was very young, and never had seen the 
wars before ; neither had any command in 
the army, but only followed the war as a vo- 
luntary, for the love and conversation of 
Proxenus his friend. He was present w r hen 
Falinus came in message from the great king 
to the Grecians, after that Cyrus was slain in 
the field, and they a handful of men left to 



no 



themselves in the midst of the king's territo- 
ries, cut off from their country by many na- 
vigable rivers, and many hundred miles. 
The message imported, that they should de- 
liver up their arms, and submit themselves 
to the king's mercy. To which message be- 
fore answer was made, divers of the army 
conferred familiarly with Falinus: and 
amongst the rest Xenophon happened to 
say, " Why, Falinus, we have now but these 
" two things left, our arms and our virtue ? 
" and if we yield up our arms, how shall we 
" make use of our virtue ?" Whereto Falinus, 
smiling on him, said, " If I be not deceived, 
" young gentleman, you are an Athenian, 
" and, I believe, you study philosophy, and 
" it is pretty that you say; but you are 
" much abused, if you think your virtue can 
" withstand the king's power." Here was 
the scorn : the wonder followed ; which was, 
that this young scholar, or philosopher, after 
all the captains were murdered in parley by 
treason, conducted those ten thousand foot, 
through the heart of all the king's high coun- 
tries, from Babylon to Graecia in safety, in 
despite of all the king's forces, to the asto- 



Ill 

nishment of the world, and the encourage- 
ment of the Grecians in time succeeding to 
make invasion upon the kings of Persia ; as 
was after purposed by Jason the Thessalian, 
attempted by Agesilaus the Spartan, and at- 
chieved by Alexander the Macedonian, all 
upon the ground of the act of that young 
scholar. 

To proceed now from imperial and mili- T . . 2 - 

* * its import- 

tar y virtue to moral and private virtue : ^ ce al t0 ^ he 

first, it is an assured truth, which is contain- ^ ate vk " 
ed in the verses : 

Scilicet ingenuas didicisse fiddlier artes, 
Emollit mores, nee sinit esseferos. 
It taketh away the wildness and barbarism 
and fierceness of men's minds : but indeed 
the accent had need be upon fideliter : for a 
little superficial learning doth rather work a 
contrary effect. It taketh away all levity, 
temerity, and insolency, by copious sugges- 
tion of all doubts and difficulties, and ac- 
quainting the mind to balance reasons on 
both sides, and to turn back the first offers 
and conceits of the mind, and to accept of 
nothing but examined and tried. It taketh 
away vain admiration of any thing, which 



112 



is the root of all weakness: for all things 
are admired, either because they are new, or 
because they are great. For novelty, no 
man that wadeth in learning or contempla- 
tion throughly, but will find that printed in 
his heart Nil novi super terrain. Neither can 
any man marvel at the play of puppets, that 
goeth behind the curtain, and adviseth weP 
of the motion. And for magnitude, as Alex- 
ander the Great after that he was used to 
great armies, and the great conquests of the 
spacious provinces in Asia, when he received 
letters out of Greece, of some fights and ser- 
vices there, which were commonly for a pas- 
sage or a fort or some walled town at the 
most, he said, ec It seemed to him, that he 
" was advertised of the battle of the frogs 
" and the mice, that the old tales went of." 
So certainly, if a man meditate upon the uni- 
versal frame of nature, the earth with men 
upon it, the divineness of souls excepted, will 
not seem much other than an ant-hill, where 
some ants carry corn, and some carry their 
young, and some go empty, and all to-and- 
fro a little heap of dust. It taketh away or 
mitigate th fear of death, or adverse fortune j' 



113 



which is one of the greatest impediments of 
virtue, and imperfections of manners. For 
if a man's mind be deeply seasoned with the 
consideration of the mortality and corruptible 
nature of things, he will easily concur with 
Epictetus, who went forth one day and saw 
a woman weeping for her pitcher of earth 
that was broken ; and went forth the next 
day, and saw a woman weeping for her son 
that was dead; and thereupon said, Heri 
vidi fragilem frangi, hodie vidi mortalem morL 
And therefore Virgil did excellently and pro- 
foundly couple the knowledge of causes and 
the conquest of all fears together, as concomi- 
tantia : 

Felix 3 qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas, 
Quique metus omnes, et inexorabile fatum 
Subjecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis 

a van. 
It were too long to go over the particular 
remedies which learning doth minister to all 
the diseases of the mind ; sometimes purging 
the ill-humours, sometimes opening the ob- 
structions, sometimes helping digestion, some- 
times increasing appetite, sometimes healing 
the wounds and exulcerations thereof, and 



1.14 



the like ; and therefore I will conclude with 
that which hath rationem totius, which is, 
that it disposeth the constitution of the mind 
not to be fixed or settled in the defects there- 
of, but still to be capable and susceptible of 
growth and reformation. For the unlearned 
man knows not what it is to descend into 
himself, or to call himself to account ; nor 
the pleasure of that suavissima vita, indies 
sentire se fieri meliorem. The good parts he 
hath he will learn to shew to the full, and 
use them dexterously, but not much to in- 
crease them: the faults he hath he will 
learn how to hide and colour them, but not 
much to amend them : like an ill mower, 
that mows on still, and never whets his 
scythe. Whereas with the learned man it 
fares otherwise, that he doth ever intermix 
the correction and amendment of his mind 
with the use and employment thereof. Nay 
farther, in general and in sum, certain it is 
that Veritas and bonitas differ but as the seal 
and the print : for truth prints goodness ; and 
they be the clouds of error which descend 
in the storms of passions and perturbations, 
From moral virtue let us pass on to matter 



115 
©f power and commandment, and consider its help to 

T>QTITpr 

whether in right reason there be any com- 
parable with that, wherewith knowledge in- 
vested! and crowneth man's nature. We see 
the dignity of the commandment is accord- 
ing to the dignity of the commanded : to 
have commandment over beasts, as herdmen 
have, is a thing contemptible ; to have com- 
mandment over children, as schoolmasters 
have, is a matter of small honor; to have 
commandment over galley slaves is a dispa- 
ragement rather than an honor. Neither is 
the commandment of tyrants much better, 
over people which have put off the genero- 
sity of their minds : and therefore it was ever 
holden, that honors in free monarchies and 
commonwealths had a sweetness more than 
in tyrannies, because the commandment ex- 
tendeth more over the wills of men, and not 
only over their deeds and services. And 
therefore, when Virgil putteth himself forth 
to attribute to Augustus Cassar the best of 
human honors, he doth it in these words : 

victor que volentes 
Perpopulos datjura, viamque affect at Qtympo* 



116 

But yet the commandment of knowledge is 
higher than the commandment over the will ; 
for it is a commandment over the reason, 
belief, and understanding of man, which is 
the highest part of the mind, and giveth 
law to the will itself : for there is no power 
©n earth which setteth up a throne or chair 
of state in the spirits and souls of men, and 
in their cogitations, imaginations, opinions, 
and beliefs, but knowledge and learning. 
And therefore we see the detestable and ex- 
treme pleasure that arch-heretics, and false 
prophets, and impostors are transported 
with, when they once find in themselves 
that they have a superiority in the faith 
and conscience of men ; so great, as, if they 
have once tasted of it, it is seldom seen that 
any torture or persecution can make them 
relinquish or abandon it. But as this is what 
the author of the Revelation calleth the depth 
or profoundness of Satan; so by argument 
of contraries, the just and lawful sovereignty 
over men's understanding, by force of truth 
rightly interpreted, is that which approacheth 
nearest to the similitude of the divine rule. 
To fortune. ^ f or fortune and advancement, the bene- 



117 

licence of learning is not so confined to give 
fortune only to states and commonwealths, 
as it doth not likewise give fortune to particu- 
lar persons. For it was well noted long ago, 
that Homer hath given more men their liv- 
ings, than either Sylla, or Caesar, or Augus- 
tus ever did, notwithstanding their great 
largesses and donatives, and distributions 
of lands to so many legions; and no doubt 
it is hard to say, whether arms or learning 
have advanced greater numbers. And in case 
of sovereignty we see, that if arms or descent 
have carried away the kingdom, yet learning 
hath carried the priesthood, which ever hath 
been in some competition with empire, 

Again, for the pleasure and delight of To Pleasure. 
knowledge and learning, it far surpasseth all 
other in nature : for, shall the pleasures of 
the affections so exceed the pleasure of the 
senses, as much as the obtaining of desire 
or victory exceedeth a song or a dinner; and 
must not, of consequence, the pleasures of 
the intellect or understanding exceed the 
pleasures of the affections ? We see in all 
other pleasures there is satiety, and after 
they be used, their verdure departeth ; which 



118: 



sheweth well they be but deceits of pleasure* 
and not pleasures; and that it was the no- 
velty which pleased, and not the quality: 
and therefore we see that voluptuous men 
turn friers, and ambitious princes turn me- 
lancholy. But of knowledge there is no sa- 
tiety, but satisfaction and appetite are per- 
petually interchangeable ; and therefore it ap- 
peareth to be good in itself simply, without 
fallacy or accident. Neither is that pleasure 
of small efficacy and contentment to the 
mind of man, which the poet Lucretius de- 
scribeth elegantly, 

Suave mari magno, turbantibus aquoraventis, etc. 

(' It is a view of delight," saith he, " to stand 
" or walk upon the shore side, and to see 
" a ship tossed with tempest upon the sea ; 
" or to be in a fortified tower, and to see two 
" battles join upon a plain ; but it is plea- 
" sure incomparable, for the mind of man 
" to be settled, landed, and fortified in the 
<e certainty of truth ; and from thence to 
f* descry and behold the errors, perturbations, 
" labours, and wanderings up and down of 
a other men*" 



119 

Lastly, leaving the vulgar arguments, that To immortal 
by learning man excelleth man in that 
wherein man excelleth beasts ; that by learn- 
ing man ascendeth to the heavens and their 
motions, where in body he cannot come, 
and the like : let us conclude with the 
dignity and excellency of knowledge and 
learning in that whereunto mar/s nature 
doth most aspire, which is, immortality or 
continuance : for to this tendeth genera- 
tion, and raising of houses and families ; to 
this tend buildings, foundations, and monu- 
ments; to this tendeth the desire of memory, 
fame, and celebration, and in effect the 
strength of all other human desires. We 
see then how far the monuments of wit and 
learning are more durable than the monu- 
ments of power, or of the hands. For have 
not the verses of Homer continued twenty- 
five hundred years, or more, without the 
loss of a syllable or letter ; during which 
time, infinite palaces, temples, castles, cities, 
have been decayed and demolished ? It is 
not possible to have the true pictures or 
statues of Cyrus, Alexander, and Caesar; 
no, nor of the kings or great personages of 



im 



much later years ; for the originals camiot 
last, and the copies cannot but lose of the 
life and truth. But the images of men's 
wits and knowledges remain in books, ex- 
empted from the wrong of time, and ca- 
pable of perpetual renovation. Neither are 
they fitly to be called images, because they 
generate still, and cast their seeds in the 
minds of others, provoking and causing in- 
finite actions and opinions in succeeding 
ages : so that, if the invention of the ship 
was thought so noble, which carrieth riches 
and commodities from place to place, and 
consociateth the most remote regions in par- 
ticipation of their fruits ; how much more 
ai?e letters to be magnified, which, as ships, 
pass through the vast seas of time, and 
make ages so distant to participate of the 
wisdom, illuminations, and inventions, the 
one of the other ? Nay farther, we see, 
some of the philosophers which were least 
divine, and most immersed in the senses, 
and denied generally the immortality of the 
soul ; yet came to this point, that whatso- 
ever motions the spirit of man could act 
and perform without the organs of the 



121 

body, they thought, might remain after 
death, which were only those of the under- 
standing, and not of the affections ; so im- 
mortal and incorruptible a thing did know- 
ledge seem unto them to be. But we, that 
know by divine revelation, that not only 
the understanding but the affections puri- 
fied, not only the spirit but the body 
changed, shall be advanced to immortality, 
do disclaim these rudiments of the senses. 
But it must be remembered both in this 
last point, and so it may likewise be need- 
ful in other places, that in probation of the 
dignity of knowledge or learning, I did in 
the beginning separate divine testimony from 
human, which method I have pursued, and 
so handled them both apart. 

Nevertheless I do not pretend, and I know Conclusion, 
it will be impossible for me, by any pleads 
ing of mine, to reverse the judgment, either 
of iEsop's cock, that preferred the barley- 
corn before the gem ; or of Midas, that 
being chosen judge between Apollo presi- 
dent of the Muses, and Pan god of the flocks, 
judged for plenty; or of Paris, that judg- 
ed for beauty and love against wisdom and 



122 



power ; or of Agrippina, oceidut matrem, 
modo imperet, that preferred empire with 
any condition never so detestable ; or of 
Ulysses, qui vetulam prcetulit immortalitati, 
being a figure of those which prefer custom 
and habit before all excellency; or of a 
number of the like popular judgments. For 
these things must continue as they have 
been : but so will that also continue where- 
upon learning hath ever relied, and which 
faileth not : justificata est Sapientia d filiis 
mis. 



THE 

SECOND BOOK OF FRANCIS BACON: 

OF THE 
PROFICIENCE AND ADVANCEMENT 
OF 

LEARNING, DIVINE AND HUMAN. 
TO THE KING. 



It might seem to have more convenience, 
though it come often otherwise to pass, ex- 
cellent king, that those, which are fruitful 
in their generations, and have in themselves 
the foresight of immortality in their de- 
scendants, should likewise be more careful 
of the good estate of future times, unto 
which they know they must transmit and 
commend over their dearest pledges. Queen 
Elizabeth was a sojourner in the world, in 
respect of her unmarried life, and was a 



124 

blessing to her own times : and yet so as 
the impression of her good government, be- 
sides her happy memory, is not without some 
effect which doth survive her. But to your 
majesty, whom God hath already blessed with 
so much royal issue, worthy to continue and 
represent you for ever ; and whose youthful 
and fruitful bed doth yet promise many the 
like renovations ; it is proper and agreeable 
to be conversant, not only in the transi- 
tory parts of good government, but in those 
acts also which are in their nature perma- 
nent and perpetual: among the which, if 
affection do not transport me, there is not 
any more worthy than the farther endow- 
ment of the world with sound and fruitful 
knowledge. For why should a few received 
authors stand up like Hercules's columns, 
beyond which there should be no sailing or 
discovering, since we have so bright and 
benign a star as your majesty, to conduct 
How learn- and prosper us ? To return therefore where 
advanced, we left, it remaineth to consider of what 
kind those acts are, which have been un- 
dertaken and performed by kings and others 
for the increase and advancement of learn- 



125 



ing : wherein I purpose to speak actively, 
without digressing or dilating. 

Let this ground therefore be laid, that 
all works are overcome by amplitude of re- 
ward, by soundness of direction, and by 
the conjunction of labours. The first mul- 
tiplieth endeavour, the second preventeth 
error, and the third supplieth the frailty of 
man ; but the principal of these is direc- 
tion : for claudus in via antevertit cursor em 
extra viam ; and Solomon excellently setteth 
it down, If the iron be not sharp, it re- 
quireth more strength ; but wisdom is that 
which prevaileth : signifying that the inven- 
tion or election of the mean is more effec- 
tual than any inforcement or accumulation 
of endeavours. This I am induced to speak, 
for that (not derogating from the noble in- 
tention of any that have been deservers 
towards the state of learning) I do observe 
nevertheless, that their works and acts are 
rather matters of magnificence and memory, 
than of progression and proficience ; and tend 
rather to augment the mass of learning in 
the multitude of learned men, than to rec- 
tify or raise the sciences themselves. 



126 

Three objects The works or acts of merit towards learn- 

important to 

learning. ing are conversant about three objects : the 
places of learning, the books of learning, 
and the persons of the learned. For as 
water, whether it be the dew of heaven, or 
the springs of the earth, doth' scatter and 
lose itself in the ground, except it be col- 
lected into some receptacle, where it may 
by union comfort and sustain itself, (and 
for that cause the industry of man hath 
made and framed spring-heads, conduits, 
cisterns, and pools, which men have accus- 
tomed likewise to beautify and adorn with 
accomplishments of magnificence and state, 
as well as of use and necessity) so this ex* 
cellent liquor of knowledge, whether it de- 
scend from divine inspiration, or spring from 
human sense, would soon perish and vanish 
to oblivion, if it were not preserved in books, 
traditions, conferences, and places appoint- 
ed, as universities, colleges, and schools, for 
the receipt and comforting of the same. 
Plans for its The works which concern the seats and 
a vancement. pj aces f learning are feur-f founda tions, en- 
dowments with revenues, endowments with 
franchises and privileges, institutions and or* 



1£7 



dinances for government ; all tending to 
quietness and privateness of life, and dis- 
charge of cares and troubles ; much like 
the stations which Virgil prescribeth for the 
hiving of bees : 

Principio sedes apibus statioque petenda, 
Quo neque sit vends aditus, etc. 

The works touching books are two ; first 
libraries, which are as the shrines where all 
the relicks of the ancient saints, full of 
true virtue, and that without delusion or 
imposture, are preserved and reposed : se- 
condly, new editions of authors, with more 
correct impressions, more faithful transla- 
tions, more profitable glosses, more dili- 
gent annotations, and the like. 

The works pertaining to the persons of 
learned men, besides the advancement and 
countenancing of them in general, are two : 
the reward and designation of readers in 
sciences already extant and invented ; and 
the reward and designation of writers and 
inquirers concerning any parts of learning 
not sufficiently laboured and prosecuted. 

These are summarily the works and acts, 
wherein the merits of many excellent princes 



128 



and other worthy personages have been con- 
versant. As for any particular commemo- 
rations, I call to mind what Cicero said, 
when he gave general thanks ; Difficile non 
aliquem, ingratum quenquam prceterirc. Let 
us rather, according to the Scriptures, look 
unto that part of the race which is before 
us, than look back to that which is already 
attained. 



DEFECTS OF LEARNED INSTITUTIONS. 

1. First therefore, amongst so many great 

jects studied, foundations of colleges in Europe, I find 
strange that they are all dedicated to pro- 
fessions, and none left free to arts and 
sciences at large. For if men judge that 
learning should be referred to action, they 
judge well; but in this they fall into the 
error described in the ancient fable, in which 
the other parts of the body did suppose the 
stomach had been idle, because it neither 
performed the office of motion, as the limbs 
do, nor of sense, as the head doth ; but 
yet, notwithstanding, it is the stomach that 



129 



digesteth and distributed! to all the rest : 
so if any man think philosophy and uni- 
versality to be idle studies, he doth not 
consider that all professions are from thence 
served and supplied. And this I take to 
be a great cause that hath hindered the 
progression of learning, because these fun- 
damental knowledges have been studied but 
in passage. For if you will have a tree 
bear more fruit than it hath used to do, it 
is not any thing you can do to the boughs, 
but it is the stirring of the earth, and 
putting new mould about the roots, that 
must work it. Neither is it to be forgotten, 
that this dedicating of foundations and do- 
nations to professory learning hath not 
only had a malign aspect and influence 
upon the growth of sciences, but hath also 
been prejudicial to states and governments. 
For hence it proceedeth that princes find 
a solitude in regard of able men to serve 
them in causes of state, because there is no 
education collegiate which is free ; where 
such as were so disposed might give them- 
selves to histories, modern languages, books 

K 



130 

of policy and civil discourse, and other the 
like enablements unto service of state. 
2 And because founders of colleges do plant, 

nesfo/re 11 " and founders of lectures do water, it fol- 
sdianes. loweth well in order to speak of the defect 
which is in public lectures ; namely, in the 
smallness and meanness of the salary or 
reward which in most places is assigned 
unto them ; whether they be lectures of 
arts, or of professions. For it is necessary 
to the progression of sciences that readers 
be of the most able and sufficient men, as 
those which are ordained for generating 
and propagating of sciences, and not for 
transitory use. This cannot be, except their 
condition and endowment be such as may 
content the ablest man to appropriate his 
whole labour, and continue his whole age 
in that function and attendance ; and there- 
fore must have a proportion answerable to 
that mediocrity or competency of advance- 
ment, which may be expected from a pro- 
fession or the practice of a profession. So 
as, if you will have sciences flourish, you 
must observe David's military law, which 
was, " That those which staid with the 



131 

" carriage should have equal part with those 
" which were in the action ;" else will the 
carriages be ill attended. So readers in sci- 
ences are indeed the guardians of the stores 
and provisions of sciences, whence men in 
active courses are furnished, and therefore 
ought to have equal entertainment with 
them ; otherwise if the fathers in sciences 
be of the weakest sort, or be ill -maintained, 
Et patrum irwalidi referent jejunia nati. 
Another defect I note, wherein I shall 3 - 

In the appa- 

need some alchemist to help me, .who call ratus for ex * 

i penments. 

upon men to sell their books, and to build 
furnaces, quitting and forsaking Minerva 
and the Muses as barren virgins, and relying 
upon Vulcan. But certain it is, that unto 
the deep, fruitful, and operative study of 
many sciences, especially natural philoso- 
phy and physic, books be not the only in- 
strumental ; wherein also the beneficence 
of men hath not been altogether wanting : 
for we see spheres, globes, astrolabes, maps, 
and the like, have been provided as appurte- 
nances to astronomy and cosmography, as 
well as books ; we see likewise that some 
places instituted for physic have annexed 
K 2 



1§P 

the commodity of gardens for simples of all 
sorts, and do likewise command the use of 
dead bodies for anatomies. But these do 
respect but a few things. In general, there 
will hardly be any main proficience in the 
disclosing of nature, except there be some 
allowances for expences about experiments ; 
whether they be experiments appertaining to 
Vulcanus or Daedalus, furnace or engine, or 
any other kind; and therefore as secreta- 
ries and spies of princes and states bring 
in bills for intelligence, so you must al- 
low the spies and intelligencers of nature 
to bring in their bills, or else you shall be 
ill advertised. 

And if Alexander made such a liberal 
assignation to Aristotle of treasure for the 
allowance of hunters, fowlers, fishers, and 
the like, that he might compile an history 
of nature, much better do they deserve it 
that travel in arts of nature. 

** Another defect which I note, is an ki- 

ln neglect 

©fconsuita- termission or neglect, in those which are 

tions and ° 

visitations, governors in universities, of consultation ; 
and in princes or superior persons, of visi- 
tation : to enter into account and conside- 



ia* 



ration, whether the readings, exercises, and 
other customs appertaining unto learning, 
anciently begun, and since continued, be 
well instituted or no ; and thereupon to 
ground an amendment or reformation in 
that which shall be found inconvenient. For 
it is one of your majesty's own most wise 
and princely maxims, " That in all usages 
" and precedents, the times be considered 
i( wherein they first began ; which if they 
" were weak or ignorant, it derogateth from 
u the authority of the usage, and leaveth it 
" for suspect." And therefore in as much 
as most of the usages and orders of the 
universities were derived from more obscure 
times, it is the more requisite they be re- 
examined. In this kind I will give an in- 
stance or two, for example sake, of things 
that are most obvious and familiar : the one 
is a matter, which though it be ancient and 
general, yet I hold it to be an error ; which 
is, that scholars in universities come too 
soon and too unripe to logic and rhetoric, 
arts fitter for graduates than children and no- 
vices : for these tw r o, rightly taken, are the 
gravest of sciences, being the arts of arts ; 



134 

the one for judgment* the other for orfla* 
ment ; and they be the rules and direc- 
tions how to set forth and dispose matter ; 
and therefore for minds empty and un- 
fraught with matter* and which have not 
gathered that which Cicero calleth sylva and 
supellex, stuff and variety, to begin with 
those arts, (as if one should learn to weigh, 
or to measure, or to paint the wind,) doth 
w r ork but this effect, that the wisdom of 
those arts, which is great and universal, is 
almost made contemptible, and is degene- 
rate into childish sophistry and ridiculous 
affectation. And farther, the untimely learn- 
ing of them hath drawn on, by consequence, 
the superficial and unprofitable teaching and 
writing of them, as fittest indeed to the ca- 
pacity of children. Another is a lack I find 
in the exercises used in the universities, 
which do make too great a divorce between 
invention and memory; for their speeches 
are either premeditate, in verbis conceptis, 
where nothing is left to invention ; or 
merely extemporal, where little is left to 
memory ; whereas in life and action there 
is least use of either of these, but rather 



iS5 

of intermixtures of premeditation and inven- 
tion, notes and memory ; so as the exercise 
fitteth not the practice, nor the image the 
life; and it is ever a true rule in exer- 
cises, that they be framed as near as may 
be to the life of practice, for otherwise 
they do pervert the motions and faculties of 
the mind, and not prepare them* The truth 
whereof is not obscure, when scholars come 
to the practices of professions, or other ac- 
tions of civil life ; which when they set into, 
this want is soon found by themselves, and 
sooner by others. But this part, touching 
the amendment of the institutions and or- 
ders of universities, I will conclude with the 
clause of Caesar's letter to Oppius and Balbus, 
Hoc quemadmodum fieri possit, nonnulla mihi 
in mentem veniunt, et multa reperiri possunt ; 
de Us rebus rogo vos ut cogitationem suscipiatis. 

Another defect, which I note, ascendeth 5. 

Tii-i i i i n * n Tfant °f 

a little higher than the precedent; for as correspond- 

ence with 

the proficience of learning , consisteth much foreign uni- 

. versities. 

in the orders and institutions of universi- 
ties in the same states and kingdoms, so it 
would be yet more advanced, if there were 
more intelligence mutual between the uni- 



136 

versities of Europe than now there is. We 
see there be many orders and foundations, 
which though they be divided under several 
sovereignties and territories, yet they take 
themselves to have a kind of contract, fra- 
ternity, and correspondence one with ano- 
ther, insomuch as they have provincials and 
generals. And surely as nature createth 
brotherhood in families, and arts mechani- 
cal contract brotherhoods in commonalties, 
and the anointment of God superinduceth 
a brotherhood in kings and bishops; so in 
like manner there cannot but be a frater- 
nity in learning and illumination, relating 
to that paternity which is attributed to God, 
who is called the father of illuminations or 
lights. 
innofap- ^ e ^ ast defect which I will note is, that 

?uirers g into the re hath not been, or very rarely been, 
of rt know- arts an y Public designation of writers or in- 
Jedge. quirers concerning such parts of know- 

ledge as may appear not to have been 
already sufficiently laboured or undertaken ; 
unto which point it is an inducement to 
enter into a view and examination what 
parts of learning have been prosecuted, 



137 
and what omitted : for the opinion of 
plenty is amongst the causes of want, and 
the great quantity of books maketh a shew 
rather of superfluity than lack ; which sur- 
charge, nevertheless, is not to be remedied 
by making no more books, but by making 
more good books, which, as the serpent 
of Moses, might devour the serpents of the 
enchanters. 

The removing of all the defects formerly 
enumerated, except the last, and of the ac- 
tive part also of the last, (which is the de- 
signation of writers,) are opera basilica ; 
towards which the endeavours of a private 
man may be but as an image in a cross - 
way, that may point at the way, but cannot 
go it : but the inducing part of the latter, 
which is the survey of learning, may be set 
forward by private travel. Wherefore I will Purpose of 

this book. 

now attempt to make a general and faithful 
perambulation of learning, with an inquiry 
what parts thereof lie fresh and waste, and 
not improved and converted by the indus- 
try of man ; to the end that such a plot, 
made and recorded to memory, may both 
minister light to any public designation, and 



138 



also serve to excite voluntary endeavours : 
wherein nevertheless, my purpose is at this 
time to note only omissions and deficien- 
cies, and not to make any redargution of 
errors, or incomplete prosecutions ; for it is 
one thing to set forth what ground lieth un- 
manured, and another thing to correct ill 
husbandry in that which is manured. 

In the handling and undertaking of which 
work I am not ignorant what it is that I do 
now move and attempt, nor insensible of mine 
own weakness to sustain my purpose ; but my 
hope is that, if my extreme love to learning 
carry me too far, I may obtain the excuse of 
affection ; for that " it is not granted to man 
" to love and to be wise." But, I know well, I 
can use no other liberty of judgment than I 
must leave to others ; and I, for my part, 
shall be indifferently glad either to perform 
myself, or accept from another, that duty of 
humanity ; Nam qui erranti comiter monstrat 
viam, etc. I do foresee likewise, that of those 
things which I shall enter and register as 
deficiencies and omissions, many will con- 
ceive and censure that some of them are 
already done and extant; others to be but 



139 



curiosities* and things of no great use ; and 
others to be of too great difficulty, and al- 
most impossibility to be compassed and 
effected : but for the two first> I refer myself 
to the particulars ; for the last, touching im- 
possibility, I take it those things are to be 
held possible which may be done by some 
person, though not by every one ; and which 
may be done by many, though not by any 
one ; and which may be done in succession 
of ages, though not within the hour-glass of 
one man's life ; and which may be done by 
public designation, though not by private 
endeavour. 

But, notwithstanding, if any man will take 
to himself rather that of Solomon, Dicit piger, 
Leo est in via, than that of Virgil, Possunt, 
quia posse videntur ; I shall be content that 
my labours be esteemed but as the better 
sort of wishes ; for as it asketh some know- 
ledge to demand a question not impertinent, 
so it requireth some sense to make a wish not 
absurd. 



THE parts of human learning have re- Distribution 

of the parts 

ference to the three parts of man's Under- of Learning. 



140 



standing, which is the seat of learning : His- 
tory to his Memory, Poesy to his Imagina- 
tion, and Philosophy to his Reason. Divine 
learning receiveth the same distribution ; for 
the spirit of man is the same, though the 
revelation of oracle and sense be diverse : so 
as theology consisteth also of history of the 
church ; of parables, which is divine poesy ; 
and of holy doctrine or precept : for as for 
that part which seemeth supernumerary, 
which is prophecy, it is but divine history; 
which hath that prerogative over human^ as 
the narration may be before the fact as well 
as after 



HISTORY. 

History is Natural, Civil, Ecclesiastical^ 
and Literary ; whereof the three first I allow 
1. as extant, the fourth I note as deficient. For 
tory. no man hath propounded to himself the ge- 

neral state of Jearning to be described and 
represented from age to age, as many have 
done the works of nature, and the state civil 
and ecclesiastical ; without which the history 



141 



of the world seemeth to me to be as the statue 
of Polyphemus with his eye out ; that part 
being wanting which doth most shew the 
spirit and life of the person : And yet I am 
not ignorant that in divers particular sciences, 
as of the jurisconsults, the mathematicians, 
the rhetoricians, the philosophers, there are 
set down some small memorials of the schools, 
authors and books; and so likewise some 
barren relations touching the invention of 
arts or usages. 

But a just story of learning, containing the 
antiquities and originals of knowledges and 
their sects, their inventions, their traditions, 
their diverse administrations and managings, 
their flourishings, their oppositions, decays, 
depressions, oblivions, removes, with the 
causes and occasions of them, and all other 
events concerning learning, throughout the 
ages of the world, I may truly affirm to be 
wanting. 

The use and end of which work I do not so 
much design for curiosity, or satisfaction of 
those that are the lovers of learning, but 
chiefly for a more serious and grave purpose ? 
which is this in few words, that it will make 



142 

learned men wise in the use and administra- 
tion of learning. For it is not St. Augustine's 
nor St. Ambrose's works that will make so 
wise a divine as ecclesiastical history tho- 
roughly read and observed; and the same 
reason is of learning. 

^ a t U rai His- History of Nature is of three sorts ; of na- 

t0ly * ture in course, of nature erring or varying, 

and of nature altered or wrought; that is 

history of creatures, history of marvels, and 

history of arts. 

The first of these, no doubt, is extant, and 

that in good perfection ; the two latter are 

handled so weakly and unprofitably, as I am 

moved to note them as deficient. 

History of ;p or j £ n( j no sufficient or competent col- 

marvels den- r 

dent. lection of the works of nature which have a 

digression and deflexion from the ordinary 
course of generations, productions, and mo- 
tions ; whether they be singularities of place 
and region, or the strange events of time and 
chance, or the effects of yet unknown pro- 
perties, or the instances of exception to ge- 
neral kinds : it is true, I find a number of 
books of fabulous experiments and secrets, and 
frivolous impostures for pleasure and strange- 



143 



ness ; but a substantial and severe collection 
of the heteroclites or irregulars of nature, well 
examined and described, I find not, especially 
not with due rejection of fables and popular 
errors: for as things now are, if an untruth 
in nature be once on foot, what by reason of 
the neglect of examination, and countenance 
of antiquity, and what by reason of the use 
of the opinion in similitudes and ornaments 
of speech, it is never called down. 

The use of this work, honoured with a 
precedent in Aristotle, is nothing less than 
to give contentment to the appetite of curi- 
ous and vain wits, as the manner of mira- 
bilaries is to do ; but for two reasons, both 
of great weight ; the one, to correct the par- 
tiality of axioms and opinions, which are 
commonly framed only upon common and 
familiar examples; the other, because from 
the wonders of nature is the nearest intelli- 
gence and passage towards the wonders of 
art : for it is no more but by following, 
and as it were hounding nature in her wan- 
derings, to be able to lead her afterwards to 
the same place again. 

Neither am I of opinion, in this history of 



144 



marvels, that superstitious narrations of sor- 
ceries, witchcrafts, dreams, divinations, and 
the like, where there is an assurance and 
clear evidence of the fact, be altogether ex- 
cluded. For it is not yet known iu what 
cases and how far effects attributed to super- 
stition do participate of natural causes : and 
therefore howsoever the practice of such 
things is to be condemned, yet from the spe- 
culation and consideration of them light may 
be taken, not only for the discerning of the 
offences, but for the farther disclosing of na- 
ture. Neither ought a man to make scruple 
of entering into these things for inquisition 
of truth, as your majesty hath shewed in 
your own example ; who with the two clear 
eyes of religion and natural philosophy have 
looked deeply and wisely into these shadows, 
and yet proved yourself to be of the nature of 
the sun, which passeth through pollutions, 
and itself remains as pure as before. 

But this I hold fit, that these narrations, 
which have mixture with superstition, be 
sorted by themselves, and not be mingled 
with the narrations which are merely and 
sincerely natural. 



145 

But as for the narrations touching the pro- 
digies and miracles of religions, they are 
either not true, or not natural ; and there- 
fore impertinent for the story of nature. 

For history of nature wrought or mecha- History of 

• ", T > t « • 1 O ArtS defiCi " 

meal, I hnd some collections made ot agn- ent. 
culture, and likewise of manual arts; but 
commonly with a rejection of experiments 
familiar and vulgar. 

For it is esteemed a kind of dishonour unto 
learning to descend to inquiry or medita- 
tion upon matters mechanical, except they 
be such as may be thought secrets, rarities, 
and special subtilties ; which humour of vain 
and supercilious arrogancy is justly derided 
in Plato; where he brings in Hippias, a 
vaunting sophist, disputing with Socrates, a 
true and unfeigned inquisitor of truth; where 
the subject being touching beauty, Socrates, 
after his wandering manner of inductions, 
put first an example of a fair virgin, and then 
of a fair horse, and then of a fair pot well 
glazed, whereat Hippias was offended ; and 
said, " More^ than for courtesy's sake, he 
" did think much to dispute with any that 
if did aliedge such base and sordid in- 



146 



te stances :" whereunto Socrates answered, 
" You have reason, and it becomes you well, 
" being a man so trim in your vestments." 
etc. And so goeth on in irony. 

But the truth is, they be not the highest 
instances that give the securest information ; 
as may be well expressed in the tale so com- 
mon of the philosopher, that while he gazed 
upwards to the stars fell into the water ; for 
if he had looked down he might have seen 
the stars in the water, but looking aloft he 
could not see the water in the stars. So it 
cometh often to pass, that mean and small 
things discover great, better than great can 
discover the small ; and therefore Aristotle 
noteth well, " that the nature of every thing 
" is best seen in its smallest portions." And 
for that cause he inquireth the nature of a 
commonwealth, first in a family, and the sim- 
ple conjugations of man and wife, parent 
and child, master and servant, which are in 
every cottage. Even so likewise the nature of 
this great city of the world, and the policy 
thereof, must be first sought in mean con- 
cordances and small portions. So we see how 
that secret of nature, of the turning of iron 



147 



touched with the loadstone towards the north, 
was found out in needles of iron, not in bars 
of iron. 

But if my judgment he of any weight, the 
use of History Mechanical is of all others 
the most radical and fundamental towards 
natural philosophy ; such natural philosophy 
as shall not vanish in the fume of subtile, sub- 
lime, or delectable speculation, but such as 
■shall be operative to the endowment and be- 
nefit of man's life : for it will not only mi- 
nister and suggest for the present many in- 
genious practices in all trades, by a connexion 
and transferring of the observations of one 
art to the use of another, when the experi- 
ences of several mysteries shall fall under the 
consideration of one man's mind; but far- 
ther, it will give a more true and real illumi- 
nation concerning causes and axioms than is 
hitherto attained. 

For like as a man's disposition is never 
well known till he be crossed, nor Proteus 
ever changed shapes till he was straitened 
and held fast ; so the passages and variations 
of nature cannot appear so fully in the liberty 
l2 



148 

of nature, as in the trials and vexations of 
art. 

^ ., 3 - For Civil History, it is of three kinds; 

Civil History. J 9 

not unfitly to be compared with the three 
kinds of pictures or images : for of pictures 
or images, we see, some are unfinished, some 
are perfect, and some are defaced. So of 
histories we may find three kinds, Memorials, 
Perfect Histories, and Antiquities; for me- 
morials are history unfinished, or the first or 
rough draughts of history ; and antiquities 
are history defaced, or some remnants of his- 
tory which have casually escaped the ship- 
wreck of time. 
Of Memo- Memorials, or preparatory history, are of 

~~ two sorts ; whereof the one may be termed 
Commentaries, and the other Registers. Com- 
mentaries are they which set down a con- 
tinuance of the naked events and actions, 
without the motives or designs, the counsels, 
the speeches, the pretexts, the occasions and 
other passages of action : for this is the true 
nature of a Commentary ; though Caesar, in 
modesty mixed with greatness, did for his 



149 

pleasure apply the name of a Commentary 
to the best history of the world. Registers 
are collections of public acts, as decrees of 
council, judicial proceedings, declarations 
and letters of state, orations and the like, 
without a perfect continuance or contexture 
of the thread of the narration. 

Antiquities? or remnants of history, are, ^o* 
as was said, tanquam tabula naufragii ; when 
industrious persons, by an exact and scrupu- 
lous diligence and observation, out of monu*- 
ments, names, words, proverbs, traditions, 
private records and evidences, fragments of 
stories, passages of books that concern not 
story, and the like, do save and recover 
somewhat from the deluge of time. 

In these kinds of imperfect histories I do 
assign no deficience, for they are tanquam im~ 
perfecte mista ; and therefore any deficience 
in them is but their nature* 

As for the corruptions and moths of his- Epitomes, 
tory, which are Epitomes, the use of them 
deserveth to be banished, as all men of sound 
judgment have confessed ; as those that have 
fretted- and corroded the sound bodies of many 



150 

excellent histories, and wrought them into 
base and unprofitable dregs. 
Perfect His- History, which may be called Just and Per* 

tory of three * J 

kinds. f ec t History, is of three kinds, according to 

the object which it propoundeth, or pre- 
tendeth to represent: for it either repre- 
sented a time, or a person, or an action. 
The first we call Chronicles, the second Lives, 
and the third Narrations or Relations. 

Of these, although the first be the most 
complete and absolute kind of history, and 
hath most estimation and glory, yet the se- 
cond excelleth it in profit and use, and the 
third in verity and sincerity : for history of 
times representeth the magnitude of actions, 
and the public faces and deportments of per- 
sons, and passeth over in silence the smaller 
passages and motions of men and matters. 

But such being the workmanship of God, 
as he doth hang the greatest weight upon 
the smallest wires, maxima e minimis sus- 
pendens, it comes therefore to pass, that such 
histories do rather set forth the pomp of busi- 
ness than the true and inward resorts there- 
of. But Lives, if they be well written, pro-* 
pounding to themselves a person to repre- 



151 

sent, m whom actions both greater and 
-smaller, public, and private, have a commix- 
ture, must of a necessity contain a more true> 
native, and lively representation. So again 
narrations and relations of actions, as the 
War of Peloponnesus, the Expedition of 
Cyrus Minor, the Conspiracy of Catiline, 
cannot but be more purely and exactly true 
than histories of times, because they may 
choose an argument comprehensible within 
the notice and instructions of the writer: 
whereas he that undertaketh the story of a 
time, especially of any length, cannot but 
meet with many blanks and spaces which 
he must be forced to fill up out of his own 
wit and conjecture. 

For the History of Times, I mean of civil of 
history, the providence of God hath made the 
distribution: for it hath pleased God to, or- 
dain and illustrate two exemplar states of the 
world for arms, learning, moral virtue, po- 
licy, and laws; the state of Graecia, and the 
state of Rome ; the histories whereof, occu- 
pying the middle part of time, have more an- 
cient to them, histories which may by one 
common name be termed the Antiquities of 



\5t 

the world; and after them, histories which 
may be likewise called by the name of Mo* 
dern History. 
Heathen An- Now to speak of the deficiencies. As to 

tiquities. x 

the heathen antiquities of the world, it is in 
vain to note them for deficient: deficient 
they are no doubt> consisting mostly of fables 
and fragments ; but the deficience cannot be 
holpen ; for antiquity is like fame, caput inter 
nubila condit, her head is muffled from our 
sight. For the history of the exemplar states, 
it is extant in jgood perfection. Not but I 
could wish there were a perfect course of 
history for Graecia from Theseus to Philo- 
pcemen, (what time the affairs of Graecia 
were drowned and extinguished in the affairs 
of Rome ;) and for Rome from Romulus to 
Justinianus, who may be truly said to be 
ultimus Romanorum. In which sequences of 
story the text of Thucydides and Xenophon 
in the one, and the text of Livius, Polybius, 
' Sallustius, Caesar, Appianus, Tacitus, Hero- 
dianus in the other, to be kept intire with- 
out any diminution at all, and only to be 
supplied and continued. But this is matter 
of magnificence, rather to be commended 



153 

than required : and we speak now of parts of 
learning supplemental, and not of superero- 
gation. 

But for modern Histories, whereof there Unworthi- 

ness of the 

are some few very worthy, but the greater histories of 

J < J to England and 

part beneath mediocrity, (leaving the care Scotland. 
of foreign stories to foreign states, because I 
will not be curiosus in aliena republica,) I 
cannot fail to represent to your majesty 
the unworthiness of the history of England 
in the main continuance thereof, and the 
partiality and obliquity of that of Scotland 
in the latest and largest author that I have 
seen : supposing that it would be honour 
for your majesty, and a work very me- 
morable, if this island of Great Britain, as 
it is now joined in monarchy for the ages 
to come, so were joined in one history for 
the times passed ; after the manner of the 
sacred history, which draweth down the 
story of the ten tribes and of the two tribes, 
as twins, together. And if it shall seem that 
the greatness of this work may make it less 
exactly performed, there is an excellent 
period of a smaller compass of time, as to 
the story of England ; that is to say, from 



154 



the uniting of the roses to the uniting of 
the kingdoms ; a portion of time, wherein, 
to my understanding, there hath been the 
rarest varieties that in like number of suc- 
cessions of any hereditary monarchy hath 
been known : for it beginneth with the mix- 
ed adeption of a crown by arms and title ; 
an entry by battle, an establishment by mar- 
riage ; and therefore times answerable, like 
waters after a tempest, full of working and 
swelling, though without extremity of storm ; 
but well passed through by the wisdom of 
the pilot, being one of the most sufficient 
kings of all the number. Then followeth 
the reign of a king, whose actions, howso- 
ever conducted, had much intermixture with 
the affairs of Europe, balancing and in- 
clining them variably ; in whose time also 
began that great alteration in the state ec- 
clesiastical, an action which seldom cometh 
upon the stage. Then the reign of a minor : 
then an offer of an usurpation, though it 
was but as febris ephemera: then the reign 
of a queen matched with a foreigner : then 
of a queen that lived solitary and unmar- 
ried, and yet her government so masculine 



155 



as it had greater impression and operation 
upon the states abroad than it any ways re^- 
ceived from thence. And now last, this most 
happy and glorious event, that this island 
of Britain, divided from all the world, should 
be united in itself : and that oracle of rest, 
given to iEneas, Antiquam exquirite ?natrem, 
should now be performed and fulfilled upon 
the nations of England and Scotland, being 
now reunited in the ancient mother name 
of Britain, as a full period of all instabi- 
lity and peregrinations : so that as it cometh 
to pass in massive bodies, that they have 
certain trepidations and waverings before 
they fix and settle ; so it seemeth that by 
the providence of God this monarchy, be- 
fore it was to settle in your majesty and 
your generations, (in which, I hope, it is 
now established for ever,) it had these pre- 
lusive changes and varieties. 

For Lives, I do find strange that these of Lives, 
times have so little esteemed the virtues of 
the times, as that the writing of lives should 
be no more frequent. For although there 
be not many sovereign princes or absolute 
commanders, and that states are most col- 



156 



lected into monarchies, yet there are many 
worthy personages that deserve better than 
dispersed report or barren eulogies. For 
herein the invention of one of the late 
poets is proper, and doth well enrich the 
ancient fiction : for he feigneth that at the 
end of the i thread or web of every man's 
life there was a little medal containing the 
person's name, and that Time waited upon 
the shears ; and as soon as the thread was 
cut, caught the medals, and carried them 
to the river of Lethe ; and about the 
bank there were many birds flying up and 
down, that would get the medals and carry 
them in their beak a little while, and then 
let them fall into the river : only there were 
a few swans, which if they got a name, 
would carry it to a temple where it was 
consecrated. 

And though many men, more mortal in 
their affections than in their bodies, do 
esteem desire of name and memory but as 
a vanity and ventosity, 

Animi nil magna laudis egentes ; 
which opinion cometh from the root, non 
prius laudes contempsimus, quam laudanda fa* 



157 

cere desivimus ; yet that will not alter Solo- 
mon's judgment, Memoria justi cum laudi- 
bus, at impiorum nomen putrescet : the one 
flourisheth, the other either consumeth to 
present oblivion, or turneth to an ill odour. 

And therefore in that stile or addition, 
which is and hath been long well received 
and brought in use, felicis memories, pi& 
memoriae, bonce memories, we do acknowledge 
that which Cicero saith, borrowing it from 
Demosthenes, that bona fama propria possessio 
defunctorum ; which possession I cannot but 
note that in our times it lieth much waste, 
and that therein there is a deficience. 

For Narrations and Relations of particu- of Nan*. 
lar actions, there were also to be wished a 
greater diligence therein ; for there is no 
great action but hath some good pen which 
attends it. 

And because it is an ability not eommon 
to write a good history, as may well appear 
by the small number of them ; yet if par* 
ticularity of actions memorable were but 
tolerably reported as they pass, the com- 
piling of a complete history of times might 
be the better expected, when a writer should 



158 

arise that were fit for it : for the collection 
of such relations might be as a nursery- 
garden, whereby to plant a fair and stately 
garden, when time should serve. 
Annals and There is yet another partitionSrf history 

Journals. 

which Cornelius Tacitus maketh, which is 
not to be forgotten, especially with that ap- 
plication which he accoupleth it withal* 
Annals and Journals : appropriating to the 
former matters of state, and to the latter 
acts and accidents of a meaner nature. For 
giving but a touch of certain magnificent 
buildings, he addeth, Cum ex dignitate populi 
Romani repertum sit, res illustres annalibus, 
talia diurnis urbis actis mandare. So as there 
is a kind of contemplative heraldry, as well 
as civil. And as nothing doth derogate from 
the dignity of a state more than confusion 
of degrees ; so it doth not a little embase 
the authority of an history, to intermingle 
matters of triumph, or matters of ceremony, 
or matters of novelty, with matters of state. 
But the use of a journal hath not only been 
in the history of time, but likewise in the 
history of persons, and chiefly of actions ; 
for princes in ancient time had, upon point 



159 

of honor and policy both, journals kept of 
what passed day by day : for we see the 
Chronicle which was read before Ahasuerus, 
when he could not take rest, contained 
matter of affairs indeed, but such as had 
passed in his own time, and very lately be- 
fore : but the journal of Alexander's house 
expressed every small particularity, even 
concerning his person and court ; and it is 
yet an use well received in enterprises me- 
morable, as expeditions of war, navigations, 
and the like, to keep diaries of that which 
passeth continually. 

I cannot likewise be ignorant of a form Ruminated 

« . . l • i i or philoso- 

ot writing, which some grave and wise men pnicai his- 
have used, containing a scattered history of 
those actions which they have thought worthy 
of memory, with politic discourse and ob- 
servation thereupon ; not incorporated into 
the history, but separately, and as the more 
principal in their intention ; which kind of 
ruminated history I think more fit to place 
amongst books of policy, whereof w r e shall 
hereafter speak, than amongst books of his- 
tory : for it is the true office of history to 
represent the events themselves together with 



the counsels, and to leave the observations 
and conclusions thereupon to the liberty and 
faculty of every man's judgment ; but mix- 
tures are things irregular, whereof no man 
can define. 
History of So also is there another kind of history 
phy. ° manifoldly mixed, and that is History of 
Cosmography; being compounded of natural 
history, in respect of the regions themselves ; 
of history civil, in respect of the habitations, 
regimens, and manners of the people ; and 
the mathematics, in respect of the climates 
and configurations towards the heavens : 
which part 01 learning of all others, in this 
latter time, hath obtained most proficience # 
For it may be truly affirmed to* the honour 
of these times, and in a virtuous emulation 
with antiquity, that this great building of 
the world had never thorough lights made 
in it, till the age of us and our fathers : 
for although they had knowledge of the 
antipodes, 
Nosque ubi primus equis oriens afflavit anhelis, 
. Iilic sera rubens accendit lumina Vesper : 
yet that might be by demonstration, and 
not in fact; and if by travel, it requiretk 



161 



the voyage but of half the globe. But to 
circle the earth, as the heavenly bodies do, 
was not done or enterprised till these latter 
times: and therefore these times may justly 
bear in their word, not only plus ultra, in 
precedence of the ancient non ultra, and imi- 
tabile fulmen, in precedence of the ancient 
non imitabile fulmen , 

Demens qui nimbos et non imitabile fulmen, etc. 
but likewise imitabile codum; in respect of the 
many memorable voyages, after the manner 
of heaven, about the globe of the earth. 

And this proficience in navigation and dis- 
coveries may plant also an expectation of the 
farther proficience and augmentation of all 
sciences ; because it may seem they are or- 
dained by God to be coevals, that is, to meet 
one age. For so the prophet Daniel, speak- 
ing of the latter times, foretelleth, Plurimi 
pertransibunt, et multiplex erit scientia; as if 
the openness and thorough passage of the 
world and the increase of knowledge were 
appointed to be in the same ages, as we see 
it is already performed in great part; the 
learning of these latter times not much giv- 
ing place to the former two periods- or re- 



162 



turns of learning, the one of the Grecians, 
the other of the Romans. 



Ecclesiastical 
History. 



History of 
the Church. 



History of 
2 5 rophecy. 



History ecclesiastical receiveth the same 
divisions with history civil: but farther, in 
the propriety thereof, may be divided into 
the History of the church, by a general 
name; History of prophecy ; and History of 
providence. 

The first describeth the times of the mili- 
tant church, whether it be fluctuant, as the 
ark of Noah ; or moveable, as the ark in the 
wilderness ; or at rest, as the ark in the 
temple ; that is, the state of the church in 
persecution, in remove, and in peace. This 
part I ought in no sort to note as deficient, 
only I would that the virtue and sincerity of 
it were according to the mass and quantity. 
But I am not now in hand with censures, 
but with omissions. 

The second, which is history of prophecy, 
consisteth of two relatives, the prophecy, and 
the accomplishment; and therefore the na- 
ture of such a work ought to be, that every 
prophecy of the scripture be sorted with the 
event fulfilling the same, throughout the ages 



163 

of the world; both for the better confirma- 
tion of faith, and for the better illumination 
of the church touching those parts of prophe- 
cies which are yet unfulfilled : allowing- never- 
theless that latitude which is agreeable and 
familiar unto divine prophecies; being of 
the nature of their author, with whom a 
thousand years are but as one day; and 
therefore are not fulfilled punctually at once, 
but have springing and germinant accom- 
plishment throughout many ages; though 
the height or fulness of them may refer to 
some one age. 

This is a work which I find deficient ; but 
is to be done with wisdom, sobriety, and re- 
verence, or not at all. 

The third, which is history of providence, History of 
containeth that excellent correspondence 
which is between God's revealed will and 
his secret will : which though it be so ob- 
scure, as for the most part it is not legible to 
the natural man; no, nor many times to 
those who behold it from the tabernacle; 
yet at some times it pleaseth God, for our 
better establishment, and the confuting of 
m 2 



164 

those which are as without God in the world, 
to write it in such text and capital letters/ 
that as the prophet saith, he that runneth by 
may read it; that is, mere sensual persons, 
which hasten by God's judgments and never 
bend or fix their cogitations upon them, are 
nevertheless in their passage and race urged 
to discern it. Such are the notable events 
and examples of God's judgments, chastise- 
ments, deliverances, and blessings ; and this 
is a work which hath passed through the la- 
bours of many, and therefore I cannot pre- 
sent as omitted. 
of the Ap- There are also other parts of learning 
ffi»toiy. which are Appendices to history : for all the 
exterior proceedings of man consist of words 
and deeds ; whereof history doth properly 
receive and retain in memory the deeds; 
and if words, yet but as inducements and 
passages to deeds : so are there other books 
and writings, which are appropriated to the 
custody and receipt of words only; which 
likewise are of three sorts ; Orations, Letters, 
and brief Speeches or Sayings. 

Orations are pleadings, speeches of conn- 



165 



sel, laudatives, invectives, apologies, repre- 
hensions, orations of formality or ceremony, 
and the like. 

Letters are according to all the variety of 
occasions, advertisements, advices, directions, 
propositions, petitions, commendatory, ex- 
postulatory, satisfactory; of compliment, of 
pleasure, of discourse, and all other passages 
of action. And such as are written from 
wise men, are of all the words of man, in 
my judgment, the best; for they are more 
natural than orations and public speeches, 
and more advised than conferences or pre- 
sent speeches. So again letters of affairs 
from such as manage them, or are privy to 
them, are of all others the best instructions 
for history, and to a diligent reader the best 
histories in themselves. 

For Apophthegms, it is a great loss of that 
book of Caesar's ; for as his history, and those 
few letters of his which we have, and those 
apophthegms which were of his own, excel 
all mens' else, so I suppose would his collec- 
tion of apophthegms have done ; for as for 
those which are collected by others, either I 
have no taste in such matters, or else their 



166 



choice hath not been happy. But upon these 
three kinds of writings I do not insist, be- 
cause I have no deficiencies to propound con- 
cerning them. 

Thus much therefore concerning history ; 
which is that part of learning which an- 
swereth to one of the cells, domiciles, or of- 
fices of the mind of man ; which is that of 
the memory. 



POESY. 

The nature Poesy is a part of learning in measure of 

of Poesy : it's L ° 

two senses. WO rds for the most part restrained, but in all 
other points extremely licensed, and doth 
truly refer to the imagination ; which, being 
not tied to the laws of matter, may at plea- 
sure join that which nature hath severed, 
and sever that which nature hath joined; 
and so make unlawful matches and divorces 
of things ; Pictoribus atque poetis, etc. It is 
taken in two senses, in respect of words, or 
matter; in the first sense it is but a charac- 
ter of stile, and belongeth to arts of speech, 
and is not pertinent for the present : in the 



167 

latter, it is, as hath been said, one of the 
principal portions of learning, and is nothing 
else but feigned history, which may be stiled 
as well in prose as in verse. 

The use of this feigned history hath been Use of Poesy. 
to give some shadow of satisfaction to the 
mind of man in those points wherein the na- 
ture of things doth deny it, the world being 
in proportion inferior to the soul ; by reason 
whereof there is, agreeable to the spirit of 
man, a more ample greatness, a more exact 
goodness, and a more absolute variety, than 
can be found in the nature of things. There- 
fore, because the acts or events of true his- 
tory have not that magnitude which satis- 
fieth the mind of man, poesy feigneth acts 
and events greater and more heroical : be- 
cause true history propoundeth the successes 
and issues of actions not so agreeable to the 
merits of virtue and vice, therefore poesy 
feigns them more just in retribution, and 
more according to revealed providence : 
because true history representeth actions 
and events more ordinary, and less inter- 
changed, therefore poesy endueth them 
with more rareness, and more unexpected 



168 

and alternative variations : so as it appeareth 
that poesy serveth and conferreth to mag- 
nanimity, morality, and to delectation. And 
therefore it was ever thought to have some 
participation of divineness, because it doth 
raise and erect the mind, by submitting the 
shews of things to the desires of the mind ; 
whereas reason doth buckle and bow the 
mind unto the nature of things. 

And we see, that by these insinuations 
and congruities with man's nature and plea- 
sure, joined also with the agreement and 
consort it hath with music, it hath had access 
and estimation in rude times and barba- 
rous regions, where other learning stood ex- 
cluded. 
Poesy, nar- The division of poesy, which is aptest in 

rative, repre- f ,'.,... 

sentathe, and the propriety thereof, (besides those divisions 

allusive. 

which are common unto it with history, as 
feigned chronicles, feigned lives, and the 
appendices of history, as feigned epistles, 
feigned orations, and the rest) is into Poesy 
Narrative, Representative, and Allusive. 

The Narrative is a mere imitation of his- 
tory, with the excesses before remember- 
ed; choosing for subject commonly wars and 



169 



love, rarely state, and sometimes pleasure or 
mirth. 

Representative is as a visible history ; and 
is an image of actions as if they were present, 
as history is of actions in nature as they are, 
that is past. 

Allusive or parabolical is a narration ap- 
plied only to express some special purpose 
or conceit: which latter kind of parabolical 
wisdom was much more in use in the ancient 
times, as by the fables of iEsop, and the brief 
sentences of the Seven, and the use of hiero- 
glyphics, may appear. And the cause was, 
for that it was then of necessity to express 
any point of reason, which was more sharp 
or subtile than the vulgar, in that manner ; 
because men in those times wanted both va- 
riety of examples and subtilty of conceit : 
and as hieroglyphics were before letters, so 
parables were before arguments. And never- 
theless now, and at all times, they do retain 
much life and vigour ; because reason cannot 
be so sensible, nor examples so fit. 
" But there remaineth yet another use of 
poesy parabolical, opposite to that which we 
last mentioned : for that tendeth to demon- 



170 

strate and illustrate that which is taught or 
delivered, and this other to retire and ob- 
scure it : that is, when the secrets and mys- 
teries of religion, policy, or philosophy, are 
involved in fables and parables. 
Exposition Of this in divine poesy we see the use is 

of certain 

febies. authorised. In heathen poesy we see the ex- 

position of fables doth fall out sometimes 
with great felicity ; as in the fable that the 
giants being overthrown in their war against 
the gods, the Earth their mother in revenge 
thereof brought forth Fame : 

Illam terra parens ira irritata deorutn, 
Extremam, ut perhibent, Cceo Enceladoque 
sororem Progenuit. 

Expounded, that when Princes and mo- 
narchies have suppressed actual and open 
rebels, then the malignity of people, which 
is the mother of rebellion, doth bring forth 
libels and slanders, and taxations of the state, 
which is of the same kind with rebellion, but 
more feminine. So in the fable, that the 
rest of the gods having conspired to bind Ju- 
piter, Pallas called Briareus with his hun- 
dred hands to his aid : expounded, that mo- 



171 



narchies need not fear any curbing of their 
absoluteness by mighty subjects, as long as 
by wisdom they keep the hearts of the peo- 
ple, who will be sure to come in on their 
side. So in the fable, that Achilles was 
brought up under Chiron the Centaur, who 
was part a man and part a beast ; expound- 
ed ingeniously, but corruptly by Machiavel, 
that it belongeth to the education and disci- 
pline of princes to know as well how to play 
the part of the lion in violence, and the fox 
in guile, as of the man in virtue and jus- 
tice. 

Nevertheless, in many the like encounters, 
I do rather think that the fable was first, 
and the exposition devised, than that the mo- 
ral was first, and thereupon the fable framed. 
For I find it was an ancient vanity in Chry- 
sippus, that troubled himself with great con- 
tention to fasten the assertions of the Stoics 
upon fictions of the ancient poets ; but yet 
that all the fables and fictions of the poets 
were but pleasure and not figure, I inter- 
pose no opinion. 

Surely of those poets which are now ex- 
tant, even Homer himself, notwithstanding 



172 



he was made a kind of Scripture by the lat- 
ter schools of the Grecians, yet I should with- 
out any difficulty pronounce that his fables 
had no such inwardness in his own meaning ; 
but what they might have upon a more ori- 
ginal tradition, is not easy to affirm, for he 
was not the inventor of many of them. 

In this third part of learning, which is 
poesy, I can report no deficience. For be- 
ing as a plant that cometh of the lust of the 
earth, without a formal seed, it hath sprung 
up and spread abroad more than any other 
kind : but to ascribe unto it that which is 
due, for the expression of affections, pas- 
sions, corruptions, and customs, we are be- 
holden to poets more than to philosophers' 
works ; and for wit and eloquence, not much 
less than to orators' harangues. But it is 
not good to stay too long in the theatre. Let 
us now pass to the judicial place or palace 
of the mind, which we are to approach and 
view with more reverence and attention. 

PHILOSOPHY. 

The knowledge of man is as the waters, 
some descending from above, and some 



173 

springing from beneath ; the one informed 
by the light of nature/ the other inspired 
by divine revelation. 

The light of nature consisteth in the no- 
tions of the mind and the reports of the 
senses : for as for knowledge which man 
receiveth by teaching, it is cumulative and 
not original ; as in a water that, besides his 
own spring-head, is fed with other springs 
and streams. So then, according to these 
two differing illuminations or originals, 
knowledge is first of all divided into Divi- 
nity and Philosophy. 

In Philosophy, the contemplations of man Three enqui- 
do either penetrate unto God, — or are cir- lophy. * °" 
cumferred to nature, — or are reflected or 
reverted upon himself. Out of which seve- 
ral enquiries there do arise three know- 
ledges, Divine philosophy, Natural philoso- 
phy, and Human philosophy or Humanity. 
For all things are marked and stamped 
with this triple character, of the power of 
God, the difference of nature, and the use 
of man. 

But because the distributions and parti- Primitive or 

niii summary 

tions ot knowledge are not like several lines Philosophy, 



1.74 



that meet in one angle, and so touch but 
in a point; but are like branches of a tree, 
that meet in a stem, which hath a dimen- 
sion and quantity of intireness and conti- 
nuance, before it come to discontinue and 
break itself into arms and boughs ; there- 
fore it is good, before we enter into the 
former distribution, to erect and constitute 
one universal science, by the name of Phi- 
losophia prima, primitive or summary phi- 
losophy, as the main and common way, 
before we come where the ways part and 
divide themselves ; which science whether 
I should report as deficient or no, I stand 
doubtful. 

For I find a certain rhapsody of natural 
theology, and of divers parts of logic ; and 
of that olbw part of natural philosophy 
which concerneth the principles; and of 
that other part of natural philosophy which 
concerneth the soul or spirit; all these 
strangely commixed and confused; but be- 
ing examined, it seemeth to me rather a 
depredation of other sciences, advanced and 
exalted unto some height of terms, than any 
thing solid or substantial of itself. 



175 



Nevertheless I cannot be ignorant of the 
distinction which is current, that the same 
things are handled but in several respects. 
As for example, that logic considereth of 
many things as they are in notion ; and 
this philosophy as they are in nature ; the 
one in appearance, the other in existence: 
but I find this difference better made than 
pursued. For if they had considered quan- 
tity, similitude, diversity, and the rest of 
those external characters of things, as phi- 
losophers, and in nature, their inquiries must 
of force have been of a far other kind than 
they are. 

For doth any of them, in handling quan- 
tity, speak of the force of union, how and 
how far it multiplieth virtue ? Doth any 
give the reason, why some things in nature 
are so common, and in so great mass, and 
others so rare, and in so small quantity ? 
Doth any, in handling similitude and di- 
versity, assign the cause why iron should 
not move to iron, which is more like, but 
move to the loadstone which is less like? 
Why in all diversities of things there should 
be certain participles in nature, which are 



176 

almost ambiguous/ to which kind they should 
be referred ? But there is a mere and deep 
silence touching the nature and operation 
of those common adjuncts of things, as in 
nature ; and only a resuming and repeat- 
ing of the force and use of them in speech 
or argument. 
Meaning of Therefore, because in a writing of this 

primitive ° 

Philosophy. na ture I avoid all subtilty, my meaning 
touching this original or universal philoso- 
phy is thus, in a plain and gross descrip- 
tion by negative ; " That it be a receptacle 
" for all such profitable observations and 
" axioms as fall not within the compass of 
" any of the special parts of philosophy or 
" sciences, but are more common and of 
<c a higher stage." 

Now that there are many of that kind, 
need not to be doubted. For example; is 
not the rule Si incBqualibus cequalia addas, 
omnia erunt incequalia, an axiom as well of 
justice as of the mathematics? And is there 
not a true coincidence between commuta- 
tive and distributive justice, and arithme- 
tical and geometrical proportion ? Is not 
that other rule Quce in eodem tertio conve- 



177 



niunt, et inter se conveniunt a rule taken from 
the mathematics, but so potent in logic as 
all syllogisms are built upon it ? Is not the 
observation Omnia mutantur, nil interit a 
contemplation, in philosophy thus, that the 
quantum of nature is eternal ? in natural theo- 
logy thus, that it requireth the same omni- 
potence to make something nothing, which 
at the first made nothing something ; ac- 
cording to the scripture, Didici quod omnia 
opera, qucz fecit ~Deus, per sever ent in perpetuum; 
non possumus eis quicquam addere nee auferre. 

Is not the ground, which Machiavel wisely 
and largely discourseth concerning govern- 
ments, that the way to establish and pre- 
serve them, is to reduce them ad principia, 
a rule in religion and nature, as well as 
in civil administration ? Was not the Per- 
sian magic a reduction or correspondence 
of the principles and architectures of nature 
to the rules and policy of governments ? Is 
not the precept of a musician, to fall from 
a discord or harsh accord upon a concord or 
sweet accord, alike true in affection ? Is not 
the trope of music, to avoid or slide from 
the close or cadence, common with the trope 



178 



of rhetoric, of deceiving expectation ? Is 
not the delight of the quavering upon a stop 
in music, the same with the playing of light 
upon the water? 

Splendet tremulo sub lumine pontics. 
Are not the organs of the senses of one 
kind with the organs of reflection, the eye 
with a glass, the ear with a cave or strait de- 
termined and bounded ? Neither are these 
only similitudes, as men of narrow obser- 
vation may conceive them to be, but the 
same footsteps of nature, treading or print- 
ing upon several subjects or matters. 

This science therefore, as I understand it, 
I may justly report as deficient; for I see 
sometimes the profounder sort of wits, in 
handling some particular argument, will now 
and then draw a bucket of water out of this 
well for their present use; but the spring- 
head thereof seemeth to me not to have been 
visited; being of so excellent use, both for 
the disclosing of nature, and the abridge- 
ment of art. 

This science being therefore first placed 
as a common parent, like unto Berecynthia, 
which had so much heavenly issue, Omnes 



179 



c&licolas, omnes supera alta tenentes, we may 
return to the former distribution of the three 
philosophies, divine, natural, and human. 



1. OF DIVINE PHILOSOPHY 
OR NATURAL THEOLOGY. 

And as concerning Divine Philosophy or 
Natural Theology, it is that knowledge or 
rudiment of knowledge concerning God, 
which may be obtained by the contempla- 
tion of his creatures ; which knowledge may 
be truly termed divine in respect of the 
object, and natural in respect of the light. 

The bounds of this knowledge are, that 
it suffice th to convince atheism, but not to 
inform religion : and therefore there was 
never miracle wrought by God to convert 
an atheist, because the light of nature might 
have led him to confess a God : but mi- 
racles have been wrought to convert idola- 
ters and the superstitious, because no light 
of nature extendeth to declare the will and 
true worship of God. 

For as all works do shew forth the power 
n 2 



180 



and skill of the workman, and not his 
image ; so it is of the works of God, which 
do shew the omnipotency and wisdom of 
the maker, but not his image : and there- 
fore therein the heathen opinion differeth 
from the sacred truth ; for they supposed 
the world to be the image of God, and man 
to be an extract or compendious image of 
the world ; but the Scriptures never vouch- 
safe to attribute to the world that honor, as 
to be the image of God, but only the work 
of his hands ; neither do they speak of any 
other image of God, but man : wherefore 
by the contemplation of nature to induce 
and inforce the acknowledgment of God, 
and to demonstrate his power, providence, 
and goodness, is an excellent argument, and 
hath been excellently handled by divers. 

But on the other side, out of the contem- 
plation of nature, or ground of human know- 
ledges, to induce any verity or persuasion 
concerning the points of faith, is in my judg- 
ment not safe : Da fidci qu<z fidei sunt. For 
the heathens themselves conclude as much in 
that excellent and divine fable of the golden 
chain ; " That men and gods were not able 



1SI 



" to draw Jupiter down to the earth; but 
" contrariwise, Jupiter was able to draw 
" them up to heaven." 

So as we ought not to attempt to draw 
down or submit the mysteries of God to our 
reason ; but contrariwise, to raise and advance 
our reason to the divine truth. So as in this 
part of knowledge, touching* divine philoso- 
phy, I am so far from noting any deficience, 
as I rather note an excess ; whereunto I have 
digressed, because of the extreme prejudice 
which both religion and philosophy have re- 
ceived and may receive, by being commixed 
together ; as that which undoubtedly will 
make an heretical religion, and an imaginary 
and fabulous philosophy. 

Otherwise it is of the nature of angels and 
spirits, which is an appendix of theology, 
both divine and natural, and is neither in- 
scrutable nor interdicted; for although the 
Scripture saith, Let no man deceive you in 
sublime discourse touching the worship of an- 
gels, pressing into that he knoweth not, &c. yet, 
notwithstanding, if you observe well that pre- 
cept, it may appear thereby that there be 
two things only forbidden, adoration of them, 



182 



and opinion fantastical of them ; either to 
extol them farther than appertaineth to the 
degree of a creature, or to extol a man's 
knowledge of them farther than he hath 
ground. But the sober and grounded in- 
quiry, which may arise out of the passages 
of holy Scriptures, or out of the gradations 
of nature, is not restrained. So of degene- 
rate and revolted spirits, the conversing with 
them or the employment of them is prohi- 
bited, much more any veneration towards 
them : but the contemplation or science of 
their nature, their power, their illusions, ei- 
ther by Scripture or reason, is a part of spi- 
ritual wisdom. For so the apostle saith, We 
are not ignorant of his stratagems. And it is 
no more unlawful to inquire the nature of 
evil spirits, than to inquire the force of poi- 
sons in nature, or the nature of sin and vice 
in morality. But this part touching angels 
and spirits, I cannot note as deficient, for 
many have occupied themselves in it ; I may 
rather challenge it, in many of the writers 
thereof, as fabulous and fantastical. 



183 



% OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY. 

Leaving therefore divine philosophy or na- 
tural theology (not divinity or inspired theo- 
logy, which we reserve for the last of all, as 
the haven and sabbath of all man's contem- 
plations) we will now proceed to Natural Phi- 
losophy. 

If then it be true that Democritus said, 
<e That the truth of nature lieth hid in cer- 
' ' tain deep mines and caves ;" and if it be 
true likewise that the alchemists do so much 
inculcate, that Vulcan is a second nature, 
and imitateth that dexterously and compen- 
diously, which nature worketh by ambages 
and length of time ; it were good to divide speculative 

and operative, 

natural philosophy into the mine and the fur- 
nace; and to make two professions or occu- 
pations of natural philosophers, some to be 
pioneers, and some smiths ; some to dig, and 
some to refine and hammer : and surely I do 
best allow of a division of that kind, though 
in more familiar and scholastical terms; 
namely, that these be the two parts of na- 






184 



tural philosophy, — the inquisition of causes, 
and the production of effects ; speculative, 
and operative ; natural science, and natural 
prudence. 

For as in civil matters there is a wisdom of 
discourse, and a wisdom of direction ; so is 
it in natural. And here I will make a re- 
quest, that for the latter, or at least for a 
part thereof, I may revive and redintegrate 
the misapplied and abused name of Natural 
Magic ; which, in the true sense, is but natu- 
ral wisdom, or natural prudence ; taken ac- 
cording to the ancient acceptation, purged 
from vanity and superstition. 

Now although it be true, and I know it 
well, that there is an intercourse between 
causes and effects, so as both these know- 
ledges, speculative and operative, have a great 
connection between themselves ; yet because 
all true and fruitful natural philosophy hath a 
double scale or ladder, ascendent and de- 
scendent; ascending from experiments to the 
invention of causes, and descending from 
causes to the invention of new experiments ; 
therefore I judge it most requisite that these 



185 
two parts be severally considered and hand- 
led. 

Natural Science or Theory is divided into 1. 

t~u- i^yr i- ti- Of Natural 

rnysic and Metaphysic : wherein 1 desire it science or 

. Speculative 

may be conceived that I use the word meta- Philosophy. 
physic in a differing sense from that that is 
received: and in like manner, I doubt not 
but it will easily appear to men of judgment, 
that in this and other particulars, whereso- 
ever my conception and notion may differ 
from the ancient, yet I am studious to keep 
the ancient terms. 

For hoping well to deliver myself from mis- 
taking, by the order and perspicuous ex- 
pressing of that I do propound ; T am other- 
wise zealous and affectionate to recede as 
little from antiquity, either in terms or opi- 
nions, as may stand with truth and the pro- 
ficience of knowledge. 

And herein I cannot a little marvel at the Procedure of 

Aristotle. 

philosopher Aristotle, that did proceed in 
such a spirit of difference and contradiction 
towards all antiquity; undertaking not only 
to frame new words of science at pleasure, 
but to confound and extinguish all ancient 
wisdom : insomuch as he never nameth or 



186 



mentioneth an ancient author or opinion, but 
to confute and reprove ; wherein for glory, 
and drawing followers and disciples, he took 
the right course. 

For certainly there cometh to pass, and 
hath place in human truth, that which was 
noted and pronounced in the highest truth ; 
Veni in nomine Patris, nee recipitis me; si quis 
venerit in nomine suo, eum recipietis. But in 
this divine aphorism, (considering to whom 
it was applied, namely to Antichrist, the 
highest deceiver,) we may discern well that 
the coming in a man's own name, without 
regard of antiquity or paternity, is no good 
sign of truth, although it be joined with the 
fortune and success of an Eum recipietis. 

But for this excellent person, Aristotle, I 
will think of him that he learned that hu- 
mour of his scholar, with whom, it seemeth, 
he did emulate ; the one to conquer all 
opinions, as the other to conquer all nations: 
wherein nevertheless, it may be, he may at 
some men's hands, that are of a bitter dispo- 
sition, get a like title as his scholar did : 

Felix terrarum pr&do, non utile mundo 

Editus exemplum, etc. 



187 

Felix doctrince prcedo. 
But to me, on the other side, that do desire 
as much as lieth in my pen to ground a soci- 
able intercourse between antiquity and pro- 
ficience, it seemeth best to keep way with an- 
tiquity usque ad aras ; and therefore to retain 
the antient terms, though I sometimes alter 
the uses and definitions : according to the 
moderate proceeding in civil government; 
where although there be some alteration, yet 
that holdeth which Tacitus wisely noteth, 
eadem magistratuum vocabida. 

To return therefore to the use and accept- Meaning of 

Metaphysic. 

ation of the word Metaphysic, as I do now 
understand the word ; it appeareth, by that 
which hath been already said, that I intend 
philosophia prima, Summary Philosophy, and 
Metaphysic, which heretofore have been con- 
founded as one, to be two distinct things. 
Tor, the one I have made as a parent or 
common ancestor to all knowledge ; and the 
other I have now brought in as a branch or 
descendent of natural science. It appeareth 
likewise that I have assigned to Summary 
Philosophy the common principles and 



188 

axioms which are promiscuous and indif- 
ferent to several sciences : I have assigned 
unto it likewise the inquiry touching the 
operation of the relative and adventitious 
characters of essences, as quantity, simili- 
tude, diversity, possibility, and the rest ; 
with this distinction and provision ; that they 
be handled as they have efficacy in nature, 
and not logically. It appeareth likewise, that 
Natural Theology, which heretofore hath 
been handled confusedly with Metaphysic, I 
have inclosed and bounded by itself. 
Difference ft * s therefore now a question what is left 

sfcTnd P Me- remaining for Metaphysic ; wherein I may 
*p ysic without prejudice preserve thus much of the 
conceit of antiquity, that physic should con- 
template that which is inherent in matter, 
and therefore transitory ; and metaphysic 
that which is abstracted and fixed. 

And again, that physic should handle that 
which supposeth in nature only a being and 
moving; and metaphysic should handle that 
which supposeth farther in nature a reason 
understanding, and platform. But the differ, 
ence, perspicuously expressed, is most fami- 
liar and sensible. 



189 



For as we divided natural philosophy in 
general into the inquiry of causes, and pro- 
duction of effects ; so that part which con- 
cerneth the inquiry of causes we do subdi- 
vide according to the received and sound di- 
vision of causes ; the one part, which is 
physic, inquireth and handleth the material 
and efficient causes; and the other which is 
metaphysic, handleth the formal and final 
causes. 

Physic, taking it according to the deriva- 
tion, and not according to our idiom for me- 
dicine, is situate in a middle term or dis- 
tance between natural history and metaphy- 
sic. For natural history describeth the va- 
riety of things; physic the causes, but vari- 
able or respective causes ; and metaphysic, 
the fixed and constant causes. 

Limus ut hie durescit, et h&c ut cera Uqnescit, 

Una eodemque igne. 
Fire is the cause of induration, but respec- 
tive to clay ; fire is the cause of colliquation, 
but respective to wax : but fire is no con- 
stant cause either of induration or colliqua- 
tion: so then the physical causes are but 
the efficient and the matter. 



190 

Three enqui- Physic hath three parts ; whereof two re~ 
sic. -spect nature united or collected, the third 

contemplateth nature diffused or distributed. 

Nature is collected either into one entire 
total, or else into the same principles or 
seeds. So as the first doctrine is touching 
the contexture or configuration of things, as 
de mundo, de universitate rerum. 

The second is the doctrine concerning the 
principles or originals of things. 

The third is the doctrine concerning all 
variety and particularity of things ; whether 
-it be of the differing substances, or their 
- differing qualities and natures ; whereof 
there needeth no enumeration, this part be- 
. ing but as a gloss, or paraphrase, that at- 
. tendeth upon the text of natural history. 

Of these three I cannot report any as de- 

: ficient. In what truth or perfection they are 

handled, I make not now any judgment : 

but they are parts of knowledge not deserted 

t by the labour of man. 

Two enqui- For Metaphysic, we have assigned unto 

physic. e a " it the enquiry of formal and final causes ; 

which assignation, as to the former of them, 

may seem to be nugatory and void ; because 



191 

of the received and inveterate opinion, that 
the inquisition of man is not competent to 
find out essential forms or true differences: 
of which opinion we will take this hold, 
that the invention of forms is of all other 
parts of knowledge the worthiest to be sought, 
if it be possible to be found. 

As for the possibility, they are ill disco- 
verers that think there is no land, when they 
can see nothing but sea. 

But it is manifest that Plato, in his opi- Error of 

' r Plato. 

nion of ideas, as one that had a wit of ele- 
vation situate as upon a cliff, did descry, 
" That forms were the true object of know- 
f< ledge ;" but lost the real fruit of his opi- 
nion, by considering of forms as absolutely 
abstracted from matter, and not confined and 
determined by matter ; and so turning his 
opinion upon theology, wherewith all his 
natural philosophy is infected. 

But if any man shall keep a continual Enquiry int# 

, n , ! . formal 

watctiiul and severe eye upon action, opera- causes, 
tion, and the use of knowledge, he may ad- 
vise and take notice what are the forms, the 
disclosures whereof are fruitful and import- 
ant to the state of man. For as to the forms 



192 



of substances, man only except, (of whom 
it is said, Formavit hominem de limo terra, et 
spiravit infaciem ejus spiraculum vita, and not 
as of all other creatures, Prodncant aqua, 
producat terra,) the forms of substances, I 
say, as they are now by compounding and 
transplanting multiplied, are so perplexed 
as they are not to be enquired; no more 
than it were either possible or to purpose to 
seek in gross the forms of those sounds which 
make words, which by composition and 
transposition of letters are infinite. 

But, on the other side, to enquire the 
form of those sounds or voices which make 
simple letters is easily comprehensible ; and 
being known, induceth and manifested! the 
forms of all words, which consist and are 
compounded of them. In the same manner 
to enquire the form of a lion, of an oak, of 
gold ; nay, of water, of air, is a vain pur- 
suit : but to enquire the forms of sense, of 
voluntary motion, of vegetation, of colours, 
of gravity and levity, of density, of tenuity, 
of heat, of cold, and all other natures and 
qualities; which, like an alphabet, are not 
many, and of which the essences, upheld by 



:-l.93 

matter, of all creatures do consist ; to in- 
quire, I say, the true forms of these, is that 
part of metaphysic which we now define of. 

Not but that physic doth make inquiry, 
and take consideration of the same natures : 
but how ? Only as to the material and effici- 
ent causes of them, and not as to the forms. 
For example ; if the cause of whiteness in 
snow or froth be inquired, and it be ren- 
dered thus, that the subtile intermixture of 
air and water is the cause, it is well render- 
ed; but nevertheless, is this the form of 
whiteness ? No ; but it is the efficient, which 
is ever but vehiculum format. 

This part of metaphysic I do not find la- 
boured and performed ; whereat I marvel 
not : because I hold it not possible to be in- 
vented by that course of invention which hath 
been used; in regard that men, which is 
the root of all error, have made too untimely 
a departure and too remote a recess from 
particulars. 

But the use of this part of metaphysic, Two uses of 

• • n _ this part of 

which I report as deficient, is or the rest the Metaphysic. 
most excellent in two respects : the one, be- 
cause it is the duty and virtue of all know- 

o 



194 



ledge to abridge the infinity of individual 
experience, as much as the conception of 
truth will permit, and to remedy the com- 
plaint of vita brevis, ars longa ; which is per- 
formed by uniting the notions and concep- 
tions of sciences : for knowledges are as py- 
ramids, whereof history is the basis. So of 
Natural Philosophy, the basis is natural his- 
tory ; the stage next the basis is physic; the 
stage next the vertical point is metaphysic. 
As for the vertical point, Opus quod operatur 
Deus d principio usque ad finem, the summary 
law of nature, we know not whether man's 
enquiry can attain unto it. But these three 
be true stages of knowledge, and are to 
them that are depraved no better than the 
giants' hills, 

Ter sunt conati imponere Velio Ossam, 
Scilicet, atque Ossce frondosum involverc 
Olympum. 

But to those which refer all things to the 
glory of God, they are as the three acclama- 
tions, Sancte, sancte, sancte ; holy in the de- 
scription or dilatation of his works ; holy in 
the connection or concatenation of them ; 



19*5 



and holy in the union of them in a perpetual 
and uniform law. 

And therefore the speculation was excel- 
lent in Parmenides and Plato, although but 
a speculation in them, that all things by 
scale did ascend to unity. So then always 
that knowledge is worthiest, which is charg- 
ed with least multiplicity ; which appeareth 
to be Metaphysic ; as that which consi- 
dered the simple forms or differences of 
things, which are few in number, and the 
degrees and co-ordinations whereof make 
all this variety. 

The second respect, which valueth and 
commendeth this part of metaphysic, is that 
it doth enfranchise the power of man unto 
the greatest liberty and possibility of works 
and effects. For physic carrieth men in 
narrow and restrained ways, subject to many 
accidents of impediments, imitating the ordi- 
nary flexuous courses of nature ; but latce tin- 
dique sunt sapientibus vice : to sapience, which 
was anciently defined to be rerum divina- 
rum et humanarum scientia, there is ever 
choice of means : for physical causes give 
o 2 



196 

light to new invention in simili materia. But 
whosoever knoweth any form, knoweth the 
utmost possibility of super-inducing that na- 
ture upon any variety of matter ; and so is 
less restrained in operation, either to the 
basis of the matter, or the condition of the 
efficient : which kind of knowledge Solomon 
likewise, though in a more divine sense, ele- 
gantly describeth ; Non arctabuntur gressus 
tui, et currens non habebis offendiculum. The 
ways of sapience are not much liable either 
to particularity or chance. 
Enquiry into The second part of Metaphysic is the en- 

nnal causes. 

quiry of final causes, which I am moved 
to report not as omitted, but as misplaced ; 
and yet if it were but a fault in order, I 
would not speak of it : for order is mat- 
ter of illustration, but pertaineth not to the 
substance of sciences. But this misplacing 
hath caused a deficience, or at least a great 
improficience in the sciences themselves. 
For the handling of final causes, mixed 
with the rest in physical enquiries, hath en- 
tercepted the severe and diligent enquiry of 
all real and physical causes, and given men 



197 

the occasion to stay upon these satisfactory 
and specious causes, to the great arrest and 
prejudice of farther discovery. 

For this I find done not only by Plato, Error of 

J J Plato, Aris 

who ever anchoreth upon that shore, but totie, &c. 
by Aristotle, Galen, and others, which do 
usually likewise fall upon these flats of dis- 
coursing causes. For to say that the hairs 
of the eyelids are for a quickset and fence 
about the sight; or that the firmness of the 
skins and hides of living creatures is to de- 
fend them from the extremities of heat or 
cold ; or that the bones are for the columns 
or beams, whereupon the frame of the bodies 
of living creatures is built ; or that the leaves 
of the trees are for protecting of the fruit ; 
or that the clouds are for watering of the 
^arth ; or that the solidness of the earth is 
for the station and mansion of living crea- 
tures, and the like, is well enquired and col- 
lected in metaphysic ; but in physic they are 
impertinent. Nay, they are indeed but remo- 
ras and hinderances to stay and slug the ship 
from farther sailing ; and have brought this 
to pass, that the search of the physical causes 
hath been neglected, and passed in silence. 



193 
Better theory And therefore the natural philosophy of 
tus, &c. Democritus and some others, (who did not 
suppose a mind or reason in the frame of 
things, but attributed the form thereof, able 
to maintain itself, to infinite essays or proofs 
of nature, which they term fortune,) seemeth 
to me, as far as I can judge by the recital 
and fragments which remain unto us, in 
particularities of physical causes, more real 
and better inquired than that of Aristotle 
and Plato ; whereof both intermingled final 
causes, the one as a part of theology, and 
the other as a part of logic, which were the 
favourite studies respectively of both those 
Relation be- P ersons » Not because those final causes are 
and^hyskii llot true * anc ^ worthy to be inquired, being 
kept within their own province ; but be- 
cause their excursions into the limits of phy- 
sical causes hath bred a vastness and soli- 
tude in that tracfc For otherwise, keeping 
their precincts and borders, men are ex- 
tremely deceived if they think there is an 
enmity or repugnancy at all between them. 
For the cause rendered, that the hairs about 
the eye-lids are for the safe-guard of the 
sight, doth not impugn the cause rendered, 



causes. 



199 



that pilosity is incident to orifices of moisture ; 
Muscosi forties, etc. Nor the cause rendered, 
that the firmness of hides is for the armour 
of the body against extremities of heat and 
cold, doth not impugn the cause rendered, 
that contraction of pores is incident to 
the outwardest parts, in regard of their ad- 
jacence to foreign or unlike bodies; and so 
of the rest : both causes being true and 
compatible, the one declaring an intention, 
the other a consequence only. 

Neither doth this call in question, or de- 
rogate from divine providence, but highly 
confirms and exalts it. For as in civil ac- 
tions he is the greater and deeper politician, 
that can make other men the instruments 
of his will and ends, and yet never ac- 
quaint them with his purpose, so as they 
shall do it, and yet not know what they 
do, than he that imparteth his meaning to 
those he employeth ; so is the wisdom of 
God more admirable, when nature intendeth 
one thing, and providence draweth forth 
another, than if he had communicated to 
particular creatures and motions the charac- 
ters and impressions of his providence. And 



matic. 



300 

thus much for metaphysic; the latter -pan 
whereof I allow as extant, but wish it con- 
fined to it's proper place, 
of Mathe- Nevertheless, there remaineth yet another 
part of natural philosophy, which is com- 
monly made a principal part, and holdeth 
rank with physic special and metaphysic, 
which is mathematic ; but I think it more 
agreeable to. the nature of things, and "to 
the light of order, to place it as a branch 
of metaphysic : for the subject of it being 
quantity, (not quantity indefinite, which is 
but a relative, and belongeth to philosophia 
prima, as hath been said, but quantity de- 
termined or proportionable,) it appeareth to 
be one of the essential forms of things ; 
as that that is causative in nature of a 
number of effects; insomuch as we see, 
in the schools both of Democritus and of 
Pythagoras, that the one did ascribe figure 
to the first seeds of things, and the other 
did suppose numbers to be the principles and 
originals of things : and it is true also, that 
of all other forms, as we understand forms, 
it is the most abstracted and separable from 
"matter,, and therefore most proper to me* 



201 

taphysic; which hath likewise been the cause 
why it hath been better laboured and enquired 
than any of the other forms which are more 
immersed in matter. 

For it being the nature of the mind of 
man, to the extreme prejudice of know- 
ledge, to delight in the spacious liberty of 
generalities, as in a champain region, and 
not in the inclosures of particularity ; the 
mathematics of all other knowledge were 
the goodliest fields to satisfy that appetite. 

But for the placing of thcs. science,, it 
is not much material; only we have en- 
deavoured, in these our partitions, to ob- 
serve a kind of perspective, that one part 
may cast light upon another. 

The Mathematics are either pure or mix- Mathema- 

_ . matics pure 

ed« To the pure mathematics are those and mixt. 
sciences belonging which handle quantity de- 
terminate, merely severed from any axioms of 
natural philosophy ; and these are two, Geo- 
metry and Arithmetic ; the one handling 
quantity continued, and the other disse- 
vered. 

Mixed hath for subject some axioms or 
parts of natural philosophy, and considered! 



202 



quantity determined, as it is auxiliary and 
incident unto them. 

For many parts of nature can neither be 
invented with sufficient subtilty, nor demon- 
strated with sufficient perspicuity, nor ac- 
commodated unto use with sufficient dex- 
terity, without the aid and intervening of 
the mathematics : of which sort are perspec- 
tive, music, astronomy, cosmography, archi- 
tecture, enginery, and divers others. 

In the mathematics I can report no 
deficience, except it be that men do not 
sufficiently understand the excellent use of 
the pure mathematics, in that they do re- 
medy and cure many defects in the wit 
and faculties intellectual. For, if the wit 
be too dull, they sharpen it; if too wan- 
dering, they fix it; if too inherent in 
the sense, they abstract it. So that as 
tennis is a game of no use in itself, but 
of great use in respect it maketh a quick 
eye and a body ready to put itself into all 
postures ; so in the mathematics, that use 
which is collateral and intervenient is no 
less worthy than that which is principal 
and intended* 



£03 

And as for the mixed mathematics, I may 
only make this prediction, that there cannot 
fail to be more kinds of them, as nature 
grows further disclosed. 

Thus much of natural science, or the part 
of nature speculative. 

For Natural Prudence, or the part opera- p^encefor 
tive of natural philosophy, we will divide it^g^J_ < 
into three parts, experimental, philosophical, 
and magical; which three parts active have 
a correspondence and analogy with the three 
parts speculative, natural history, physic, and 
metaphysics for many operations have been 
invented, sometimes by a casual incidence 
and occurrence, sometimes by a purposed 
experiment; and of those which have been 
found by an intentional experiment, some 
have been found out by varying or extending 
the same experiment, some by transferring 
and compounding divers experiments the one 
into the other, which kind of invention an 
empiric may manage. 

Again, by the knowledge of physical caus- 
es there cannot fail to follow many indica- 
tions and designations of new particulars, if 
men in their speculation will keep one eye 



£04 

upon use and practice. But these are but 
coastings along 1 the shore, premendo liitus ini- 
quum : for, it seemeth to me, there can hardly 
be discovered any radical or fundamental al- 
terations and innovations in nature, either by 
the fortune and essays of experiments, or by 
the light and direction of physical causes, 
of Natural If therefore we have reported metaphysic 
deficient, it must follow that we do the like 
of natural magic, which hath relation there- 
unto. For as for the natural magic whereof 
now there is mention in books, containing 
certain credulous and superstitious conceits 
and observations of sympathies, and antipa- 
thies, and hidden properties, and some fri- 
volous experiments, strange rather by dis- 
guisement than in themselves, it is as far 
differing in truth of nature from such a 
knowledge as we require, as the story of king 
Arthur of Britain, or Hugh of Bourdeaux, 
differs from Caesar's commentaries in truth 
of story. For it is manifest that Ccesar did 
greater things de vero than those imaginary 
heroes were feigned to do; but he did them 
not in that fabulous manner. Of this kind of 
learning the fable of Ixion was a figure, who 



£0.5 



designed to enjoy Juno, the goddess of power ; 
and instead of her had copulation with a 
cloud, of which mixture were begotten cen- 
taurs and chimeras. 

So whosoever shall entertain high and va- 
porous imaginations, instead of a laborious 
and sober enquiry of truth, shall beget hopes 
and beliefs of strange and impossible shapes. 
And therefore we may note in these sciences 
which hold so much of imagination and be- 
lief, as this degenerate natural magic, alche- 
my, astrology, and the like, that in their 
propositions the description of the means is 
ever more monstrous than the pretence or 
end. 

For it is a thing more probable, that he 
that knoweth well the natures of weight, of 
colour, of pliant and fragile in respect of the 
hammer, of volatile and fixed in respect of 
the fire, and the rest, may superinduce upon 
some metal the nature and form of gold by 
such mechanic as belongeth to the production 
of the natures afore rehearsed, than that 
some grains of the medicine projected should 
in a few moments of time turn a sea of quick- 
silver or other material into gold : so it is 
more probable, that he that knoweth the na- 



206 

ture of arefaction, the nature of assimilation 
of nourishment to the thing nourished, the 
manner of increase and clearing of spirits, 
the manner of the depredations which spirits 
make upon the humours and eolid parts, shall 
by ambages of diets, bathings, anointings, 
medicines, motions, and the like, prolong 
life, or restore some degree of youth or viva- 
city, than that it can be done with the use of 
a few drops or scruples of a liquor or receipt. 
To conclude therefore, the true natural ma- 
gic, which is that great liberty and latitude 
of operation which dependeth upon the 
knowledge of forms, I may report deficient, 
as the relative thereof is. 
Use of a ca- To which part, if we be serious, and in- 
thmgs known cline not to vanities and plausible discourse, 
sought. g besides the deriving and deducing the opera- 
tions themselves from metaphysic, there are 
pertinent two points of much purpose, the 
one by way of preparation, the other by way 
of caution : the first is, that there be made a 
calendar, resembling an inventory of the 
estate of man, containing all the inventions 
being the works or fruits of nature or art 
which are now extant, and whereof man is 
already possessed; out of which doth naturally 



207 

result a note, what things are yet held im- 
possible or not invented : which calendar will 
be the more artificial and serviceable, if to 
every reputed impossibility you add what 
thing is extant which cometh the nearest in 
degree to that impossibility ; to the end that 
by these optatives and potentials man's en- 
quiry may be the more awake in deducing 
direction of works from the speculation of 
causes : and secondly, that those experiments 
be not only esteemed which have an immedi- 
ate and present use, but those principally 
which are of most universal consequence for 
invention of other experiments, and those 
which give most light to the invention of 
causes ; for the invention of the mariner's 
needle, which giveth the direction, is of no 
less benefit for navigation than the invention 
of the sails, which give the motion. 

Thus have I passed through natural philo- conclusion, 
sophy, and the deficiences thereof ; wherein 
if I have differed from the ancient and re- 
ceived doctrines, and thereby shall move con- 
tradiction, — for my part, as I affect not to 
dissent, so I purpose not to contend. If it 
be truth, 



208 

Non canimus surdis, respondent omnia sylvct: 
The voice of nature will consent, whether the 
voice of man do or no. And as Alexander 
Borgia was wont to say of the expedition of 
the French for Naples, that they came with 
chalk in their hands to mark up their lodg- 
ings, and not with weapons to fight: so I 
like better that entry of truth which cometh 
peaceably, with chalk to mark up those minds 
which are capable to lodge and harbour it, 
than that which cometh with pugnacity and 
contention. 
Use of a ca- But there remaineth a division of natural 
Boubts°and philosophy according to the report of the en- 
rols!* a * x quny> and nothing concerning the matter or 
subject ; and that is positive and considera- 
tive ; when the enquiry reporteth either an 
assertion or a doubt. These doubts or non 
liquets are of two sorts, particular and total. 
of particular F° r the first, we see a good example thereof 
in Aristotle's Problems , which deserved to 
have had a better continuance ; but so never- 
theless, as there is one point whereof warn- 
ing is to be given and taken. The registering 
of doubts hath two excellent uses : the one, 
that it saveth philosophy from errors and falsr 



209 



hoods, when that which is not fully appear- 
ing is not collected into assertion, whereby 
error might draw error, but reserved in 
doubt : the other, that the entry of doubts 
is as so many suckers or spunges to draw use 
of knowledge ; insomuch, as that which, if 
doubts had not preceded, a man should never 
have advised, but passed it over without note, 
by the suggestion and solicitation of doubts 
is made to be attended and applied. But 
both these commodities do scarcely counter- 
vail an inconvenience which will intrude it- 
self, if it be not debarred; which is that, 
when a doubt is once received, men labor 
rather how to keep it a doubt still, than how 
to solve it, and accordingly bend their wits. 
Of this we see the familiar example in law- 
yers and scholars, both which, if they have 
once admitted a doubt, it goeth ever after au- 
thorised for a doubt. But that use of wit and 
knowledge is to be allowed, which laboreth to 
make doubtful things certain and not those 
which labor to make certain things doubtful. 
Therefore these calendars of doubts I com- 
mend as excellent things ; so that there be this 
caution used, that when they be thoroughly 
p 



210 



Of popular 
Errors. 



Of total 
Doubts. 



sifted and brought to resolution, they be from 
thenceforth omitted, discarded, and not con- 
tinued to cherish and encourage men in 
doubting. To which calendar of doubts or 
problems, I advise to be annexed another ca- 
lendar, as much or more' material, which is 
a calendar of popular errors ; I mean chiefly 
in natural history, such as pass in speech 
and conceit, and are nevertheless apparently 
detected and convicted of untruth ; that 
man's knowledge be not weakened nor im- 
based by such dross and vanity. 

As for the doubts or non liquets general or 
in total, I understand those differences of opi- 
nions touching the principles of nature, and 
the fundamental points of the same, which 
have caused the diversity of sects, schools, 
and philosophies, as that of Empedocles, Py- 
thagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, and the 
rest. For although Aristotle, as though he 
had been of the race of Ottomans, thought 
he could not reign, except the first thing he 
did he killed all his brethren; yet to those 
that seek truth and not magistrality, it can- 
not but seem a matter of great profit, to see 
before them the several opinions touching the 



alii 

foundations of nature; not for any exact 
truth that can be expected in those theories ; 
for as the same phenomena in astronomy 
are satisfied by the received astronomy of the 
diurnal motion, and the proper motions of 
the planets, with their eccentrics and epi- 
cyles, and likewise by the theory of Coper- 
nicus, who supposed the earth to move, and 
the calculations are indifferently agreeable 
to both; so the ordinary face and view of 
experience is many times satisfied by several 
theories and philosophies ; whereas to find the 
real truth requireth another manner of seve- 
rity and attention. For as Aristotle saith, 
that children at the first will call every wo- 
man mother, but afterward they come to 
distinguish according to truth; so experi- 
ence, if it be in childhood, will call every 
philosophy mother, but when it cometh to 
ripeness, it will discern the true mother. 

So as in the mean time it is good to see A collection 

of the Philo- 

the several glosses and opinions upon nature, sophies of the 

° '4 l A Antients se- 

whereof it may be every one in some one veraiiy desi- 

J J rable. 

point hath seen clearer than his fellows; 
therefore I wish some collection to be made 
painfully and understanding^ de antiqvds 

p2 



212 



phUosophiis, out of all the possible light which 
remaineth to us of them : which kind of work 
I find deficient. But here I must give warn- 
ing, that it be done distinctly and severally, 
the philosophies of every one throughout by 
themselves, and not by titles packed and fag- 
gotted up together, as hath been done by 
Plutarch. For it is the harmony of a philo- 
sophy in itself which giveth it light and cre- 
dence ; whereas if it be singled and broken, 
it will seem more foreign and dissonant. For 
as when I read in Tacitus the actions of Nero 
or Claudius, with circumstances of times, in- 
ducements and occasions, I find them not 
so strange ; but when I read them in Sueto- 
nius Tranquillus, gathered into titles and 
bundles, and not in order of time, they seem 
more monstrous and incredible ; so is it of 
any philosophy reported entire, and dismem- 
bered by articles. Neither do I exclude opi- 
nions of latter times to be likewise repre- 
sented in this calendar of sects of philoso- 
phy, as that of Theophra^us Paracelsus, elo- 
quently reduced into an harmony by the 
pen of Severinus the Dane ; and that of 
Tilesius, and his scholar Donius being as 



213 



a pastoral philosophy, full of sense, but of 
no great depth ; and that of Fracastorius, 
who though he pretended not to make any 
new philosophy, yet did use the absolute- 
ness of his own sense upon the old ; and 
that of Gilbertus our countryman, who re- 
vived, with some alterations and demonstra- 
tions, the opinions of Xenophanes; and any 
other worthy to be admitted. 

Thus have we now dealt with two of the 
three beams of man's knowledge, that is Ra- 
dius directus, which is referred to nature ; 
Radius refractus, which is referred to God, 
and cannot report truly because of the ine- 
quality of the medium : there resteth Radius 
reflexus, whereby man beholdeth and con- 
templated himself. 



215 



3. OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE, 
OR HUMANITY. 



We come therefore now to that know- 
ledge whereunto the ancient oracle directeth 
us, which is the knowledge of ourselves ; 
which deserveth the more accurate handling, 
by how much it toucheth us more nearly. 
This knowledge, as it is the end and term of 
natural philosophy in the intention of man, 
so notwithstanding, it is but a portion of 
.natural philosophy in the continent of na- 
ture : and generally let this be a rule, that 
all partitions of knowledges be accepted ra- 
ther for lines and veins, than for sections and 
separations ; and that the continuance and in- 
tireness of knowledge be preserved. For 
the contrary hereof hath made particular 
sciences to become barren, shallow, and er- 
roneous, while they have not been nourished 
and maintained from the common fountain. 
So we see Cicero the orator complained of 



216 



Socrates and his school, that he was the 
first that separated philosophy and rhetoric ; 
whereupon rhetoric became an empty and 
verbal art. So we may see that the opinion 
of Copernicus touching the rotation of the 
earth, which astronomy itself cannot correct, 
because it is not repugnant to any of the 
phenomena, yet natural philosophy may 
correct. So we see also that the science of me- 
dicine, if it be destitute and forsaken by na- 
tural philosophy, it is not much better than 
an empirical practice. 

With this reservation therefore we pro- 
ceed to Human Philosophy, or Humanity, 
which hath two parts: The one considereth 
man segregate or destributively ; the other 
congregate or in society. So as human phi- 
losophy is either simple and particular, or 
conjugate and civil Humanity particular 
consisteth, of the same parts whereof man 
consisteth that is of knowledges which re- 
spect the body, and of knowledges that re- 
spect the mind ; but before we distribute so 
i far, it is good to constitute. For I do take 
the consideration in general, and at large, 
of human nature to be fit to be emancipated 



Its Divisions 
and Sub-di- 



Kature ge- 
nerally. 



217 
and make a knowledge by itself; not so 
much in regard of those delightful and ele- 
gant discourses which have been made of the 
dignity of man, of his miseries, of his state 
and life, and the like adjuncts of his com- 
mon and undivided nature ; but chiefly in 
regard of the knowledge concerning the sym- 
pathies and concordances between the mind 
and body, which being mixed cannot be pro- 
perly assigned to the sciences of either. 

This knowledge hath two branches : for as 
all leagues and amities consist of mutual in- 
telligence and mutual offices, so this league 
of mind and body hath these two parts ; 
how the one discloseth the other, and how 
the one worketh upon the other ; Discovery, 
and Impression. 

The former of these hath begotten two of Dis- 
covery. 

arts, both of prediction or prenotion ; where- 
of the one is honored with the enquiry of 
Aristotle, and the other of Hippocrates. 
And although they have of later time been 
used to be coupled with superstitious and 
fantastical arts, yet being purged and re- 
stored to their true state, they have both of 



£18 



them a solid ground in nature, and a pro- 
fitable use in life. The first is physiognomy, 
which discovereth the disposition of the mind 
by the lineaments of the body : the second 
is the exposition of natural dreams, which dis- 
covereth the state of the body by the ima- 
ginations of the mind. In the former of 
these I note a deficience ; for Aristotle hath 
very ingeniously and diligently handled the 
features of the body, but not the gestures of 
the body, which are no less comprehensible 
by art, and of greater use and advantage. 
For the lineaments of the body do disclose 
the disposition and inclination of the mind 
in general; but the motions of the counte- 
nance and parts do not only so, but do far-, 
ther disclose the present humor and state of 
the mind and will. For as your majesty saith 
most aptly and elegantly, " As the tongue 
" speaketh to the ear, so the gesture speaketh 
4( to the eye." And therefore a number of 
subtle persons, whose eyes do dwell upon the 
faces and fashions of men, do well know the 
advantage of this observation, as being most 
part of their ability ; neither can it be de- 



219 

rued, but that it is a great discovery of 
dissimulations, and a great direction in bu- 
siness. 2 

The latter branch touching impression, hath Im re ° f ion 
not been collected into art, but hath been 
handled dispersedly; and it hath the same 
relation or antistrophe that the former hath. 
For the consideration is double; '5 Either 
" how, and how far the humors and effects 
" of the body do alter or work upon the 
" mind; or again, How and how far the 
" passions or apprehensions of the mind do 
" alter or work upon the body." The former 
of these hath been enquired and considered 
as a part and appendix of medicine, but much 
more as a part of religion or superstition : 
for the physician prescribeth cures of the 
mind in frenzies and melancholy passions ; 
and pretendeth also to exhibit medicines to 
exhilarate the mind, to confirm the courage, 
to clarify the wits, to corroborate the me- 
mory, and the like: but the scruples and 
superstitions of diet and other regimen of 
the body, in the sect of the Pythagoreans, 
in the heresy of the Manicheans, and in 
the law of Mahomet do exceed. So like- 



220 



wise the ordinances in the ceremonial law, 
interdicting the eating of the blood and fat, 
distinguishing between beasts clean and un- 
clean for meat, are many and strict. Nay 
the faith itself, being clear and serene from 
all clouds of ceremony, yet retaineth the 
use of fastings, abstinences, and other ma- 
cerations and humiliations of the body, as 
things real and not figurative. The root 
and life of all which prescripts is, besides 
the ceremony, the consideration of that de- 
pendency which the affections of the mind 
are submitted unto upon , the state and dis- 
position of the body. And if any man of 
weak judgment do conceive that this suf- 
fering of the mind from the body doth 
either question the immortality, or dero- 
gate from the sovereignty of the soul, he 
may be taught in easy instances, that the 
infant in the mother's womb is compatible 
with the mother, and yet separable ; and the 
most absolute monarch is sometimes led by his 
servants, and yet without subjection. As 
for the reciprocal knowledge, which is the 
operation of the conceits and passions of 
the mind upon the body, we see all wise 



221 



physicians, in the prescriptions of their re- 
gimens to their patients, do ever consider 
accidentia animi as of great force to further 
or hinder remedies or recoveries ; and more 
especially it is an enquiry of great depth 
and worth concerning imagination, how and 
how far it altereth the body proper of the 
imaginant. For although it hath a manifest 
power to hurt, it followeth not it hath the 
same degree of power to help ; no more 
than a man can conclude, that because there 
be pestilent airs, able suddenly to kill a man 
jn health, therefore there should be sove- 
reign airs, able suddenly to cure a man in 
sickness. But the inquisition of this part 
is of great use, though it needeth, as So- 
crates said, " a Delian diver," being dif- 
ficult and profound. But unto all this know- 
ledge de communi vinculo, of the concord- 
ances between the mind and the body, that 
part of enquiry is most necessary, which 
considereth of the seats and domiciles which 
the several faculties of the mind do take 
and occupate in the organs of the body ; 
which knowledge hath been attempted, and 
is controverted, and deserveth to be much 



222 



better enquired. For the opinion of Plato, 
who placed the understanding in the brain, 
animosity (which he did unfitly call anger, 
having a greater mixture with pride) in 
the heart, and concupiscence or sensuality 
in the liver, deserveth not to be despised, 
but much less to be allowed. So then we 
have constituted, as in our own wish and 
advice, the enquiry touching human nature 
entire, as a just portion of knowledge to 
be handled apart. 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE BODY. 

The knowledge that concerneth man's 
Body is divided as the good of man's body 
is divided, unto which it referreth. The 
good of man's body is of four kinds, health, 
it's four beauty, strength, and pleasure : So the know- 
ledges are medicine, or art of cure ; art of 
decoration, which is called cosmetic; art of 
activity, which is called athletic; and art 
voluptuary, which Tacitus truly calleth eru- 
ditus luxus. The subject of man's body is 
of all other things in nature most suscep- 



parts 



223 



tible of remedy ; but then that remedy is 
most susceptible of error. For the same sub- 
tility of the subject doth cause large possi- 
bility and easy failing ; and therefore the 
enquiry ought to be the more exact. 

To speak therefore of medicine, and to Medicine 
resume that we have said, ascending a little 
higher ; the ancient opinion that man was 
microcosmus, an abstract or model of the world, 
hath been fantastically strained by Paracelsus 
and the alchemists, as if there were to be 
found in man's body certain correspond- 
ences and parallels, which should have re- 
spect to all varieties of things, as stars, pla- 
nets, minerals, which are extant in the great 
world. But thus much is evidently true, that 
of all substances which nature hath pro- 
duced, man^s body is the most extremely 
compounded : For we see herbs and plants 
are nourished by earth and water ; beasts 
for the most part by herbs and fruits; man by 
the flesh of beasts, birds, fishes, herbs, grains, 
fruits, water, and the manifold alterations, 
dressings, and preparations of these several 
bodies, before they come to be his food and 
aliment. Add hereunto, that beasts have a 



224 

more simple order of life, and less change 
of affections to work upon their bodies : 
whereas man in his mansion, sleep, exer- 
cise, passions, hath infinite variations ; and 
it cannot be denied but that the body of 
man of all other things is of the most com- 
pounded mass. The soul on the other side 
is the simplest of substances, as is well ex- 
pressed : 

Purumque reliquit 
JEthereum sensum aique aiirdi simplicis ignein. 
So that it is no marvel though the soul so 
placed enjoy no rest, if that principle be 
true, that Biotas rerum est rapidus extra lo- 
cum, placidus in loco. But to the purpose : 
this variable composition of man's body hath 
made it as an instrument easy to distemper ; 
and therefore the poets did well to conjoin 
music and medicine in Apollo ; because the 
office of medicine is but to tune this cu- 
rious harp of man's body, and to reduce it 
to harmony. 
An art parti- So then the subject being so variable 

cularly con- .. .. 

jecturai and hath made the art by consequence m^re 

fit for impos- . . . 

ture. conjectural ; ana the art being conjectural 

hath made so much the more place to be 



225 



left for imposture. For almost all other arts 
and sciences are judged by acts or master- 
pieces, as I may term them, and not by the 
successes and events. The lawyer is judged 
by the virtue of his pleading, and not by 
the issue of the cause. The master of the 
ship is judged by the directing his course 
aright, and not by the fortune of the voyage. 
But the physician, and perhaps. the politi- 
cian, hath no particular acts demonstrative 
of his ability, but is judged most by the 
event; which is ever but as it is taken : 
for who can tell, if a patient die or re- 
cover, or if a state be preserved or ruined, 
whether it be art or accident ? And there- 
fore many times the impostor is prized, 
and the man of virtue taxed. Nay, we see 
the weakness and credulity of men is such, 
as they will often prefer a mountebank or 
witch before a learned physician. And 
therefore the poets were clear-sighted in 
discerning this extreme folly, when they 
made iEsculapius and Circe brother and 
sister, both children of the sun, as in the 
verses ; Mu. vii. 772. 
a 



226 

Ipse repertorem medicince talis et artis 
Fulmine Phcebigenam Stygias detrusit ad 
undas : 
And again, 

Dives inaccessos ubi Solis filia lucos, etc. 

JEn. vii. 11. For in all times, in the opinion 

of the multitude, witches and old women 

and impostors have had a competition with 

Physicians physicians. And what followeth ? Even this ; 

usually cul- r J 3 

tivatesome that physicians say to themselves, as Solo- 
other ait. J J 

mon expresseth it upon an higher occasion ; 

If it befal to me as befalleth to the fools, ivhy 
should I labour to be more wise ? And there- 
fore I cannot much blame physicians, that 
they use commonly to intend some other 
art or practice, which they fancy more 
than their profession. For you shall have of 
them, antiquaries, poets, humanists, states- 
men, merchants, divines, and in every of 
these better seen than in their profession ; 
and no doubt, upon this ground, that they 
find that mediocrity and excellency in their 
/ art maketh no difference in profit or repu- 

tation towards their fortune ; for the weak- 
ness of patients, and sweetness of life, and 



227 
nature of hope, maketh men depend upon 
physicians with all their defects. 

But, nevertheless, these things, which we Causes of it's 

uncertainty* 

have spoken of, are courses begotten between 
a little occasion, and a great deal of sloth 
and default ; for if we will excite and awake 
our observation, we shall see in familiar in- 
stances what a predominant faculty the sub- 
tilty of spirit hath over the variety of matter 
or form : nothing more variable than faces 
and countenances, yet men can bear in me- 
mory the infinite distinctions of them ; nay, 
a painter with a few shells of colours, and the 
benefit of his eye, and habit of his imagi- 
nation, can imitate them all that ever have 
been, are, or may be, if they were brought 
before him. Nothing more variable than 
voices, yet men can likewise discern them 
personally ; nay, you shall have a buffoon, 
or pantomimus, will express as many as he 
pleaseth. Nothing more variable than the 
differing sounds of words, yet men have 
found the way to reduce them to a few 
simple letters. So that it is not the insuf- 
ficiency or incapacity of .man's mind, but 
it is the remote standing or placing thereof 
*2 



22S 



that breedeth these mazes and incompre* 
hensions : for as the sense afar off is full of 
mistaking, but is exact at hand, so it is 
of the understanding ; the remedy whereof 
is not to quicken or strengthen the organ, 
but to go nearer to the object ; and there- 
fore there is no doubt but if the physi- 
cians will learn and use the true approaches 
and avenues of nature, they may assume as 
much as the poet saith : 

' Et quoniam variant morli, variahimus artes ; 
\Mille mall species, mille salutis erurit. 
Which that they should do, the noble- 
ness of their art doth deserve ; well sha- 
dowed by the poets, in that they made iEs- 
culapius to be the son of the Sun, the one 
being the fountain of life, the other as the 
second stream : but infinitely more honour- 
ed by the example of our Saviour, who 
made the body of man the object of his 
miracles, as the soul was the object of his 
doctrine ; for we read not that ever he 
vouchsafed to do any miracle about honor 
or money, except that one for giving tribute 
to Csesar, but only about the preserving, 
sustaining, and healing the body of mam 



229 

Medicine is a science which hath been, Deficiencies 

in medicine. 

as we have said, more professed than la- 
boured, and yet more laboured than ad- 
vanced; the labour having been, in my 
judgment, rather in circle than in progres- 
sion. For I find much iteration, but small 
addition. It considereth the causes of dis- 
eases, with the occasions or impulsions ; the 
diseases themselves, with the accidents ; and 
the cures, with the preservations. The defi- 
eiences which I think good to note, being 
a few of many, and those such as are of a 
more open and manifest nature, I will enu- 
merate and not place. 

The first is the discontinuance of the an- J. n a n f ra * 

. tive of spe- 

cient and serious diligence of Hippocrates, cial cases> 
who used to set down a narrative of the 
special cases of his patients, and how they 
proceeded, and how they were judged by 
recovery or death. Therefore having an 
example proper in the father of the art, I 
shall not need to allege an example fo- 
reign, of the wisdom of the lawyers, who 
are careful to report new cases and deci- 
sions for the direction of future judgments. 
This continuance of Medicinal History I 



230 

find deficient; which I understand neither 
to be so infinite as to extend to every com- 
mon case, nor so reserved as to admit none 
but wonders ; for many things are new in 
the manner which are not new in the kind ; 
and if men will intend to observe, they 
shall find much worthy to observe. 
des^f tmT* -* n * ne en( l u i r y which is made by anatomy 
tomy. j f m( j mucQ deficience : for they enquire of 

the parts, and their substances, figures, and 
collocations; but they enquire not of the 
diversities of the parts, the secrecies of the 
passages, and the seats or the nestling of 
the humours, nor much of the footsteps and 
impressions of diseases : the reason of which 
omission I suppose to be, because the first 
enquiry may be satisfied in the view of one 
or a few anatomies ; but the latter being 
comparative and casual must arise from the 
view of many. And as to the diversity of 
parts, there is no doubt but the facture or 
framing of the inward parts is as full of 
difference as the outward, and in that is the 
cause continent of many diseases ; which 
not being observed, they quarrel many times 
rwith the humours, which are not in fault; 



231 



the fault being in the very frame and me- 
chanic of the part, which cannot be moved 
by medicine alterative, but must be accom- 
modated and palliated by diets and medi- 
cines familiar. And for the passages and 
pores, it is true which was anciently noted, 
that the more subtile of them appear not 
in anatomies, because they are shut and 
latent in dead bodies, though they be open 
and manifest in live : which being supposed, 
though the inhumanity of anatomia vivorum 
was by Celsus justly reproved, yet in regard 
of the great use of this observation, the en- 
quiry needed not by him so slightly to have 
been relinquished altogether, or referred to 
the casual practices of surgery ; but might 
have been well diverted upon the dissection 
of beasts alive, which, notwithstanding the 
dissimilitude of their parts, may sufficiently 
satisfy this enquiry. And for the humours, 
they are commonly passed over in anato- 
mies as purgaments ; whereas it is most ne- 
cessary to observe, what cavities, nests, and 
receptacles the humours do find in the parts, 
with the differing kind of the humour so 
lodged and received. And as for the foot- 



£32 

steps of diseases, and their devastations of 
the inward parts, imposthumations, exulcera- 
tions, discontinuations, putrefactions, con- 
sumptions, contractions, extensions, convul- 
sions, dislocations, obstructions, repletions, 
together with all praeternatural substances, 
as stones, carnosities, excrescences, worms, 
and the like ; they ought to have been 
exactly observed by multitude of anatomies, 
and the contribution of men's several expe- 
riences, and carefully set down, both his- 
torically, according to the appearances, and 
artificially, with a reference to the diseases 
and symptoms which resulted from them, 
in. case where the anatomy is of a defunct 
patient ; whereas now upon opening of bo- 
dies, they are passed over slightly and in 
silence. 
in the de- In the enquiry of diseases they do aban- 

spair pi . 

cures. don the cures of many, some as in their na- 

ture incurable, and others as past the period 
of cure ; so that Sylla and the triumvirs 
never proscribed so many men to die, as 
they do by their ignorant edicts ; whereof 
numbers do escape with less difficulty than 
they did in the Boman proscriptions. There- 



233 

fore I will not doubt to note as a deficience", 
that they enquire not the perfect cures of 
•many diseases, or extremities of diseases ; 
but pronouncing them incurable, do enact 
a law of neglect, and exempt ignorance from 
discredit. 

Nay farther, I esteem it the office of a of the office 

of a Physi- 

physician not only to restore health, butcian.. 
to mitigate pain and dolors; and not only 
when such mitigation may conduce to re- 
covery, but when it may serve to make a 
fair and easy passage : for it is no small 
felicity which Augustus Caesar was wont to 
wish to himself, that same euthanasia, and 
which was specially noted in the death of 
Antoninus Pius, whose death was after the 
fashion and semblance of a kindly and plea- 
sant sleep. So it is written of Epicurus, 
that after his disease was judged desperate, 
he drowned his stomach and senses with 
a large draught and ingurgitation of wine ; 
whereupon the epigram was made, Hinc 
Stygias ebrius hausit aquas ; he was not sober 
enough to taste any bitterness of the Sty- 
gian water. But the physicians, contrari- 
wise, do make a kind of scruple and re- 



es4 

ligion to stay with the patient after the 
disease is deplored; whereas, in my judg- 
ment, they ought both to enquire the skill, 
and to give the attendances for the faci- 
litating and assuaging of the pains and 
agonies of death. 
•Tradition of In the consideration of the cures of dis- 

particular 

cures defi- eases, I find a deficience in the receipts 

.cjent. 

of propriety, respecting the particular cures 
of diseases : for the physicians have frus- 
trated the fruit of tradition and experience 
by their magistracies, in adding, and taking 
out, and changing "quid pro quo in their re- 
ceipts, at their pleasures ; commanding so 
over the medicine, as the medicine cannot 
command over the disease : for except it 
be treacle and mithridatum, and of late 
diascordium, and a few more, they tie them- 
selves to no receipts severely and religiously : 
for as to the confections of sale which are 
in the shops, they are for readiness and 
not for propriety ; for they are upon ge- 
neral intentions of purging, opening, com- 
forting, altering, and not much appropriated 
to particular diseases: and this is the cause 
why empirics and old women are more 



£35 

happy many times in their cures than 
learned physicians, because they are more 
religious in holding their medicines. There- 
fore here is the deficience which I find, that 
physicians have not, partly out of their own 
practice, partly out of their constant proba- 
tions reported in books, and partly out of the 
traditions of empirics, set down and deli- 
vered over certain experimental medicines 
for the cure of particular diseases, besides 
their own conjectural and magisterial de- 
scriptions. For as they were the men of 
the best composition in the state of Rome, 
which either being consuls inclined to the 
people, or being tribunes inclined to the 
senate ; so in the matter we now handle, 
they be the best physicians, which being 
learned incline to the traditions of expe- 
rience, or being empirics incline to the 
methods of learning. 

In preparation of medicines, I do find of artificial 

mineral 

strange, especially considering how mineral baths, 
medicines have been extolled, and that they 
are safer for the outward than inward parts, 
that no man hath sought to make an imita- 
tion by art of natural baths and medicinable 



236 

fountains ; which nevertheless are confessed 
to receive their virtues from minerals; and 
not so only, but discerned and distinguished 
from what particular mineral they receive 
tincture, as sulphur, vitriol, steel, or the like ; 
which nature, if it may be reduced to com- 
positions of art, both the variety of them 
will be increased, and the temper of them 
will be more commanded. 
Prescriptions But lest I grow to be more particular than 

too compen- 
dious, is agreeable either to my intention or to pro- 
portion, I will conclude this part with the note 
of one deficience more, which seemeth to me 
of greatest consequence; which is, that the 
prescripts in use are too compendious to attain 
their end : for to my understanding, it is a 
vain and flattering opinion to think any 
medicine can be so sovereign or so happy, 
as that the receipt or use of it can work any 
great effect upon the body of man. It were 
a strange speech, which spoken, or spoken 
oft, should reclaim a man from a vice to . 
which he were by nature subject : it is order, 
pursuit, sequence, and interchange of ap- 
plication, which is mighty in nature ; whic ii 
although it require more exact knowledge in 



237 

prescribing, and more precise obedience in 
observing, yet is recompensed with the mag- 
nitude of effects. And although a man would 
think by the daily visitations of the phy- 
sicians, that there were a pursuance in the 
cure ; yet let a man look into their prescripts 
and ministrations, and he shall find them 
but inconstancies and every day's devices, 
without any settled providence or project ; 
not that every scrupulous or superstitious 
prescript is effectual, no more than every 
straight way is the way to heaven ; but the 
truth of the direction must precede severity 
of observance. 

For Cosmetic, it hath parts civil, and parts Cosmetic 
effeminate : for cleanness of body was ever 
esteemed to proceed from a due reverence to 
God, to society, and to ourselves. As for 
artificial decoration, it is well worthy of the 
deficiencies which it hath; being neither fine 
enough to deceive, nor handsome to use, nor 
wholesome to please. 

For Athletic, I take the subject of it larger Athletic. 
ly, that is to say, for any point of ability, 
whereunto the body of man may be brought^ 
whether it be of activity, or of patience ; 



S38 

whereof activity hath two parts, strength and 
swiftness; and patience likewise hath two 
parts, hardness against wants and extremi- 
ties, and indurance of pain or torment; 
whereof we see the practices in tumblers, in 
savages, and in those that suffer punish- 
ment: nay, if there be any other faculty 
which falls not within any of the former di- 
visions, as in those that dive, that obtain a 
strange power of containing respiration, and 
the like, I refer it to this part. Of these 
things the practices are known, but the phi- 
losophy that concerneth them is not much 
enquired ; the rather, I think, because they 
are supposed to be obtained, either by an 
aptness of nature, which cannot be taught, 
or only by continual custom, which is soon 
prescribed ; which though it be not true, yet 
I forbear to note any deficiencies ; for the 
Olympian games are down long since, and 
the mediocrity of these things is for use ; as 
for the excellency of them, it serveth for the 
most part for mercenary ostentation. 
Sensuality. For arts of Pleasure sensual, the chief defi- 
cience in them is of laws to repress them. 
For as it bath been well observed, that the 



239 



arts which flourish in times while virtue is in 
growth, are military ; and while virtue is in 
state, are liberal ; and while virtue is in de- 
clination, are voluptuary; so I doubt that 
this age of the world is somewhat upon the 
descent of the wheel. With arts voluptuary 
I couple practices joculary ; for the deceiv- 
ing of the senses is one of the pleasures of 
the senses. As for games of recreation, I 
hold them to belong to civil life and educa- 
tion. And thus much of that particular hu- 
man philosophy which concerns the body, 
which is but the tabernacle of the mind. 



PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 



For Human Knowledge which concerns 
the Mind, it hath two parts; the one that 
enquireth of the substance or nature of the 
soul or mind, the other that enquireth of the 
faculties or functions thereof. 

Unto the first of these, the considerations of of the Na- 
the original of the soul, whether it be native soul or Mind. 
or adventive, and how far it is exempted from 



240 

laws of matter, and of the immortality there- 
of, and many other points, do appertain ; 
which have been not more laboriously en- 
quired than variously reported; so as the 
travel therein taken seemeth to have been 
rather in a maze than in a way. But although 
I am of opinion that this knowledge may be 
more really and soundly enquired even in 
nature than it hath been ; yet I hold that in 
the end it must be bounded by religion, or 
else it will be subject to deceit and delusion : 
for as the substance of the soul in the crea- 
tion was not extracted out of the mass of 
heaven and earth by the benediction of a 
producat, but was immediately inspired from 
God ; so it is not possible that it should be, 
otherwise than by accident, subject to the 
laws of heaven and earth, which are the sub- 
ject of philosophy; and therefore the true 
knowledge of the nature and state of the soul 
must come by the same inspiration that gave 
the substance. Unto this part of knowledge 
touching the soul there be two appendixes; 
which, as they have been handled, have ra- 
ther vapoured forth fables than kindled truth > 
divination and fascination. 



Ml 
Divination hath been anciently and fitly Two kinds of 

w v Divination. 

divided into artificial and natural; whereof 
artificial is when the mind maketh a pre- 
diction by argument, concluding upon signs 
and tokens ; natural is when the mind hath 
a presention by an internal power, with- 
out the inducement of a sign. Artificial is 
of two sorts; either when the argument 
is coupled with a derivation of causes, 
which is rational ; or when it is only ground- 
ed upon a coincidence of the effect, which 
is experimental; whereof the latter for the 
most part is superstitious: such as were the 
heathen observations upon the inspection of 
sacrifices, the flights of birds, the swarming 
of bees, and such as were the Chaldean as- 
trology, and the like. For artificial divina- 
tion, the several kinds thereof are distri- 
buted amongst particular knowledges. The 
astronomer hath his predictions, as of con- 
junctions, aspects, eclipses, and the like. 
The physician hath his predictions of death, 
of recovery, of the accidents and issues of 
diseases. The politician hath his predictions ; 
O urbem venalem, et cito perituram, si emp- 
tor em invenerit ! which stayed not long to be 

R 



performed in Sylla first, and after in Caesar ; 
so as these predictions are now impertinent, 
and to be referred over. But the divination 
which springeth from the internal nature of 
the soul, is that which we now speak of, 
which hath been made to be of two sorts, 
primitive and by influxion. Primitive is 
grounded upon the supposition that the 
mind, when it is withdrawn and collected 
into itself, and not diffused into the organs of 
the body, hath some extent and latitude of 
prenotion; which therefore appeareth most 
in sleep, in extasies, and near death, and 
more rarely in waking apprehensions ; and 
is induced and furthered by those absti- 
nences and observations which make the 
mind most to consist in itself: by influxion, 
is grounded upon the conceit that the mind, 
as a mirror or glass, should take illumination, 
from the foreknowledge of God and spirits; 
unto which the same regimen doth likewise 
conduce. For the retiring of the mind with- 
in itself is the state which is most suscep- 
tible of divine influxions; save that it is ac- 
companied in this case with a fervency and 
elevation which the ancients noted by fury, 



and not with a repose and quiet, as it is in 
the other. 

Fascination is the power and act of imagi- of Fastina- 

tion. 

nation intensive upon other bodies than the 
body of the imaginant ; for of that we spake 
in the proper place; wherein the school of 
Paracelsus, and the disciples of pretended 
natural magic, have been so intemperate, as 
that they have exalted the power of the ima- 
gination to be much one with the power of 
miracle-working faith; others, that draw 
nearer to probability, calling to their view 
the secret passages of things, and especially 
of the contagion that passeth from body to 
body, do conceive it should likewise be agree- 
able to nature, that there should be some 
transmissions and operations from spirit to 
spirit, without the mediation of the senses : 
whence the conceits have grown, now almost 
made civil, of the mastering spirit, and the 
force of confidence, and the like. Incident 
unto this is the enquiry how to raise and for- 
tify the imagination : for if the imagination 
fortified have power, then it is material to 
know how to fortify and exalt it. And here- 
in comes in crookedly and dangerously a pal- 
*2 



244 

liation of a great part of ceremonial magic. 
For it may be pretended that ceremonies, 
characters, and charms, do work not by any 
tacit or sacramental contract with evil spirits, 
but serve only to strengthen the imagination 
of him that useth it ; as images are said by 
the Roman church to fix the cogitations, and 
raise the devotions of them that pray before 
them. But for mine own judgment, if it be 
admitted that imagination hath power, and 
that ceremonies fortify imagination, and that 
they be used sincerely and intentionally for 
that purpose ; yet I should hold them unlaw- 
ful, as opposing to that first edict which God 
gave unto man, In sudore vultus comedes panem 
tuum. For they propound those noble effects, 
which God hath set forth unto man to be 
bought at the price of labour, to be attained 
by a few easy and slothful observances. De^ 
ficiencies in these knowledges I will report 
none other than the general deficience, that 
it is not known how much of them is verity, 
and how much vanity, 
of thelaeui- The knowledge which respecteth the facul- 
soui°or mind, ties of the mind of man is of two kinds; the 
one respecting his understanding and reason, 



245 



the other his will, appetite, and affection; 
whereof the former produceth position or de- 
cree, the latter action or execution. It is 
true that the imagination is an agent or nun- 
cius in both provinces, both the judicial and 
the ministerial. For sense sendeth over to 
imagination before reason have judged, and 
reason sendeth over to imagination before the 
decree can be acted: for imagination ever 
precedeth voluntary motion, saving that this 
Janus of imagination hath differing faces; 
for the face towards reason hath the print of 
truth, but the face towards action hath the 
print of good ; which nevertheless are faces^ 

Quales decet esse sororum. 
Neither is the imagination simply and only a 
messenger, but is invested with, or at least- 
wise usurpeth no small authority in itself, be- 
sides the duty of the message. For it was 
well said by Aristotle, " That the mind hath 
" over the body that commandment, which 
" the lord hath over a bondman ; but that 
" reason hath over the imagination that com- 
" mandment which a magistrate hath over a 
" free citizen ;" who may come also to rule 
in his turn. For we see that in matters of 



44B 



faith and religion we raise our imagination 
above our reason ; which is the cause why re- 
ligion sought ever access to the mind by si- 
militudes, types, parables, visions, dreams. 
And again, in all persuasions that are 
wrought by eloquence, and other impres- 
sions of like nature, which do paint and dis- 
guise the true appearance of things, the 
chief recommendation unto reason is from 
the imagination. Nevertheless, because I 
find not any science that doth properly or 
fitly pertain to the imagination, I see no 
cause to alter the former division. For as 
for poesy, it is rather a pleasure, or play of 
imagination, than a work of duty thereof: 
and if it be a work, we speak not now of 
such parts of learning as the imagination 
produceth, but of such sciences as handle 
and consider of the imagination ; no more 
than we shall speak now of such knowledges 
as reason produceth, for that extendeth to all 
philosophy, but of such knowledges as do 
handle and enquire of the faculty of reason ; 
so as poesy had its true place. As for the 
power of the imagination in nature, and the 
manner of fortifying the same, we have men- 



247 



tioned it in the doctrine De anima, whereun- 
to most fitly it belongeth: and lastly, for 
imaginative or insinuative reason, which is 
the subject of rhetoric, we think it best to re- 
fer it to the arts of reason. So therefore we 
content ourselves with the former division, 
that Human Philosophy, which respecteth 
the faculties of the mind of man, hath two 
parts, Rational and Moral, 



RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 

The part of Human Philosophy which is 
Rational is of all knowledges, to the most 
wits, the least delightful, and seemeth but a 
net of subtilty and spinosity: for as it was 
truly said, that knowledge is pabulum animi; 
so in the nature of men's appetite to this 
food, most men are of the taste and stomach 
of the Israelites in the desert, that would fain 
have returned ad ollas camium, and were 
weary of manna ; which though it were ce- 
lestial, yet seemed less nutritive and com- 
fortable. So generally men taste well know- 
ledges that are drenched in flesh and blood, 



248 

civil history, morality, policy, about the 
which men's affections, praises, fortunes, do 
turn and are conversant ; but this same lu- 
men siccum doth parch and offend most men's 
watery and soft natures. But to speak truly 
of things as they are in worth, rational know- 
ledges are the keys of all other arts ; for as 
Aristotle saith aptly and elegantly, " That 
" the hand is the instrument of instruments., 
" and the mind is the form of forms;" so 
these be truly said to be the art of arts : nei^ 
ther do they only direct, but likewise con- 
firm and strengthen; even as the habit of 
shooting doth not only enable to shoot a nearer 
shoot, but also to draw a stronger bow. 
Four intei- The arts intellectual are four in number ; 

Jectual arts. 

divided according to the ends whereunto they 
are referred; for man's labour is to invent 
that which is sought or propounded; or to 
judge that which is invented ; or to retain 
that which is judged; or to deliver over that 
which is retained. So as the arts must be 
four ; art of enquiry or invention ; art of ex-* 
animation or judgment ; art of custody or me« 
tnory; and art of elocution or tradition* 



249 
Invention is of two kinds, much differing; Artof Euqui- 

i n -1 • i i i O t or inven- 

the one of arts and sciences ; and the other tion. 
of speech and arguments. The former of 
these I do report deficient ; which seemeth to 
me to be such a deficience as if, in the mak- 
ing of an inventory touching the state of a 
defunct, it should be set down, That there 
is no ready money. For as money will fetch 
all other commodities, so this knowledge is 
that which should purchase all the rest. And 
like as the West-Indies had never been dis- 
covered, if the use of the mariner's needle 
had not been first discovered, though the one 
be vast regions, and the other a small motion; 
so it cannot be found strange, if sciences be 
no farther discovered, if the art itself of 
invention and discovery hath been passed 
over. 

That this part of knowledge is wanting, to 
my judgment standeth plainly confessed : for 
first, logic doth not pretend to invent sci- 
ences, or the axioms of sciences, but pass- 
eth it over with a cuique in sua arte credendum. 
And Celsus acknowledged it gravely, speak- 
ing of the empirical and dogmatical sects of 
physicians, " That medicines and cures were 



£50 



" first found out, and then after the reasons 
" and causes were discoursed ; and not the 
f* causes first found out, and by light from 
? them the medicines and cures discovered." 
And Plato, in his Thecetetus, noteth well, 
" That particulars are infinite, and the high- 
" er generalities give no sufficient direction ; 
Jf and that the pith of all sciences, which 
tc maketh the artsman differ from the inex- 
ff pert, is in the middle propositions, which 
" in every particular knowledge are taken 
" from tradition and experience." And 
therefore we see that they, which discourse 
of the inventions and originals of things, re- 
fer them rather to chance than to art, and 
rather to beasts, birds, fishes, serpents, than 
to men. 

Dictamnum genetrix Cretcea carpit ab Ida, 
Puberibus caulem foliis, etjlore comantem 
Purpureo: non ilia feris incognita capris 
Gramina, cum tergo volucres hasere sagitta. 
So that it was no marvel, the manner of anti-? 
quity being to consecrate inventors, that the 
Egyptians had so few human idols in thei* 
temples, but almost all brute. 



251 



Omnigenumque Deum monstra, et latrator 
Anubis > 

Contra Neptunum, et Venerem, contraque Mi- 
new am, etc. 
And if you like better the tradition of the 
Grecians, and ascribe the first inventions to 
men, yet you will rather believe that Prome- 
theus first struck the flints, and marvelled at 
the spark, than that when he first struck the 
flints he expected the spark ; and therefore 
we see the West-Indian Prometheus had no 
intelligence with the European, because of 
the rareness with them of flint, that gave the 
first occasion : so as it should seem, that hi- 
therto men are rather beholden to a wild goat 
for surgery, or to a nightingale for music, or 
to the ibis for some part of physic, or to the 
potlid that flew open for artillery, or gene- 
rally to chance, or any thing else than to h> 
gic, for the invention of arts and sciences. 
Neither is the form of invention which Vir- 
gil describeth much other; 

Ut varias usus meditando extunderet artes 

Pauiati?n. 
For if you observe the words well, it is no 



£52 



other method than that which brute beasts are 
capable of, and do put in use ; which is a 
perpetual intending or practising some one 
thing, urged and imposed by an absolute ne- 
cessity of conservation of being : for so Ci- 
cero saith very truly, Usus uni rei deditus et 
naturam et art em scepe vincit. And therefore 
if it be said of men, 

Labor omnia vincit 
Improbus, et duris urgens in rebus egestas; 
it is likewise said of beasts, 2uis psittaco docuit 
suum xoupz : Who taught the raven in a 
drought to throw pebbles into an hollow tree, 
where she espied water, that the water might 
rise so as she might come to it ? Who taught 
the bee to sail through such a vast sea of air, 
and to find the way from a field in flower, a 
great way of£ to her hive ? Who taught the 
ant to bite every grain of corn that she buri- 
eth in her hill, lest it should take root and 
grow? Add then the word extundere, which 
importeth the extreme difficulty, and the 
word paulatim, which importeth the extreme 
slowness, and we are where we were, even 
amongst the iEgyptians' gods; there being 



U53 

little left to the faculty of reason, and no- 
thing to the duty of art, for matter of in- 
vention. 

Secondly, the induction which the logicians The induction 
speak of, and which seemeth familiar with the Logicians 

incompetent, 

Plato, (whereby the principles of sciences 
may be pretended to be invented, and so the 
middle propositions by derivation from the 
principles,) their form of induction, I say, 
is utterly vicious and incompetent ; wherein 
their error is the fouler, because it is the duty 
*of art to perfect and exalt nature ; but they 
contrariwise have wronged, abused, and tra- 
duced nature. For he that shall attentively, 
observe how the mind doth gather this excel- 
lent dew of knowledge, like unto that which 
the poet speaketh of, Aerei mellis ccekstia do- 
na, distilling and contriving it out of parti- 
culars natural and artificial, as the flowers of 
the field and garden, shall find that the mind 
of herself by nature doth manage and act an 
induction much better than they describe it. 
For to conclude upon an enumeration of par- 
ticulars, without instance contradictory, is no 
conclusion, but a conjecture; for who can 
assure, in many subjects, upon those parti- 



254 

culars which appear of a side, that there are 
not on the contrary side which appear not. 
As if Samuel should have rested upon those 
sons of Jesse which were brought before him, 
and failed of David which was in the field. 
And this form, to say truth, is so gross, as it 
had not been possible for wits so subtile as 
have managed these things to have offered 
it to the world, but that they hasted to their 
theories and dogmaticals, and were imperious 
and scornful toward particulars; which their 
manner was to use but as lictores and viatores, 
for Serjeants and whifflers, ad summovendam 
turbam, to make way and make room for their 
opinions, rather than in their true use and 
service. Certainly it is a thing may touch a 
man with a religious wonder to see how the 
footsteps of seducement are the very same in 
divine and human truth: for as in divine 
truth man cannot endure to become as a 
child; so in human, they reputed the attend- 
ing the inductions whereof we speak, as if it 
were a second infancy or childhood. 
Nature can- Thirdly, allow some principles or axioms 

not be exa- J 7 r r 

Srn^oFs 11 ? w ere rightty m ^ uce d> yet nevertheless certain 
logism, j t j s that middle propositions cannot be de- 



£55 



duced from them in subject of nature by syl- 
logism, that is by touch and reduction of 
them to principles in a middle term. It is 
true that in sciences popular, as moralities, 
laws, and the like, yea and divinity (because 
it pleaseth God to apply himself to the capa- 
city of the simplest) that form may have use ; 
and in natural philosophy likewise, by way 
of argument or satisfactory reason, 3uce assen- 
sum parity operis effceta est ; but the subtilty 
of nature and operations will not be inchain- 
ed in those bonds : for arguments consist of 
propositions, and propositions of words; and 
words are but the current tokens or marks o 
popular notions of things ; which notions, if 
they be grossly and variably collected out of 
particulars, it is not the laborious examina- 
tion either of consequences of arguments, or 
of the truth of propositions, that can ever 
correct that error, being, as the physicians 
speak, in the first digestion : and therefore it 
was not without cause, that so many excellent 
philosophers became sceptics and academics, 
and denied any certainty of knowledge or 
comprehension; and held opinion, that the 
knowledge of man extended only to appear- 



256 

aftces and probabilities. It is true that hi 
Socrates it was supposed to be but a form of 
irony, Scientia?n dissimulando simulavit; for 
he used to disable his knowledge, to the end 
to enhance his knowledge; like the humour 
of Tiberius in his beginnings, that would 
reign, but would not acknowledge so much : 
and in the later academy, which Cicero em- 
braced, this opinion also of acatalepsia, I 
doubt, was not held sincerely : for that all 
those which excelled in copia of speech seem 
to have chosen that sect, as that which was 
, fittest to give glory to their eloquence and 

variable discourses ; being rather like pro- 
gresses of pleasure, than journeys to an end. 
Error of the But assuredly many scattered in both acade- 

Sceptics and ° 

Academics. m ies did hold it in subtilty and integrity: 
but here was their chief error ; they charged 
the deceit upon the senses ; which in my 
judgment, notwithstanding all their cavilla- 
tions, are very sufficient to certify and report 
truth, though not always immediately, yet 
by comparison, by help of instrument, and 
by producing and urging such things as are 
too subtile for the sense to some effect com- 
prehensible by the sense ; and other like as- 



257 

sistance. But they ought to have charged 
the deceit upon the weakness of the intel- 
lectual powers, and upon the manner of 
collecting and concluding upon the reports 
of the senses. This I speak not to disable 
the mind of man, but to stir it up to seek 
help: for no man, be he never so cunning 
or practised, can make a straight line or 
perfect circle by steadiness of hand, which 
may be easily done by help of a ruler or 
compass. 

This part of invention, concerning the in- 
vention of sciences, I purpose, if God give me 
leave, hereafter to propound, having digested 
it into two parts ; whereof the one I term ex- 
perientia literata, and the other, interpretatio 
naturae : the former being but a degree and 
rudiment of the latter. But I will not dwell 
too long, nor speak too much upon a pro- 
mise. 

The invention of speech or argument is of invention 

of Speech or 

not properly an invention ; for to invent is to Argument. 
discover that we know not ; and not to re- 
cover or resummon that which we already 
know : and the use of this invention is no 



258 

other but, out of the knowledge whereof our 
mind is already possessed, to draw forth or 
call before us that which may be pertinent 
to the purpose which we take into our consi- 
deration. So as, to speak truly, it is no inven- 
tion, but a remembrance or suggestion, with 
an application ; which is the cause why the 
schools do place it after judgment, as subse- 
quent and not precedent. Nevertheless, be- 
cause we do account a chace, as well of deer 
in an inclosed park, as in a forest at large, 
and that it hath already obtained the name, 
let it be called invention ; so as it be per- 
ceived and discerned that the scope and end 
of this invention is readiness and present use 
of our knowledge, and not addition or am- 
plification thereof, 
of prepara. To procure this ready use of knowledge 
there are two courses, preparation and sug- 
gestion. The former of these seemeth scarce- 
ly a part of knowledge, consisting rather of 
diligence than of any artificial erudition. 
And herein Aristotle wittily, but hurtfully, 
doth deride the sophists near his time, say- 
ing, " They did as if one that professed the 
" art of shoe-making should not teach how to 



tioa". 



259 



" make up a shoe, but only exhibit in a 
" readiness a number of shoes of all fashions 
" and sizes." But yet a man might reply, 
that if a shoe-maker should have no shoes in 
his shop, but only work as he is bespoken, he 
should be weakly customed. But our Sa- 
viour speaking of divine knowledge, saith, 
that the kingdom of heaven is like a good hons- 
holder, that hringeth forth neiv and old store : 
and we see the ancient writers of rhetoric 
do give it in precept, that pleaders should 
have the places, whereof they have most 
continual use, ready handled in all the va- 
riety that may be; as that, to speak for^ the 
literal interpretation of the law against equi- 
ty, and contrary; and to speak for pre- 
sumptions and inferences against testimony, 
and contrary. And Cicero himself, being 
broken unto it by great experience deli* 
vereth it plainly ; that whatsoever a man 
shall have occasion to speak of, if he will 
take the pains, he may have it in effect 
premeditate, and handled in thesi : so that 
when he cometh to a particular, he shall 
have nothing to do, but to add names, and 
times, and places, and such other circum- 
s2 



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stances of individuals. We see likewise the 
exact diligence of Demosthenes ; who, in re- 
gard of the great force that the entrance and 
access into causes nath to make a good im- 
pression, had ready framed a number of pre- 
faces for orations and speeches. All which 
authorities and precedents may overweigh 
Aristotle's opinion, that would have us change 
a rich wardrobe for a pair of shears. 

But the nature of the collection of this pro- 
vision or preparatory store, though it be 
common both to logic and rhetoric, yet hav- 
ing made an entry of it here, where it came 
first to be spoken of, I think fit to refer over 
the farther handling of it to rhetoric, 
of sugges- The other part of invention, which I term 
suggestion, doth assign and direct us to cer- 
tain marks or places, which may excite our 
mind to return and produce such knowledge 
as it hath formerly collected, to the end we 
may make use thereof. Neither is this use, 
truly taken, only to furnish argument to 
dispute probably with others, but likewise to 
minister unto our judgment to conclude 
aright within ourselves. Neither may these 
places serve only to prompt our invention, 



lion. 



<26l 

but also to direct our enquiry. For a faculty 
of wise interrogating is half a knowledge. 
For as Plato saith, " Whosoever seeketh, 
" knoweth that which he seeketh for in a 
" general notion, else how shall he know it 
" when he hath found it ?" And therefore the 
larger your anticipation is, the more direct 
and compendious is your search. But the 
same places which will help us what to pro- 
duce of that which we know already, will 
also help us, if a man of experience were be- 
fore us, what questions to ask : or, if we have 
books and authors to instruct us, what points 
to search and resolve : so as I cannot report 
that this part of invention, which is that 
which the schools call topics, is deficient. 

Nevertheless topics are of two sorts, gene- of Topics, 
ral and special. The general we have spoken fpedS. an 
to, but the particular hath been touched by 
some, but rejected generally as inartificial 
and variable. But leaving the humour which 
hath reigned too much in the schools, which 
is to be vainly subtile in a few things which 
are within their command, and to reject the 
rest, I do receive particular topics, (that is, 
places or directions of invention and enquiry 



262 

in every particular knowledge) as things of 
. great use, being mixtures of logic with the mat- 
ter of sciences : for in these it holdeth, Ars in- 
veniendi adolescit cum inventis; for as in go- 
ing of a way, we do not only gain that part 
of the way which is passed, but we gain the 
better sight of that part of the way which 
remaineth, so every degree of proceeding in 
a science giveth a light to that which fol- 
loweth; which light if we strengthen, by 
drawing it forth into questions or places 
of enquiry, we do greatly advance our 
pursuit. 
Art of ex- Now w r e pass unto the arts of judgment, 
judgment. ° r which handle the natures of proofs and de- 
monstrations ; which as to induction hath a 
coincidence with invention: for in all induc- 
tions, whether in good or vicious form, the 
same action of the mind which inventeth, 
judgeth; all one as in the sense : but other- 
wise it is in proof by syllogism; for the proof 
being not immediate, but by mean, the in- 
vention of the mean is one thing, and the 
judgment of the consequence is another ; the 
one exciting only, the other examining. 
Therefore, for the real and exact form of 



£63 

judgment, we refer ourselves to that which 
we have spoken of interpretation of nature. 

For the other judgment by syllogism, as it of Syllogism. 
is a thing most agreeable to the mind of 
man, so it hath been vehemently and excel- 
lently laboured ; for the nature of man doth 
extremely covet to have somewhat in his 
understanding fixed and immoveable, and as 
a rest and support of the mind. And therefore 
as Aristotle endeavoureth to prove, that in all 
motion there is some point quiescent; and 
as he elegantly expoundeth the ancient fable 
of Atlas, that stood fixed, and bore up the 
heaven from falling, to be meant of the poles 
or axle-tree of heaven, whereupon the con- 
version is accomplished ; so assuredly men 
have a desire to have an Atlas or axle-tree 
within, to keep them from fluctuation, which 
is like to a perpetual peril of falling; there- 
fore men did hasten to set down some prin- 
ciples about which the variety [of their dis- 
putations might turn. 

So then this art of judgment is but the re- 
duction of propositions to principles in a 
middle term. The principles to be agreed by 
all, and exempted from argument ; the mid- 



264 

die term to be elected at the liberty of every 
man's invention ; the reduction to be of two 
kinds, direct and inverted; the one when 
the proposition is reduced to the principle, 
which they term a probation ostensive ; the 
other when the contradictory of the proposi- 
tion is reduced to the contradictory of the 
principle, which is that which they call per 
incommodum, or pressing an absurdity; the 
number of middle terms to be as the propo- 
sition standeth degrees more or less removed 
from the principle. 
it's two me- But tn ^ s art natn * wo several methods of 
Poctrine. doctrine, the one by way of direction, the 
other by way of caution : the former frameth 
and setteth down a true form of consequence, 
by the variations and deflections from which 
errors and inconsequences may be exactly 
judged: toward the composition and struc- 
ture of which form it is incident to handle 
the parts thereof, which are propositions, and 
the parts of propositions, which are simple 
words; and this is that part of logic which 
is comprehended in the analytics. 

The second method of doctrine was intro- 
duced for expedite use and assurance sake ; 



265 

discovering the more subtile forms of so- 
phisms and illaqueations with their redargu- 
tions, which is that which is termed elenches. 
For although in the more gross sorts of fallacies 
it happeneth, as Seneca maketh the compari- 
son well, as in juggling feats, which though 
we know not how they are done, yet we 
know well it is not as it seemeth to be ; yet 
the more subtile sort of them doth not only 
put a man besides his answer, but doth many 
times abuse his judgment 

This part concerning Elenches is excel- The doctrine 
lently handled by Aristotle in precept, but W eii handled 
more excellently by Plato in example, not and piato. e 
only in the persons of the sophists, but even 
in Socrates himself ; who professing to affirm 
nothing, but to infirm that which was affirm- 
ed by another, hath exactly expressed all the 
forms of objection, fallacy, and redargution. 
And although we have said that the use of 
this doctrine is for redargution; yet it is ma- 
nifest, the degenerate and corrupt use is for 
caption and contradiction, which passeth for 
a great faculty, and no doubt is of very 
great advantage ; though the difference be 
good which was made between orators and 



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sophisters, that the one is as the greyhound, 
which hath his advantage in the race, and 
the other as the hare, which hath her ad- 
vantage in the turn, so as it is the advantage 
of the weaker creature. 
Extent of this But yet farther, this doctrine of Elenches 

doctrine. . 

hath a more ample latitude and extent than 
is perceived; namely, unto divers parts of 
knowledge ; whereof some are laboured and 
others omitted. For I first conceive, though 
it may seem at first somewhat strange, that 
that part which is variably referred, some- 
times to logic, sometimes to metaphysic, 
touching the common adjuncts of essences, 
is but an Elench; for the great sophism of 
all sophisms being equivocation or ambi- 
guity of words and phrase (especially of such 
words as are most general, and intervene in 
every enquiry) it seemeth to me that the true 
and fruitful uses, leaving vain subtilties and 
speculations, of the enquiry of majority, mi- 
nority, priority, posteriority, identity, di- 
versity, possibility, act, totality, parts, ex- 
istence, privation, and the like, are but wise 
cautions against ambiguities of speech. So 
again, the distribution of things into certain 



£67 

tribes, which we call categories, or predica- 
ments, are but cautions against the confu- 
fusion of definitions and divisions. 

Secondly, there is a seducement that 
worketh by the strength of the impression, 
and not by the subtilty of the illaqueation ; 
not so much perplexing the reason, as over- 
ruling it by power of the imagination. But 
this part I think more proper to handle when 
I shall speak of rhetoric. 

But lastly, there is yet a much more im- Fallacies 

J J founded on 

portant and profound kind of fallacies in the general 

1 x nature of thfc 

the mind of man, which I find not ob- mind * 
served or enquired at all, and think good 
to place here, as that which of all others 
appertaineth most to rectify judgment: the 
force whereof is such, as it doth not dazzle 
or snare the understanding in some parti- 
culars, but doth more generally and in- 
wardly infect and corrupt the state thereof. 
For the mind of man is far from the na- 
ture of a clear and equal glass, wherein 
the beams of things should reflect accord- 
ing to their true incidence ; nay, it is ra- 
ther like an inchanted glass, full of super- 
stition and imposture, if it be not deliver- 



^d and reduced. For this purpose, let us 
consider the false appearances that are im- 
posed upon us by the general nature of 
the mind, beholding them in an example 
or two ; as first in that instance which is 
the root of all superstition, namely, that to 
the nature of the mind of all men it is 
consonant for the affirmative or active to 
affect more than the negative or privative : 
so that a few times hitting, or presence, 
countervails oft-times failing, or absence ; as 
was well answered by Diagoras to him that 
shewed him in Neptune's temple the great 
number of pictures of such as had escaped 
shipwreck, and had paid their vows to Nep- 
tune,, saying, " Advise now, you that think 
" it folly to invocate Neptune in tempest:" 
" Yea, but, saith Diagoras, where are they 
"painted that are drowned?" Let us be- 
hold it in another instance, namely, " That 
" the spirit of man, being of an equal and 
ft uniform substance, doth usually suppose 
" and feign in nature a greater equality 
" and uniformity than is in truth." Hence 
it cometh that the mathematicians cannot 
satisfy themselves, except they reduce the 



269 



motions of the celestial bodies to perfect 
circles, rejecting spiral lines, and labouring 
to be discharged of eccentrics. Hence it 
cometh, that whereas there are many things 
in nature, as it were monod'ica, sui juris ; yet 
the cogitations of man do feign unto them 
relatives, parallels, and conjugates, whereas 
no such thing is ; as they have feigned an 
element of fire to keep square with earth, 
water, and air, and the like ; nay, it is not 
credible, till it be opened, what a number 
of fictions and fancies the similitude of 
human actions and arts, together with the 
making of man communis mensura, have 
brought into natural philosophy ; not much 
better than the heresy of the Anthropo- 
morphites, bred in the cells of gross and 
solitary monks, and the opinion of Epicurus, 
answerable to the same in heathenism, who 
supposed the gods to be of human shape- 
And therefore Velleius the Epicurean needed 
not to have asked, why God should have 
adorned the heavens with stars ; as if he 
had been an JEdilis, one that should have 
set forth some magnificent shews or plays. 
For if that great work-master had been of 



270 

an human disposition, he would have cast 
the stars into some pleasant and beautiful 
works and orders, like the frets in the roofs 
of houses ; whereas one can scarce find a 
posture in square, or triangle, or straight 
line, amongst such an infinite number ; so 
differing an harmony there is between the 
spirit of man and the spirit of nature. 
Fallacies of Let us consider again the false appear- 

individual -, , , 

nature. ances imposed upon us by every man s own 

individual nature and custom, in that feign- 
ed supposition that Plato maketh of the 
cave ; for certainly if a child were conti- 
nued in a grot or cave under the earth 
until maturity of age, and came suddenly 
abroad, he would have strange and absurd 
imaginations. So in like manner, although 
our persons live in the view of heaven, yet 
our spirits are included in the caves of our 
own complexions and customs, which mi- 
nister unto us infinite errors and vain opi- 
nions, if they be not recalled to examina- 
tion. But hereof we have given many ex- 
amples in one of the errors or peccant 
humors which we ran briefly over in our 
first book. 



271 

And lastly, let us consider the false ap- Fallacies in*. 

J posed by 

pearances that are imposed upon us bywords. 
words, which are framed and applied accord- 
ing to the conceit and capacities of the vulgar 
sort ; and although we think we govern 
our words, and prescribe it well, Loquen- 
dum ut vulgus, sentiendum ut sapientes ; yet 
certain it is that words, as a Tartar's bow, 
do shoot back upon the understanding of 
the wisest, and mightily entangle and per- 
vert the judgment ; so as it is almost ne- 
cessary in all controversies and disputations 
to imitate the wisdom of the mathemati- 
cians, in setting down in the very begin- 
ning the definitions of our words and 
terms, that others may know how we accept 
and understand them, and whether they 
concur with us or no. For it cometh to 
pass, for want of this, that we are sure to 
end there where we ought to have begun, 
which is in questions and differences about 
words. To conclude therefore, it must be 
confessed that it is not possible to divorce 
ourselves from these fallacies and false ap- 
pearances, because they are inseparable from 
our nature and condition of life ; so yet 



Iff 

nevertheless the caution of them, (for all 
elenches, as was said, are but cautions,) 
doth extremely import the true conduct of 
human judgment. The particular elenches 
or cautions against these three false appear- 
ances I find altogether deficient. 
Four kinds of There remaineth one part of judgment of 

demonstra- 
tion, great excellency, which to mine understand- 
ing is so slightly touched as I may report 
that also deficient ; which is the applica- 
tion of the differing kinds of proofs to the 
differing kinds of subjects : for there being 
but four kinds of demonstrations, that is 
i by the immediate consent of the mind or 
sense, by induction, by syllogism, and by 
. congruity (which is that which Aristotle 
calleth demonstration in orb or circle, and 
not d notioribus,) every of these hath certain 
subjects in the matter of sciences, in which 
respectively they have chiefest use ; and 
certain others, from which respectively they 
ought to be excluded : and the rigour and 
curiosity in requiring the more severe proofs 
in some things, and chiefly the facility in 
contenting ourselves with the more remiss 
proofs in others, hath been amongst the 



2<o 

greatest causes of detriment and hindrance 
to knowledge. The distributions and assig- 
nations of demonstrations, according to the 
analogy of sciences, I note as deficient. 



3. 



The custody or retaining of knowledge is Art of cu?* 

... . „ tody or me- 

either in writing or memory ; wnereot writ- mo ry, 
ing hath two parts, the nature of the cha- 
racter, and the order of the entry : for the 
art of characters, or other visible notes of 
words or things, it hath nearest conjuga- 
tion with grammar ; and therefore I refer 
it to the due place : for the disposition and 
collocation of that knowledge which we 
preserve in writing, it consisteth in a good 
digest of common-places, wherein I am not 
ignorant of the prejudice imputed to the 
use of common-place books, as causing a 
retardation of reading, and some sloth or 
relaxation of memory. But because it is but 
a counterfeit thing in knowledges to be for- 
ward and pregnant, except a man be deep 
and full, I hold the entry of common -places 
to be a matter of great use and essence 
in studying, as that which assureth copia 
of invention, and contracted! judgment to 
strength. But this is true, that of the me- 



274 

tTiods of common-places that I have seen,, 
there is none of any sufficient worth ; all 
of them carrying merely the face of a school, 
and not of a world ; and referring to vulgar 
matters and pedantical divisions, without all 
life, or respect to action. 
of the faculty For the other principal part of the cus- 

of memory. . . 

tody of knowledge, which is memory, I find 
that faculty in my judgment weakly en-* 
quired of. An art there is extant of it ; but 
it seemeth to me that there are better pre- 
cepts than that art, and better practices of 
that art than those received. It is certain 
the art, as it is, may be raised to points 
of ostentation prodigious : but in use, as it 
is now managed, it is barren, (not burden- 
some, nor dangerous to natural memory, as 
is imagined, but barren,) that is not dex- 
terous to be applied to the serious use of 
business and occasions. And therefore I 
make no more estimation of repeating a 
great number of names or words upon onee 
hearing, or the pouring forth of a number 
of verses or rhimes ex tempore, or the making 
of a satirical simile of every thing, or the 
turning of every thing to a jest, or the fal- 



275 

sifying or contradicting of every thing by 
cavil, or the like, (whereof in the faculties of 
the mind there is great copia, and such as 
by device and practice may be exalted to an 
extreme degree of wonder,) than I do of 
the tricks of tumblers, funambuloes, bala- 
dines ; the one being the same in the mind 
that the other is in the body ; matters of 
strangeness without worthiness. 

This art of memory is but built upon 
two intentions ; the one prenotion, the other 
emblem. Prenotion dischargeth the indefi- 
nite seeking of that we would remember, 
and directeth us to seek in a narrow com- 
pass, that is, somewhat that hath congruity 
with our place of memory. Emblem reduceth 
conceits intellectual to images sensible, which 
strike the memory more ; out of which axioms 
may be drawn much morej^ractical than that ^ J^ 
in use ; and besides which axioms, there 
are divers more touching help of memory, 
not inferior to them. But I did in the be- 
ginning distinguish, not to report those things 
deficient which are but only ill managed. 

There remaineth the fourth kind of ra- Art of°Eio~ 
tional knowledge, which is transitive ; con- Tradition. 
t 2 



£76 

eerning the expressing or transferring our 
knowledge to others, which I will term by 
the general name of tradition or delivery. 
Tradition hath three parts : the first con- 
cerning the organ of tradition ; the second 
concerning the method of tradition ; and the 
third concerning the illustration of tradition, 
of the organ For the organ of tradition, it is either 

of Tradition. . . . 

speech or writing : tor Aristotle saith well, 
U Words are the images of cogitations, and 
" letters are the images of words ;" but yet 
it is not of necessity that cogitations be ex- 
pressed by the medium of words. For what- 
soever is capable of sufficient differences, 
and those perceptible by the sense, is in 
nature competent to express cogitations. 
And therefore we see in the commerce of 
barbarous people, that understand not one 
. another's language, and in the practice of 
divers that aTe -dumb and deaf, that men's 
minds are expressed in gestures, though not 
exactly, yet to serve the turn. And we 
understand farther that it is the use of China,, 
and the kingdoms of the high Levant, to 
write in characters real, which express nei- 
ther letters nor words in gross, but things 
or notions ; insomuch as countries and 



277 

provinces, which understand not one ano- 
ther's language, can nevertheless read one 
another's writings, because the characters 
are accepted more generally than the lan- 
guages do extend; and therefore they have 
a vast multitude of characters, as many, I 
suppose, as radical words. 

These notes of cogitations are of two sorts ; Two kinds of 

, . . . notes of our 

the one when the note hath some similitude Thoughts. 
or congruity with the notion ; the other ad 
placitum, having force only by contract or 
acceptation. Of the former sort are hiero- 
glyphics and gestures. For as to hieroglyphics, 
tilings of ancient use, and embraced chiefly 
by the ^Egyptians, one of the most ancient 
nations, they are but as continued impresses 
and emblems. And as for gestures, they are 
as transitory hieroglyphics, and are to hiero- 
glyphics as words spoken are to words writ- 
ten, in that they abide not : but they have 
evermore, as well as the other, an affinity 
with the things signified; as Periander, 
being consulted with how to preserve a 
tyranny newly usurped, bid the messenger 
attend and report what he saw him do; 
and went into his garden and topped all 
his highest flowers : signifying, that it con- 



£78 

sisted in the cutting off and keeping low of 
the nobility and grandees. Ad placitum are 
the characters real before mentioned, and 
words: although some have been willing by- 
curious inquiry, or rather by apt feigning, to 
have derived imposition of names from reason 
and intendment ; a speculation elegant, and 
by reason it searcheth into antiquity, reve- 
rent; but sparingly mixed with truth, and 
of small fruit. This portion of knowledge, 
touching the notes of things, and cogitations 
in general, I find not enquired but deficient. 
And although it may seem of no great use, 
considering that words and writings by let- 
ters do far excel all the other ways ; yet be- 
cause this part concerneth, as it were, the 
mint of knowledge, (for words are the tokens 
current and accepted for conceits, as moneys 
are for values, and that it is fit men be not 
ignorant that moneys may be of another kind 
than gold and silver,) I thought good to pro- 
pound it to better enquiry, 
of Speech Concerning speech and words, the consi- 

deration of them hath produced the science 
of Grammar ; for man still striveth to reinr 
tegrate himself in those benedictions, from 
which by his fault he hath been deprived ; 



and Words. 



279 



and as he hath striven against the first gene- 
ral curse by the invention of all other arts, so 
hath he sought to come forth of the second 
general curse, which was the confusion of 
tongues, by the art of grammar: whereof 
the use in a mother tongue is small, in a fo- 
reign tongue more ; but most in such foreign 
tongues as have ceased to be vulgar tongues, 
and are turned only to learned tongues. The 
duty of it is of two natures ; the one popular, 
which is for the speedy and perfect attaining 
languages, as well for intercourse of speech 
as for understanding of authors; the other 
philosophical, examining the power and na- 
ture of words, as they are the footsteps and 
prints of reason : which kind of analogy be- 
tween words and reason is handled sparsim, 
brokenly, though not intirely ; and therefore 
I cannot report it deficient ; though I think 
it very worthy to be reduced into a science 
by itself. 

Unto grammar also belongeth, as an ap- 
pendix, the consideration of the accidents of 
words; which are measure, sound, and ele- 
vation or accent, and the sweetness and harsh- 
ness of them ; whence hath issued some cu^ 



280 

rious observations in rhetoric, but chiefly 
poesy, as we consider it, in respect of the 
verse, and not of the argument: wherein 
though men in learned tongues do tie them- 
selves to the ancient measures, yet in modern 
languages it seemeth to me as free to make 
new measures of verses as of dances ; for a 
dance is a measured pace, as a verse is a 
measured speech. In these things the sense 
is better judge than the art; 

Camce fercula nostras 
Mallem controls qudm placuisse cocis. 
And of the servile expressing antiquity in an 
unlike and an unfit subject, it is well said, 
Quod tempore antiquum videtur, id incongruitate 
est maxime novum. 
of ciphers. For ciphers, they are commonly in letters 
or alphabets, but may be in words. The 
kinds of ciphers, besides the simple ciphers, 
with changes, and intermixtures of nulls and 
non-significants, are many, according to the 
nature or rule of the infolding; wheel-ci- 
phers, key-ciphers, doubles, etc. But the 
virtues of them, whereby they are to be pre- 
ferred, are three ; that they be not laborious 
to write and read; that they be impossible to 



decipher; and in some cases, that they be 
without suspicion. The highest degree there- 
of is to write omnia per omnia ; which is un- 
doubtedly possible with a proportion quin- 
cuple at most of the writing infolding to the 
writing infolded, and no other restraint what- 
soever. This art of ciphering, hath for re- 
lative an art of deciphering, by supposition 
unprofitable, but as things are, of great use. 
For suppose that ciphers were well managed, 
there be multitudes of them which exclude 
the decipherer. But in regard of the raw- 
ness and unskilfulness of the hands through 
which they pass, the greatest matters are 
many times carried in the weakest ciphers. 

In the enumeration of these private and 
retired arts, it may be, thought I seek to 
make a great muster-roll of sciences, naming 
them for shew and ostentation, and to little 
other purpose. But let those which are skil- 
ful in them judge whether I bring them in 
only for appearance, or whether in that which 
I speak of them, though in few words, there 
be not some seed of proficience. And this 
must be remembered, that as there be many 
of great account in their countries and pro- 



£82 

vinces, which when they come up to the seat 
of the estate, are but of mean rank, and 
scarcely regarded; so these arts, being here 
placed with the principal and supreme sci- 
ences, seem petty things ; yet to such as have 
chosen them to spend their labours and stu- 
dies in them, they seem great matters. 
of the me- For the method of tradition, I see it hath 

thod of Tra< 

^ition. moved a controversy in our time. But as in 

civil business, if there be a meeting, and men 
fall at words, there is commonly an end of 
the matter for that time, and no proceeding 
at all; so in learning, where there is much 
controversy, there is many times little in- 
quiry. For this part of knowledge of method 
seemeth to me so weakly enquired as I shall 
report it deficient. 

Method hath been placed, and that not 
amiss, in logic, as a part of judgment ; for 
as the doctrine of syllogisms comprehendeth 
the rules of judgment upon that which is in*- 
vented, so the doctrine of method containeth 
the rules of judgment upon that which is to 
be delivered; for judgment precedeth deli- 
very, as it followeth invention. Neither is 
the method or the nature of the tradition ma- 



2S3 

terial only to the use of knowledge, but like- 
wise to the progression of knowledge : for 
since the labour and life of one man cannot 
attain to perfection of knowledge, the wisdom 
of the tradition is that which inspireth the 
felicity of continuance and proceeding. And of method 

1 ° magisterial 

therefore the most real diversity of method is andproba- 

* tionary. 

of method referred to use, and method refer- 
red to progression ; whereof the one may be 
termed magisterial, and the other of proba- 
tion. 

The latter whereof seemeth to be via de- 
serta et interclusa. For as knowledges are now 
delivered, there is a kind of contract of er- 
ror between the deliverer and the receiver : 
for he that delivereth knowledge, desireth to 
deliver it in such form as may be best believed, 
and not as may be best examined; and he 
that receiveth knowledge, desireth rather pre- 
sent satisfaction than expectant enquiry; 
and so rather not to doubt than not to err : 
glory making the author not to lay open his 
weakness, and sloth making the disciple not 
to know his strength. 

But knowledge, that is delivered as a thread of the syn- 

thetic method 

to be spun on, ought to be delivered and in- 



284 



timated, if it were possible, in the same me- 
thod wherein it was invented: and so is it 
possible of knowledge induced. But in this 
same anticipated and prevented knowledge, 
no man knoweth how he came to the know- 
ledge which he hath obtained. But yet ne- 
vertheless, secundum majus et minus, a man 
may revisit and descend unto the foundations 
of his knowledge and consent ; and so trans- 
plant it into another, as it grew in his own 
mind. For it is in knowledges as it is in 
plants, if you mean to use the plant, it is no 
matter for the roots ; but if you mean to re- 
move it to grow, then it is more assured to 
rest upon roots than slips : so the delivery of 
knowledges, as it is now used, is as of fair 
bodies of trees without the roots; good for 
the carpenter, but not for the planter. But 
if you will have sciences grow, it is less mat- 
ter for the shaft or body of the tree, so you 
look well to the taking up of the roots: of 
which kind of delivery the method of the ma- 
thematics, in that subject, hath some shadow; 
but generally I see it neither put in ure nor 
put in inquisition, and therefore note it for 
deficient. 



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Another diversity of method there is, which of the E ™.g- 

* matical me- 

hath some affinity with the former, used in thod - 
some cases by the discretion of the ancients, 
but disgraced since by the impostures of ma- 
ny vain persons, who have made it as a false 
light for their counterfeit merchandises ; and 
that is, enigmatical and disclosed. The pre- 
tence whereof is to remove the vulgar capa- 
cities from being admitted to the secrets of 
knowledges, and to reserve them to selected 
auditors, or wits of such sharpness as can 
pierce the veil. 

Another diversity of method, whereof the Of Apho- 
risms and 
consequence is great, is the delivery of know- Methods. 

ledge in aphorisms, or in methods; where- 
in we may observe, that it hath been too 
much taken into custom, out of a few axioms 
or observations upon any subject, to make a 
solemn and formal art, filling it with some 
discourses, and illustrating it with examples, 
and digesting it into a sensible method; but 
the writing in aphorisms hath many excellent 
virtues, whereto the writing in method doth 
not approach. 

For first it trieth the writer, whether he 
be superficial or solid : for aphorisms, except 



236 



they should be ridiculous, cannot be made 
but of the pith and heart of sciences ; for 
discourse of illustration is cut off; recitals of 
examples are cut off; discourse of connection 
and order is cut off; descriptions of practice 
are cut off; so there remaineth nothing to fill 
the aphorisms but some good quantity of ob* 
servation : and therefore no man can suffice, 
nor in reason will attempt to write aphorisms, 
but he that is sound and grounded. But in 
methods, 

Tantum series juncturaque pollet, 
Tantum de medio sumptis accedit honoris ; 
as a man shall make a great shew of an art, 
which if it were disjointed, would come to 
little. Secondly, methods are more fit to win 
consent or belief, but less fit to point to ac- 
tion; for they carry a kind of demonstration 
in orb or circle, one part illuminating an- 
other, and therefore satisfy : but particulars, 
being dispersed, do best agree with dispersed 
directions. And lastly, aphorisms, represent- 
ing a knowledge broken, do invite men to 
enquire farther ; whereas methods, carrying 
the shew of a total, do secure men as if they 
were at farthest. 



287 
Another diversity of method, which is of the me- 

J tbod of Asser- 

likewise of great weight, is the handling of tionandQues- 
knowledge by assertions and their proofs, or 
by questions and their determinations ; the 
latter kind whereof, if it be immoderately 
followed, is as prejudicial to the proceeding 
of learning, as it is to the proceeding of an 
army to go about to besiege every little fort 
or hold. For if the field be kept, and the 
sum of the enterprise pursued, those smaller 
things will come in of themselves : indeed a 
man would not leave some important place 
with an enemy at his back. In like manner, 
the use of confutation in the delivery of sci- 
ences ought to be very sparing ; and to serve 
to remove strong preoccupations and pre- 
judgments, and not to minister and excite dis- 
putations and doubts* 

Another diversity of method is according of method 

-i i . i • i • i ii -i according to 

to the subject or matter which is handled ; the matter. 
for there is a great difference in the delivery 
of the mathematics, which are the most ab- 
stracted of knowledges, and policy, which is 
the most immersed ; and howsoever conten- 
tion hath been moved, touching an uniformi- 
ty of method in multiformity of matter ; yet 



288 

we see how that opinion, besides the weak- 
ness of it, hath been of ill desert towards 
learning, as that which taketh the way to re- 
duce learning to certain empty and barren 
generalities; being but the very husks and 
shells of sciences, all the kernel being forced 
out and expulsed with the torture and press 
of the method : and therefore as I did allow 
well of particular topics for invention, so do 
I allow likewise of particular methods of tra- 
dition, 
of methods Another diversity of judgment, in the de- 
o^simiii- livery and teaching of knowledge, is accord- 
ing unto the light and presuppositions of that 
which is delivered ; for that knowledge which 
is new and foreign from opinions received 
is to be delivered in another form than that 
that is agreeable and familiar ; and therefore 
Aristotle, when he thinks to tax Democritus, 
doth in truth commend him, where he saith, 
ge If we shall indeed dispute, and not follow 
" after similitudes," etc. For those, whose 
conceits are seated in popular opinions, need 
only but to prove or dispute: but those, 
whose conceits are beyond popular opinions, 
have a double labour; the one. to rnake them- 



selves conceived, and the other to prove and 
demonstrate : so that it is of necessity with 
them to have recourse to similitudes and 
translations to express themselves. And there- 
fore in the infancy of learning, and in rude 
times, when those conceits which are now 
trivial were then new, the world was full of 
parables and similitudes ; for else would men 
either have passed over without mark, or else 
rejected for paradoxes that which was offer- 
ed, before they had understood or judged. 
So in divine learning, we see how frequent 
parables and tropes are : for it is a rule, 
<c That whatsoever science is not consonant 
iC to presuppositions, must pray in aid of 
%c similitudes." 

There be also other diversities of methods, of other art* 
vulgar and received : as that of resolution or of metbod * 
analysis, of constitution or systasis, of conceal- 
ment or cryptic, etc. which I do allow well of, 
though I have stood upon those which are 
least handled and observed. All which I have 
remembered to this purpose, because I would 
erect and constitute one general enquiry, 
which seems to me deficient, touching the 
wisdom of tradition. 



£90 
As to the n- But unto this part of knowledge, concern- 
manner of ing method, doth farther belong not only the 
architecture of the whole frame of a work, 
but also the several beams and columns there- 
of; not as to their stuff, but as to their quan- 
tity and figure : and therefore method con- 
sidered not only the disposition of the argu- 
ment or subject, but likewise the proposi- 
tions ; not as to their truth or matter, but as 
to their limitation and manner. ,For herein 
Ramus merited better a great deal in reviv- 
ing the good rules of propositions, KaOaAs 
wfurov KUTce, wavTosy etc. than he did in in- 
troducing the canker of epitomes ; and yet, 
(as it is the condition of human things, that, 
according to the ancient fables, " The most 
ss precious things have the most pernicious 
" keepers ;") it was so, that the attempt of 
the one made him fall upon the other. For 
he had need be well conducted, that should 
design to make axioms convertible; if he 
make them not withal circular, and non pro- 
movent, or incurring into themselves : but yet 
the intention was excellent. 
As to their The other considerations of method con- 

iatitude and . .'■'. , . -, -, . 

longitude, cerning propositions, are chiefly touching 



291 



the utmost propositions, which limit the di- 
mensions of sciences; for every knowledge 
may be fitly said, besides the profundity 
(which is the truth and substance of it that 
makes it solid) to have a longitude and a 
latitude; accounting the latitude towards 
other sciences, and the longitude towards ac- 
tion ; that is, from the greatest generality to 
the most particular precept : The one giveth 
rule how far one knowledge ought to inter- 
meddle within the province of another, which 
is the rule they call xaQavro ; the other giveth 
rule unto what degree of particularity a 
knowledge should descend : which latter I 
find passed over in silence, being in my judg- 
ment the more material ; for certainly there 
must be somewhat left to practice ; but how 
much is worthy the enquiry. We see remote 
and superficial generalities do but offer know- 
ledge to scorn of practical men, and are no 
more aiding to practice than an Ortelius's 
universal map is to direct the way between 
London and York. The better sort of rules 
have been not unfitly compared to glasses of 
steel unpolished, where you may see the 
images of things ; but first they must be 
v2 



%9% 

filed: so the rules will help, if they be la* 
boured and polished by practice. But how 
chrystalline they may be made at the first, and 
how far forth they may be polished afore* 
hand, is the question ; the enquiry whereof 
seemeth to me deficient. 
m technical There hath been also laboured and put in 

xnethod. 

practice a method, which is not a lawful me- 
thod, but a method of imposture ; which is> 
to deliver knowledges in such manner as men 
may speedily come to make a shew of learn- 
ing who have it not : such was the travel of 
Raymundus Lullius, in making that art which 
bears his name ; not unlike to some books of 
typocosmy which have been made since, be- 
ing nothing but a mass of words of all arts, 
to give men countenance, that those which 
use the terms might be thought to understand 
the art; which collections are much like a 
fripper's or broker's shop, that hath ends of 
every thing, but nothing of worth. 

of Rhetoric, Now we descend to that part which Con- 
or the art of 

Eloquence, cerneth the illustration of tradition, compre- 
hended in that science which we call Rheto- 
ric, or art of eloquence ; a science excellent, 
and excellently well laboured. For although 



293 

m true value it is inferior to wisdom (as it is 
said by God to Moses, when he disabled 
himself for want of this faculty, Aaron shall 
be thy speaker, and thou shalt he to him as 
God) yet with people it is the more mighty : 
for so Solomon saith, Sapiens corde appellabi- 
tur prudens, sed duicis eloquio major a reperiet; 
signifying, that profoundness of wisdom will 
help a man to a name or admiration, but 
that it is eloquence that prevaileth in an 
active life : and as to the labouring of it, the 
emulation of Aristotle with the rhetoricians 
of his time, and the experience of Cicero, 
hath made them in their works of rhetorics 
exceed themselves. Again, the excellency of 
examples of eloquence in the orations of De- 
mosthenes and Cicero, added to the perfec- 
tion of the precepts of eloquence, hath 
doubled the progression in this art: and. 
therefore the deficiences which I shall note 
will rather be in some collections, which may 
as hand-maids attend the art, than in the 
rules or use of the art itself. 

Notwithstanding, to stir the earth a little purpose «? 
about the roots of this science, as we have 
done of the rest; the duty and office of rhe- 



£94 

toric is to apply reason to imagination for 
the better moving of the will: for we see 
reason is disturbed in the administration 
thereof by three means ; by illaqueation or 
sophism, which pertains to logic ; by imagi- 
nation or impression, which pertains to rhe- 
toric ; and by passion or affection, which 
pertains to morality. And as in negotiation 
with others, men are wrought by cunning, 
by importunity, and by vehemency; so in" 
this negotiation within ourselves, men are 
undermined by inconsequences, solicited and 
importuned by impressions or observations, 
and transported by passions. Neither is the 
nature of man so unfortunately built, as that 
those powers and arts should have force to 
disturb reason, and not to establish and ad- 
vance it ; for the end of logic is to teach a 
form of argument to secure reason, and not 
to intrap it : the end of morality is to pro- 
cure the affections to obey reason, and not to 
invade it : the end of rhetoric is to fill the 
imagination to second reason, and not to op- 
press it : for these abuses of arts come in but 
ex ohliquo, for caution. 
o^Rhetoric. And therefore it was great injustice in 



295 



Plato, though springing out of a just hatred 
of the rhetoricians of his time, to esteem of 
rhetoric but as a voluptuary art, resembling 
it to cookery, that did mar wholesome meats, 
and help unwholesome by variety of sauces, 
to the pleasure of the taste. For we see 
that speech is much more conversant in 
adorning that which is good, than in colour- 
ing that which is evil ; for there is no man 
but speaketh more honestly than he can do 
or think : and it was excellently noted by 
Thucydides in Cleon, that because he used 
to hold on the bad side in causes of estate, 
therefore he was ever inveighing against elo- 
quence and good speech, knowing that no 
man can speak fair of courses sordid and 
base. And therefore as Plato said elegantly, 
" That Virtue, if she could be seen, would 
& move great love and affection :" so seeing 
that she cannot be shewed to the sense by 
corporal shape, the next degree is to shew 
her to the imagination in lively representa- 
tion : for to shew her to reason only in sub» 
tilty of argument, was a thing ever derided 
in Chrysippus and many of the Stoics ; who 
thought to thrust virtue upon men by sharp 



296 



disputations and conclusions, which have n© 
sympathy with the will of man. 

Again, if the affections in themselves were 
pliant and obedient to reason, it were true, 
there would be no great use of persuasions 
and insinuations to the will, more than of 
naked proposition and proofs : but in regard 
of the continual mutinies and seditions of the 
affections, 

Video meliora, proboque, 
Deteriora sequor ; 

Reason would become captive and servile, if 
eloquence of persuasions did not practise and 
win the imagination from the affections' 
part, and contract a confederacy between 
the reason and imagination against the af- 
fections ; for the affections themselves carry 
ever an appetite to good, as reason doth. The 
difference is, that the affection beholdeth 
merely the present, reason beholdeth the fu- 
ture and sum of time. And therefore the 
present filling the imagination more, reason 
is commonly vanquished ; but after that force 
of eloquence and persuasion hath made things 
future and remote appear as present, then 



297 

upon revolt of the imagination reason pre- 
vailed. 

We conclude therefore, that rhetoric can 
be no more charged with the colouring of the 
worse part, than logic with sophistry, or mo- 
rality with vice. For we know the doctrines 
of contraries are the same, though the use be 
opposite. It appeareth also that logic dif- Difference 

rr rr ° between Rhe- 

fereth from rhetoric, not only as the fist from tone and Lo- 
gic. 
the palm, the one close, the other at large ; 

but much more in this> that logic handleth 
reason exact, and in truth; and rhetoric 
handleth it as it is planted in popular opi- 
nions and manners. And therefore Aristotle 
doth wisely place rhetoric as between logic 
on the one side, and moral or civil knowledge 
on the other, as participating of both: for 
the proof and demonstrations of logic are to- 
wards all men indifferent and the same ; but 
the proofs and persuasions of rhetoric ought 
to differ according to the auditors : 

Orpheus in sylvis, inter delphinas Arion. 
Which application, in perfection of idea, 
ought to extend so far, that if a man should 
speak of the same thing to several persons, 
he should speak to them all respectively, and 



£98 

several ways : though this politic part of elo» 
quence in private speech it is easy for the 
the greatest orators to want ; whilst by the 
observing their well graced forms of speech, 
they lose the volubility of application : and 
therefore it shall not be amiss to recommend 
this to better enquiry, not being curious 
whether we place it here, or in that part 
which concerneth policy. 
Refects of n ow therefore will I descend to the defi- 

Aristotle. 

ciences, which, as I said, are but attend- 
ances: and first, I do not find the wisdom 
and diligence of Aristotle well pursued, who 
began to make a collection of the popular 
signs and colours of good and evil, both 
simple and comparative, which are as the 
sophisms of rhetoric, as I touched before. 
For example : 

SOPHISMA. 

Quod laudatur, bonum ; quod vituperatur, malum. 

REDARGUTIO. 

Laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces. 
Malum est, malum est, inquit emptor : sed cum 
recesserit, turn gloriahitur. 
The defects in the labour of Aristotle are 
three ; one, that there be but a few of many ; 



299 

another, that their clenches are not annexed ; 
and the third, that he conceived but a part 
of the use of them: for their use is not only 
in probation, but much more in impression. 
For many forms are equal in signification, 
which are differing in impression; as the 
difference is great in the piercing of that 
which is sharp, and that which is flat, though 
the strength of the percussion be the same : 
for there is no man but will be a little more 
raised by hearing it said ; " Your enemies 
" will be glad of this ?" 

Hoc lthacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridce ; 
than by hearing it said only, " This is evil 
" for you/' 

Secondly, I do resume also that which I of antithets 

and lesser 

mentioned before, touching provision or pre- forms, 
paratory store, for the furniture of speech 
and readiness of invention, which appeareth 
to be of two sorts ; the one in resemblance 
to a shop of pieces unmade up, the other 
to a shop of things ready made up ; both 
to be applied to that which is frequent 
and most in request : the former of these 
I will call antitheta, and the latter formula. 
Antitheta are theses argued pro et contra; 



300 



wherein men may be more large and la- 
borious : but in such as are able to do it, 
to avoid prolixity of entry, I wish the seeds 
of the several arguments to be cast up into 
some brief and acute sentences, not to be 
cited, but to be as skains or bottoms of 
thread, to be unwinded at large when they 
come to be used ; supplying authorities 
and examples by reference. 

Pro Verbis Legis. 

Non est interpret atio, sed divinatio, quce rc- 

cedit d lit era. 
Cum receditur d litem, judex transit in legis- 

latorem. 

Pro Sententia Legis. 
Ex omnibus verbis est eliciendus sensus qui in- 

terpretatur singula. 

Formula are but decent and apt passages 
or conveyances of speech, which may serve 
indifferently for differing subjects ; as of 
preface, conclusion, digression, transition, 
excusation, etc. For as in buildings, there 
is great pleasure and use in the well-cast- 
ing of the stair-cases, entries, doors, win- 
dows, and the like; so in speech, the con- 



301 

veyances and passages are of special ornament 
and effect. 

A Conclusion in a Deliberative. 

So may we redeem the faults passed, and pre- 
vent the inconveniences future. 
There remain two appendices touching Two appen» 
the tradition of knowledge, the one critical, art of Tradi 
the other pedantical ; for all knowledge is 
either delivered by teachers, or attained by 
men's proper endeavours : and therefore as 
the principal part of tradition of knowledge 
concerneth chiefly writing of books, so the 
relative part thereof concerneth reading of 
books : whereunto appertain incidently these 
considerations. The first is concerning the The critical. 
true correction and edition of authors; 
wherein nevertheless rash diligence hath 
done great prejudice. For these critics 
have often presumed that that which they 
understood not is false set down. As the 
priest, that where he found it written of 
St. Paul, Demissus est per sportam, mend- 
ed his book, and made it Demissus est per 
portam ; because sporta was an hard word, 
and out of his reading : and surely these er- 
rors, though they be not so palpable and ri:- 



302 

diculous, are yet of the same kind. And 
therefore as it hath been wisely noted, the 
most corrected copies are commonly the 
least correct* 

The second is concerning the exposition 
and explication of authors ; which resteth 
in annotations and commentaries; wherein 
it is over usual to blanch the obscure places 
and discourse upon the plain. 

The third is concerning the times, which 
in many cases give great light to true in- 
terpretations* 

The fourth is concerning some brief cen« 
sure and judgment of the authors ; that men 
thereby may make some election unto them- 
selves what books to read. 

And the fifth is concerning the syntax 
and disposition of studies ; that men may 
know in what order or pursuit to read. 
ThePedan- ^ or P e dantical knowledge, it contained! 
ticai. that difference of tradition which is proper 

for youth, whereunto appertain divers con- 
siderations of great fruit. 

As first the timing and seasoning of know- 
ledges ; as with what to initiate them, and 
from what for a time to refrain them. 






Secondly, the consideration where to begin 
with the easiest, and so proceed to the more 
difficult; and in what courses to press the 
more difficult, and then to turn them to the 
more easy ; for it is one method to prac- 
tice swimming with bladders, and another 
to practise dancing with heavy shoes. 

A third is the application of learning ac- 
cording unto the propriety of the wits ; for 
there is no defect in the faculties intellec- 
tual but seemeth to have a proper cure con- 
tained in some studies : as for example, if a 
child be bird-witted, that is, hath not the 
faculty of attention, the mathematics giveth 
a remedy thereunto ; for in them, if the 
wit be caught away but a moment, one is 
to begin anew : and as sciences have a pro- 
priety towards faculties for cure and help* 
so faculties or powers have a sympathy to- 
wards sciences for excellency or speedy pro- 
fiting ; and therefore it is .an enquiry of 
great wisdom what kinds of wits and na- 
tures are most proper for what sciences. 

Fourthly, the ordering of exercises is 
matter of great consequence to hurt or 
help : for, as is well observed by Cicero* 



304 



men in exercising their faculties, if they 
be not well advised, do exercise their faults 
and get ill habits as well as good ; so there 
is a great judgment to be had in the 
continuance and intermission of exercises. 
It were too long to particularize a number 
of other considerations of this nature ; things 
but of mean appearance, but of singular 
efficacy : for as the wronging or cherish- 
ing of seeds or young plants is that that 
is most important to their thriving ; (and 
as it was noted that the first six kings, 
being in truth as tutors of the state of 
Rome in the infancy thereof, was the prin- 
cipal cause of the immense greatness of 
that state which followed;) so the culture 
and manurance of minds in youth hath 
such a forcible, though unseen, operation, 
as hardly any length of time or conten- 
tion of labour can countervail it afterwards. 
And it is not amiss to observe also, how 
small and mean faculties gotten by educa- 
tion, yet when they fall into great men or 
great matters, do work great and important 
effects ; whereof we see a notable example 
in Tacitus of two stage players, Percennius 



305 



and Vibulenus, who by their faculty of play- 
ing put the Pannonian armies into an ex- 
treme tumult and combustion : for there 
arising a mutiny amongst them upon the 
death of Augustus Caesar, Blaesus the lieute- 
nant had committed some of the mutineers, 
which were suddenly rescued ; whereupon 
Vibulenus got to be heard speak, which he 
did in this manner : — " These poor inno- 
" cent wretches, appointed to cruel death, 
€€ you have restored to behold the light : 
" but who shall restore my brother to me, 
*' or life unto my brother, that was sent 
f hither in message from the legions of 
" Germany, to treat of the common cause ? 
" And he hath murdered him this last night 
" by some of his fencers and ruffians, that 
" he hath about him for his executioners 
" upon soldiers. Answer, Blaesus, what is 
" done with his body ? The mortalest ene- 
<c mies do not deny burial : when I have 
" performed my last duties to the corpse 
" with kisses, with tears, command me to 
" be slain beside him ; so that these my 
" fellows, for our good meaning, and our 
" true hearts to the legions, may have leave 
x 



306 

" to bury us." With which speech he put 
the army into an infinite fury and uproar; 
whereas truth was he had no brother, nei- 
ther was there any such matter ; but he 
played it merely as if he had been upon the 
stage. 
Conclusion. ]j u ^ t re turn, we are now come to a 
period of rational knowledges; wherein if I 
have made the divisions other than those 
that are received, yet would I not be thought 
to disallow all those divisions which I do 
not use : for there is a double necessity im- 
posed upon me of altering the divisions ; 
the one, because it differeth in end and 
purpose, to sort together those things which 
are next in nature, and those things which 
are next in use ; for if a secretary of state 
should sort his papers, it is like in his study or 
general cabinet he would sort together things 
of a nature, as treaties, instructions, etc. but 
in his boxes or particular cabinet he would 
sort together those that he were like to use 
together, though of several natures; so in 
this general cabinet of knowledge it was ne- 
cessary for me to follow the divisions of the 
nature of things ; whereas if myself had been 



307 



to handle any particular knowledge, I would 
have respected the divisions fittest for use, 
the other, because the bringing in of the 
deficiences did by consequence alter the 
partitions of the rest ; for let the knowledge 
extant, for demonstration sake, be fifteen ; 
let the knowledge with the deficiences be 
twenty ; the parts of fifteen are not the 
parts of twenty ; for the parts of fifteen are 
three and five ; the parts of twenty are 
two, four, five and ten : so as these things 
are without contradiction, and could not 
otherwise be. 



MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 

We proceed now to that knowledge which 
eonsidereth of the Appetite and Will of Man; 
whereof Solomon saith, Ante omnia, fili, cus- 
todi cor tnum, nam inde procedunt actiones 
vitcc. In the handling of this science, those 
which have written seem to me to have 
done as if a man, that professeth to teach 
to write, did only exhibit fair copies of 
alphabets and letters joined, without giving 
x 2 



308 



any precepts or directions for the carriage 
of the hand and framing of the letters ; so 
have they made good and fair examplars 
and copies, carrying the draughts and por- 
traitures of good, virtue, duty, felicity ; pro- 
pounding them well described as the true 
objects and scopes of man's will and desires ; 
but how to attain these excellent marks, and 
how to frame and subdue the will of man 
to become true and conformable to these 
pursuits, they pass it over altogether, or 
slightly and unprofitably : for it is not the 
disputing that moral virtues are in the mind 
of man by habit and not by nature, or the 
distinguishing that generous spirits are won 
by doctrines and persuasions, and the vul- 
gar sort by reward and punishment, and 
the like scattered glances and touches, that 
c&ft excuse the absence of this part. 

The reason of this omission I suppose 
to be that hidden rock whereupon both this 
and many other barks of knowledge have 
been cast away; which is, that men have 
despised to be conversant in ordinary and 
common matters, (the judicious direction 
whereof nevertheless is the wisest doctrine, 



309 



for life consisteth not in novelties nor sub- 
tilities,) but contrariwise they have com- 
pounded sciences chiefly of a certain re- 
splendent or lustrous mass of matter, chosen 
to give glory either to the subtility of dis- 
putations, or to the eloquence of discourses. 
But Seneca giveth an excellent check to 
eloquence ; Nocet Mis eloquentia, quihus non 
rerum cupiditatem facit, sed sui. Doctrine 
should be such as should make men in love 
with their lesson, and not with the teacher ; 
being directed to the auditor's benefit, and 
not to the author's commendation ; and 
therefore those are of the right kind, which 
may be concluded as Demosthenes con- 
cludes his counsel, Quce si feceritis, non ora- 
torem duntaxat in prcesentia laudabitis, sed 
vosmetipsos etiam, non ita multo post statu re- 
rum vestrarum meliore. Neither needed men 
of so excellent parts to have despaired of 
a fortune, which the poet Virgil promised 
himself, and indeed obtained, who got as 
much glory of eloquence, wit, and learn- 
ing, in the expressing of the observa- 
tions of husbandry as of the heroical acts 
of iEneas : — 



310 

Nee sum animi dubius, verbis ea vincere mag- 
num 
Qudm sit, et angustis hunc addere rebus honorem. 
Georg. iii. 289. 
Two parts And surely, if the purpose be in good 

of moral . , . _ . . 

knowledge, earnest not to write at leisure that which 
men may read at leisure, but really to 
instruct and suborn action and active life, 
these georgics of the mind, concerning the 
husbandry and tillage thereof, are no less 
worthy than the heroical descriptions of 
virtue, duty, and felicity. Wherefore the 
main and primitive division of moral know- 
ledge seemeth to be into the Exemplar or 
Platform of Good, and the Regiment or 
Culture of the Mind ; the one describing 
the nature of good, the other prescribing 
rules how to subdue, apply, and accom- 
modate the will of man thereunto. 

of the nature The doctrine touching the Platform or Na- 
ture of Good considereth it either simple or 
compared; either the kinds of good, or the 
degrees of good : in the latter whereof those 
infinite disputations which were touching the 
supreme degree thereof, which they term fe- 
licity, beatitude, or the highest good, the 



311 

doctrines concerning which were as the hea- 
then divinity, are by the christian faith dis- 
charged. And, as Aristotle saith, " That 
?f young men may be happy, but not other- 
<( wise but by hope;" so we must ail ac- 
knowledge our minority, and embrace the 
felicity which is by hope of the future 
world. 

Freed therefore and delivered from this doc- Method of 
trine of the philosophers' heaven, whereby *Ttht" 
they feigned an higher elevation of man's quiry * 
nature than was (for we see in what an height 
of stile Seneca writeth, Vere magnum, habere 
fragilhatem hominis, securitatem Dei) we may 
with more sobriety and truth receive the rest 
of their enquiries and labours; wherein for 
the nature of good, positive or simple, they 
have set it down excellently, in describing 
the forms of virtue and duty with their situa- 
tions and postures; in distributing them into 
their kinds, parts, provinces, actions, aud 
administrations, and the like : nay farther, 
they have commended them to man's nature 
and spirit, with great quickness of argument 
and beauty of persuasions ; yea, and fortified 
and intrenched them, as much as discourse 



312 



can do, against corrupt and popular opi- 
nions. Again, for the degrees and compara- 
tive nature of good, they have also excel- 
lently handled it in their triplicity of good, 
in the comparison between a contemplative 
and an active life, in the distinction between 
virtue with reluctation and virtue secured, 
in their encounters between honesty and 
profit, in their balancing of virtue with vir- 
tue, and the like ; so as this part deserveth 
to be reported for excellently laboured. 

Notwithstanding, if before they had come 
to the popular and received notions of virtue 
and vice, pleasure and pain, and the rest, 
they had stayed a little longer upon the en- 
quiry concerning the roots of good and evil, 
and the strings of those roots, they had given, 
in my opinion, a great light to that which 
followed ; and especially if they had consult- 
ed with nature, they had made their doc- 
trines less prolix and more profound : which 
being by them in part omitted, and in part 
handled with much confusion, we will en- 
deavour to resume and open in a more clear 
manner. 

There is formed in every thing a double 



313 

nature of good ; the one as every thing is a of Good, po - 

, . • • ir» i i • sitive ami 

total or substantive in itself, tne other as it relative. 

is a part or member of a greater body ; 
whereof the latter is in degree the greater and 
the worthier, because it tendeth to the con- 
servation of a more general form : therefore 
we see the iron in particular sympathy 
moveth to the loadstone, but yet if it exceed 
a certain quantity, it forsaketh the affection 
to the loadstone, and like a good patriot 
moveth to the earth, which is the region and 
country of massy bodies : so may we go for- 
ward, and see that water and massy bodies 
move to the centre of the earth, but rather 
than to suffer a divulsion in the continuance 
of nature they will move upwards from the 
centre of the earth, forsaking their duty to 
the earth in regard of their duty to the world. 
This double nature of good and the compa- 
rative thereof is much more engraven upon 
man, if he degenerate not, unto whom the 
conservation of duty to the public ought to 
be much more precious than the conser- 
vation of life and being ; according to that 
memorable speech of Pompeius Magnus, 
when being in commission of purveyance for 



314 

a famine at Rome, and being dissuaded with 
great vehemency and instance by his friends 
about him, that he should not hazard him- 
self to sea in an extremity of weather, he 
said only to them Necesse est ut earn, non ut 
vivam. But it may be truly affirmed that 
there was never any philosophy, religion, or 
other discipline, which did so plainly and 
highly exalt the good which is communica- 
tive, and depress the good which is private 
and particular, as the holy faith : well de- 
claring, that it was the same God that gave 
the christian law to men, who gave those laws 
of nature to inanimate creatures that we 
spake of before ; for we read that the elected 
saints of God have wished themselves anathe- 
matized and razed out of the book of life, in 
an extasy of charity and infinite feeling of 
communion. 
The christi- This being set down and strongly planted, 
termines doth judge and determine most of the con- 

most of the . . . 

controversies troversies wherein moral philosophy is COn- 
irc Morals. . 

, versant. ror hrst, it decidem the question 

storie St An " toucmn g tne preferment of the contempla- 
tive or active life, and decideth it against 
Aristotle : for all the reasons which he 



315 



bringeth for the contemplative are private, 
and respecting the pleasure and dignity of a 
man's self, in which respects, no question, 
the contemplative life hath the pre-emi- 
nence ; not much unlike to that comparison, 
which Pythagoras made for the gracing and 
magnifying of philosophy and contemplation; 
who being asked what he was, answered, 
" That if Hiero were ever at the Olympian 
" games, he knew the manner, that some came 
" to try their fortune for the prizes, and some 
" came as merchants to utter their commo- 
" dities, and some came to make good cheer 
f and meet their friends, and some came to 
" look on : and that he was one of them that 
" came to look on." But men must know 
that in this theatre of man's life it is reserved 
only for God and angels to be lookers on : 
neither could the like question ever have 
been received in the church (notwithstanding 
their Pretiosd in oculis Domini mors sanctorum 
ejus, by which place they would exalt their 
civil death and regular professions) but upon 
this defence, that the monastical life is not 
simply contemplative, but performeth the 
duty either of incessant prayers and suppli- 



316 

cations, which hath been truly esteemed as 
an office in the church, or else of writing or 
taking instructions for writing concerning 
the law of God ; as Moses did when he abode 
so long in the mount. And so we see Enoch 
the seventh from Adam, who was the first 
contemplative, and walked with God, yet 
did also endow the church with prophecy, 
which St. Jude citeth. But for contempla- 
tion which should be finished in itself, with- 
out casting beams upon society, assuredly 
divinity knoweth it not. 
That be- ^ decideth also the controversies between 

and 6 socrates, Zeno and Socrates, and their schools and 
&c ' successions on the one side, who placed feli- 

city in virtue simply or attended; the actions 
and exercises whereof do chiefly embrace 
and concern society ; and on the other side, 
the Cyrenaics and Epicureans, who placed 
it in pleasure, and made virtue (as it is used 
in some comedies of errors, wherein the mis- 
tress and the maid change habits) to be but 
as a servant, without which pleasure cannot 
be served and attended, and the reformed 
school of the Epicureans, which placed it in 
serenity of mind and freedom from perturba- 



317 

tion, (as if they would have deposed Jupiter 
again, and restored Saturn and the first age, 
when there was no summer nor winter, 
spring nor autumn, but all after one air and 
season,) and Herillus, who placed felicity in 
extinguishment of the disputes of the mind, 
making no fixed nature of good and evil, 
esteeming things according to the clearness 
of the desires, or the reluctation ; which opi- 
nion was revived in the heresy of the Ana- 
baptists, measuring things according to the 
motions of the spirit, and the constancy or 
wavering; of belief : all which are manifest to 
tend to private repose and contentment, and 
not to point of society. 

It censure th also the philosophy of Epic- Against the 
tetus, which presupposeth that felicity must Epictetus^ °* 
be placed in those things which are in our 
power, lest we be liable to fortune and dis- 
turbance; as if it were not a thing much 
more happy to fail in good and virtuous ends 
for the public, than to obtain all that we can 
wish to ourselves in our proper fortune ; as 
Gonsalvo said to his soldiers, shewing them 
Naples, and protesting, " He had rather die 
" one foot forwards, than to have his life se- 



318 

rr cured for long by one foot of retreat." 
Whereunto the wisdom of that heavenly 
leader hath signed, who hath affirmed that a 
good conscience is a continual feast ; shewing 
plainly that the conscience of good inten- 
tions, howsoever succeeding, is a more con- 
tinual joy to nature than all the provi- 
sion which can be made for security and 
repose. 
Against mak- It censnreth likewise that abuse of philoso- 

ing Philoso- x 

phyanoccu- phy, which grew general about the time of 

pation. r J & & 

Epictetus, in converting it into an occupa- 
tion or profession ; as if the purpose had been 
not to resist and extinguish perturbations, 
but to fly and avoid the causes of them, and 
to shape a particular kind and course of life 
to that end ; introducing such an health of 
mind, as was that health of body of which 
Aristotle speaketh of Herodicus, who did no- 
thing all his life long but intend his health : 
whereas if men refer themselves to duties of 
society, as that health of body is best, which 
is ablest to endure all alterations and extre- 
mities; so likewise that health of mind is 
most proper, which can go through the great- 
est temptations and perturbations. So as 



319 

Biogenesis opinion is to be accepted, who 
commended not them which abstained, bat 
them which sustained, and could refrain 
their mind in prcecipitio, and could give unto 
the mind, as is used in horsemanship, the 
shortest stop or turn. 

Lastly, it censureth the tenderness and Against a re- 

J tired life. 

want of application in some of the most an- 
cient and reverend philosophers and philoso- 
phical men, that did retire too easily from 
civil business, for avoiding of indignities and 
perturbations ; whereas the resolution of men 
truly moral ought to be such as the same 
Gonsalvo said the honour of a soldier should be, 
e tela crassiore, and not so fine as that every 
thins: should catch in it and endanger it. 

To resume private or particular good, it of Active 
falleth into the division of good active and good. 
passive : for this difference of good, not un- 
like to that which amongst the Romans was 
expressed in the familiar or houshold terms of 
Promns and Condus, is formed also in all 
things, and is best disclosed in the two seve- 
ral appetites in creatures; the one to preserve 
or continue themselves, and the other to di- 
late or multiply themselves ; whereof the lat- 



320 



ter seemeth to be the worthier : for in nature 
the heavens, which are more worthy, are the 
agent ; and the earth, which is the less wor- 
thy, is the patient : in the pleasures of living 
creatures, that of generation is greater than 
that of food : in divine doctrine, Beatius est 
dare qudm accipere : and in life, there is no 
man's spirit so soft but esteemeth the effecting 
of somewhat that he hath fixed in his desire, 
more than sensuality. Which priority of the 
active good is much upheld by the considera- 
tion of our estate to be mortal and exposed to 
fortune : for if we might have a perpetuity 
and certainty in our pleasures, the state of 
them would advance their price; but when 
we see it is but Magni cestimamus mori tardius, 
and Ne glorieris de crastino, nescis partum diei, 
it maketh us to desire to have somewhat se- 
cured and exempted from time, which are 
only our deeds and works ; as it is said Opera 
eorum sequuntur eos. The preeminence like- 
wise of this active good is upheld by the af- 
fection which is natural in man towards va- 
riety and proceeding; which in the plea- 
sures of the sense, which is the principal 
part of passive good, can have no great la- 
titude : Cogita quamdiu eadem feceris; cibus. 



521 



somnus, ludus per hunc circulum curritur; niori 
velle non fantum fortis, aut miser, aut prudens, 
sed etiam fastidiosus potest ; but in enter- 
prises, pursuits, and purposes of life, there 
is much variety, whereof men are sensible 
with pleasure in theit inceptions, progres- 
sions, recoils, re-integrations, approaches 
and attainings to their ends. So as it was 
well said, Vita sine proposito languida et vaga 
est. Neither hath this active good any iden- 
tity with the good of society, though in 
some case it hath an incidence into it : for 
although it do many times bring forth acts of 
beneficence, yet it is with a respect private 
to a man's own power, glory, amplification, 
continuance ; as appeareth plainly, when it 
findeth a contrary subject. For that gigan- 
tine state of mind which possesseth the trou- 
blers of the world (such as was Lucius Sylla, 
and infinite other in smaller model, who would 
have all men happy or unhappy as they 
were their friends or enemies, and would give 
form to the world according to their own hu- 
mours, which is the true theomachy) pre- 
tendeth and aspireth to active good, though 

Y 



322 

it recedeth farthest from good of society, 

which we have determined to be the greater. 

Passive good, To resume passive good, it receiveth a sub- 
Conservative ,. . . n !_• J n A -n 

and Perfect- division ot conservative and perfective, .ror 
let us take a brief review of that which we 
have said ; we have sjpoken first of the good 
of society, the intention whereof embraceth 
the form of human nature, whereof we are 
members and portions, and not our own pro- 
per and individual form ; we have spoken of 
active good, and supposed it as a part of pri- 
vate and particular good: and rightly, for 
there is impressed upon all things a triple de- 
sire or appetite proceeding from love to them- 
selves ; one of preserving and continuing their 
form ; another of advancing and perfecting 
their form ; and a third of multiplying and 
extending their form upon other things ; 
whereof the multiplying, or signature of it 
upon other things, is that which we handled 
by the name of active good. So as there re- 
maineth the conserving of it, and perfecting 
or raising of it ; which latter is the highest de- 
gree of passive good. For to preserve in 
state is the less, to preserve with advance- 
ment is the greater. So in man,— 



323 

Igneus est ollis vigor, ct codestis origo. 
His approach or assumption to divine or an- 
gelical nature is the perfection of his form ; 
the error or false imitation of which good is 
that which is the tempest of human life ; 
while man, upon the instinct of an advance- 
ment formal and essential, is carried to seek 
an advancement local. For as those which 
are sick, and find no remedy, do tumble up 
and down and change place, as if by a re- 
move local they could obtain a remove inter- 
nal, so is it with men in ambition, when fail- 
ing of the means to exalt their nature, they 
are in a perpetual estuation to exalt their 
place. So then passive good is, as was said, 
either conservative or perfective. 

To resume the good of conservation or com- Fruition esti- 
fort, which consisteth in the fruition of that b^ts sincere. 
which is agreeable to our natures ; it seem- vigour* * 
eth to be the most pure and natural of plea- 
sures, but yet the softest and the lowest. And 
this also receiveth a difference, which hath 
neither been well judged of, nor well enquir- 
ed : for the good of fruition or contentment 
is placed either in the sincereness of the fru- 
y 2 



ition, or in the quickness an4 vigour of it ; 
the one superinduced by equality, the other 
by vicissitude ; the one having less mixture 
of evil, the other more impression of goodi 
Whether of these is the greater good, is a 
question controverted ; but whether man's 
nature may not be capable of both, is a ques T 
tion not enquired. 
Debate be- The former question being debated between 

tween So- l & 

crates and a Socrates and a sophist, Socrates placing; feli- 
Sophist. ; r r b 

city in an equal and constant peace of mind> 

and the sophist in much desiring and much 
enjoying, they fell from argument to ill 
words : the sophist saying that Socrates's fe- 
licity was the felicity of a block or stone ; and 
Socrates saying that the sophist's felicity 
was the felicity of one that had the itch, who 
did nothing but itch and scratch. And both 
these opinions do not want their supports 3. 
for the opinion of Socrates is much upheld 
by the general consent even of the Epicures 
themselves; that virtue beareth a great part 
in felicity : and if so, certain it is, that vir-? 
tue hath more use in clearing perturbations 
than in compassing desires. The sophist's 
opinion is much favoured by the assertion we 



last spake of, that good of advancement is 
greater than good of simple preservation; 
Because every obtaining a desire hath a shew 
of advancement, as motion though in a cir- 
cle hath a shew of progression. 

But the second question decided the true 
way maketh the former superfluous: for can 
it be doubted but that there are some who 
take more pleasure in enjoying pleasures, 
than some other; and yet nevertheless are 
less troubled with the loss or leaving of them : 
so as this same, Non uti ut non appetas, non 
appetere ut non rnetuas, sunt animi pusilli et 
diffideniis. And it seemeth to me that niost Doctrines of 
of the doctrines of the philosophers are more phe™^ * 
fearful and cautionary than the nature of tndtoouui, 
things requireth: so have they increased the fomi * 
fear of death in offering to cure it : for when 
they would have a man's whole life to be but 
a discipline or preparation to die, they must 
needs make men think that it is a terri- % 
ble enemy against whom there is no end of 
preparing. Better saith the poet, 

• Quifinem vitce extrerhum inter munera ponat 

{ Natura : 

So have they sought to make men's minds 



326 

too uniform and harmonical, by not breaking 
them sufficiently to contrary motions: the 
reason whereof I suppose to be, because they 
themselves were men dedicated to a private, 
free, and unapplied course of life. For as 
we see, upon the lute or like instrument, a 
ground, though it be sweet and have shew of 
many changes, yet breaketh not the hand to 
such strange and hard stops and passages, as 
a set song or voluntary; much after the same 
manner was the diversity between a philoso- 
phical and a civil life. And therefore men 
are to imitate the wisdom of jewellers ; who 
if there be a grain, or a cloud, or an ice 
which may be ground forth without taking 
too much of the stone, they help it ; but if 
it should lessen and abate the stone too much, 
they will not meddle with it : so ought men 
so to procure serenity, as they destroy not 
magnanimity. 
%h7£pect Having therefore deduced the good of man, 
^ihay,* ° r which is private and particular, as far as 
seemeth fit, we will now return to that good 
of man which respecteth and beholdeth So- 
ciety, which we may term duty ; because the 
term of duty is more proper to a mind well 



327 

framed and disposed towards others, as the 
term of virtue is applied to a mind well form- 
ed and composed in itself: though neither 
can a man understand virtue without some 
relation to society, nor duty without an in- 
ward disposition. This part may seem at 
first to pertain to science civil and politic ; 
but not if it be well observed : for it con- 
cerneth the regimen and government of every 
man over himself, and not over others. And 
as in architecture the direction of the fram- 
ing the posts, beams, and other parts of build- 
ing, is not the same with the manner of join- 
ing them and erecting the building; and in 
mechanicals, the direction how to frame an 
instrument or engine is not the same with the 
manner of setting it on work and employing 
it, (and yet nevertheless in expressing of the 
one you incidently express the aptness to- 
wards the other) so the doctrine of conjuga- 
tion of men in society differeth from that 
of their conformity thereunto. 

This part of duty is subdivided into two of. a man's 

r J duty to the 

parts ; the common duty of every man, as a state, and to 
man or member of a state ; the other the re- siou * 
spective or special duty of every man, in his 



3<28 



profession, vocation, and place. The first 
of these is extant and well laboured, as hath 
been said. The second likewise I may report 
rather dispersed than deficient ; which man- 
ner of dispersed writing in this kind of ar- 
gument I acknowledge to be best : for who 
can take upon him to write of the proper du- 
ty, virtue, challenge, and right of every se- 
veral vocation, profession, and place? For 
although sometimes a looker on may see more 
than a gamester, and there be a proverb 
more arrogant than sound, " That the vale 
best discovereth the hill ;" yet there is small 
doubt but that men can write best, and most 
really and materially in their own profes- 
sions ; and that the writing of speculative 
men of active matter, for the most part, 
doth seem to men of experience, as Phor- 
mio's argument of the wars seemed to Han- 
nibal, to be but dreams and dotage. Only 
there is one vice which accompanieth them 
that write in their own professions, that they 
magnify them in excess ; but generally it 
were to be wished, as that which would make 
learning indeed solid and fruitful, that active 
men would or could become writers. 



329 
In which I cannot but mention, honoris of the King'* 

own Book. 

causa, your majesty's excellent book touching 
the duty of a king : a work richly compound- 
ed of divinity, morality, and policy, with 
great aspersion of all other arts ; and being 
in mine opinion one of the most sound and 
healthful writings that I have read ; not dis- 
tempered in the heat of invention, nor in the 
coldness of negligence ; not sick of business, 
as those are who lose themselves in their or- 
der, nor of convulsions, as those which 
cramp in matters impertinent; not savouring 
of perfumes and paintings, as those do who 
seek to please the reader more than nature 
beareth ; and chiefly well disposed in the spi- 
rits thereof, being agreeable to truth and apt 
for action ; and far removed from that natu- 
ral infirmity, whereunto I noted those that 
write in their own professions to be subject, 
which is, that they exalt it above measure : 
for your majesty hath truly described, not a 
king of Assyria or Persia in their external 
glory, but a Moses or a David, pastors of 
their people. Neither can I ever lose out of 
my remembrance, what I heard your majesty 
in the same sacred spirit of government de- 



330 



liver in a great cause of judicature, which 
was, " That kings ruled by their laws as God 
" did by the laws of nature; and ought as 
" rarely to put in use their supreme prero- 
C( gative, as God doth his power of working 
" miracles." And yet notwithstanding, in 
your book of a free monarchy, you do well 
give men to understand, that you know the 
plenitude of the power and right of a king, 
as well as the circle of his office and duty. 
Thus have I presumed to alledge this excellent 
writing of your majesty, as a prime or emi- 
nent example of Tractates concerning spe- 
cial and respective duties ; wherein I should 
have said as much if it had been written a 
thousand years since : neither am I moved 
with certain courtly decencies, which esteem 
it flattery to praise in presence; no, it is 
flattery to praise in absence, that is, when 
either the virtue is absent, or the occasion is 
absent ; and so the praise is not natural but 
forced, either in truth or in time. But let 
Cicero be read in his oration pro Marcello, 
which is nothing but an excellent table of 
Caesar's virtue, and made to his face ; be- 
sides the example of many other excellent per- 



331 

sons wiser a great deal than such observers, 
and we will never doubt, upon a full oc- 
casion, to give just praises to present or 
absent. 

But to return, there belongeth farther to onhe fraud* 

° and vices of 

the handling of this part, touching the du- Professions. 
ties of professions and vocations, a relative 
or opposite, touching the frauds, cautels, im- 
postures, and vices of every profession, which 
hath been likewise handled : but how ? ra- 
ther in a satire and cynically, than seriously 
and wisely: for men have rather sought by 
wit to deride and traduce much of that which 
is good in professions, than with judgment 
to discover and sever that which is corrupt. 
For, as Solomon saith, he that cometh to 
seek after knowledge with a mind to scorn 
and censure, shall be sure to find matter for 
his humour, but no matter for his instruc- 
tion : Qucerenti derisori scientiam ipsa se abs- 
condit; sed studioso fit obviam. But the ma- 
naging of this argument with integrity and 
truth, which I note as deficient, seemeth to 
me to be one of the best fortifications for ho- 
nesty and virtue that can be planted. For, 
as the fable goeth of the basilisk, that if he 



332 



see you first, you die for it; but if you see 
him first, he dieth : so is it with deceits and 
evil arts; which, if they be first espied, lose 
their life ; but if they prevent, they endanger. 
So that we are much beholden to Machiavel 
and others, that write what men do, and not 
what they ought to do: for it is not possible 
to join serpentine wisdom with the columbine 
innocency, except men know exactly all the 
conditions of the serpent; his baseness and 
going upon his belly, his volubility and lu- 
bricity, his envy and sting, and the rest; 
that is, all forms and natures of evil: for 
without this, virtue lieth open and unfenced. 
Nay, an honest man can do no good upon 
those that are wicked, to reclaim them, with- 
out the help of the knowledge of evil : for 
men of corrupted minds presuppose that ho- 
nesty groweth out of simplicity of manners, 
and believing of preachers, school-masters, 
and men's exterior language : so as, except ' 
you can make them perceive that you know' 
the utmost reaches of their own corrupt opi- 
nion s, they desp i se all moral i ty ; Nori recipit 
siultus verba prudentift, nisi ea dixeris quczver~ } 
wntur in corde ejus. 



323 
Unto this part touching respective duty doth of relative 

r & ■* J duties in ge» 

also appertain the duties between husband nerah 
and wife, parent and child, master and ser- 
vant : so likewise the laws of friendship and 
gratitude/ the civil bond of companies, col- 
leges; and politic bodies, of neighbourhood, 
and all other proportionate duties ; not as 
they are parts of government and society, 
but as to the framing of the mind of parti- 
cular persons. 

The knowledge concerning good respecting 
society doth handle it also not simply alone, 
but comparatively ; whereunto belongeth the 
weighing of duties between person and per- 
son, case and case, particular and public : as 
we see in the proceeding of Lucius Brutus 
against his own sons, which was so much ex- 
tolled; yet what was said ? 

InfeliX) utcunque ferent eafata minor es. 
So the case was doubtful, and had opinion 
on both sides. Again, we see when M. Brutus 
and Cassius invited to a supper certain whose 
opinions they meant to feel, whether they 
were fit to be made their associates, and cast 
forth the question touching the killing of a 
tyrant being an .^usurper? they were divided 



334 

in opinion ; some holding that servitude was 
the extreme of evils, and others that tyranny 
was better than a civil war: and a number 
of the like cases there are of comparative 
duty amongst which that of all others is the 
most frequent, where the question is of a 
great deal of good to ensue of a small injus- 
tice, which Jason of Thessalia determined 
against the truth: Aliqua sunt injuste facknda, 
ut multa juste fieri possint. But the reply is 
good, Auctorem prcesentis justitice habes, spon- 
sorem futurcz non habes; men must pursue 
things which are just in present, and leave 
the future to the divine providence. So then 
we pass on from this general part touching 
the exemplar and description of good. 
©tthecui- Now therefore that we have spoken of this 

ture of the 

mind. fruit of life, it remaineth to speak of the hus- 

bandry that belongeth thereunto; without 
which part the former seemeth to be no better 
than a fair image, or statua, which is beauti- 
ful to contemplate, but is without life and 
motion : whereunto Aristotle himself sub- 
scribeth in these words, Necesse est scilicet de 
virtute dicere, et quid sit, et ex quibus gignatur. 
Inutile enim fere fuerit virtutem quidem nosse, 



S35 

acquirendce autem ejus modos et vias ignorare : 
non enim de virtute tantum, qua specie sit, quce- 
rendum est, sed et quomodo sui copiam faciat ; 
utrumque enim volumus, et rem ipsam nosse, et 
ejus compotes jieri ; hoc autem ex voto non sue* 
cedet, nisi sciamus et ex quibus et quomodo : in 
such full words, and with such iteration doth 
he inculcate this part : so saith Cicero in 
great commendation of Cato the second, 
that he had applied himself to philosophy, 
non ita disputandi causa, sed ita vivendi. And 
although the neglect of our times, w r herein 
few men do hold any consultations touching 
the reformation of their life, (as Seneca excel- 
lently saith, De partibus vitce quisque deliberat, 
de summd nemo) may make this part seem 
superfluous ; yet I must conclude with that 
aphorism of Hippocrates, Quigravi morbo cor- 
repti dolores non sentiunt, Us mens wgrotat ; 
they need medicine not only to assuage the 
disease, but to awake the sense. 

And if it be said, that the cure of men's philosophy 
minds belongeth to sacred divinity, it is most maid to £>i- 
true : but yet moral philosophy may be pre- vim y ' 
ferred unto her as a wise servant and hum- 
ble handmaid. For as the Psalm saith, that 



336 



the eyes of the handmaid look perpetually to* 
wards the mistress, and yet no doubt many 
things are left to the discretion of the hand- 
maid, to discern of the mistress's will ; so 
ought moral philosophy to give a constant 
attention to the doctrines of divinity, and yet 
so as it may yield of herself, within due limits, 
many sound and profitable directions. 

This part therefore, because of the ex- 
cellency thereof, I cannot but find exceed- 
ing strange that it is not reduced to written 
enquiry ; the rather, because it consisteth 
of much matter, wherein both speech and ac- 
tion is often conversant ; and such wherein 
the common talk of men, (which is rare, 
but yet cometh sometimes to pass,) is wiser 
than their books. It is reasonable there- 
fore that we propound it in the more parti- 
cularity, both for the worthiness, and because 
we may acquit ourselves for reporting it 
deficient ; which seemeth almost incredible, 
and is otherwise conceived and presupposed 
by those themselves that have written. We 
will therefore enumerate some heads or points 
thereof, that it may appear the better what 
it is, and whether it be extant. 



337 
First, therefore, in this, as in all things what can be 

done in this 

which are practical, we ought to cast up our art. 
account, what is in our power, and what 
not; for the one may be dealt with by way 
of alteration, but the other by way of appli- 
cation only. The husbandman cannot com- 
mand, neither the nature of the earth, nor 
the seasons of the weather; no more can the 
physician the constitution of the patient, nor 
the variety of accidents : so in the culture 
and cure of the mind of man, two things are 
without our command; points of nature, and 
points of fortune : for to the basis of the one, ' 
and the conditions of the other, our work is 
limited and tied. In these things therefore, 
it is left unto us to proceed by application. 

Vincenda est omnis fortuna ferendo : 
and so likewise, 

Vincenda est omnis natura ferendo. 
But when that we speak of suffering, we do 
not speak of a dull and neglected suffering 
but of a wise and industrious suffering, which 
draweth and contriveth use and advantage 
out of that which seemeth adverse and con- 
trary ; which is that properly which we call 
accommodating or applying. Now the wis- 



338 

dom of application resteth principally in the 
exact and distinct knowledge of the prece- 
dent state or disposition, unto which we do 
a PPty y f° r we cannot fit a garment, except 
we first take measure of the body. 
ofthecha- So then the first article of this knowledge 

racters and & 

tempers of is to set down sound and true distributions, 

men. I * 

and descriptions of the several characters 
and tempers of men's natures and disposi- 
tions ; especially having regard to those dif- 
ferences which are most radical, in being the 
fountains and causes of the rest, or most fre- 
quent in concurrence or commixture ; where- 
in it is not the handling of a few of them in 
passage, the better to describe the mediocri- 
ties of virtues, that can satisfy this inten- 
tion: for if it deserve to be considered, 
€< that there are minds which are proportion - 
" ed to great matters, and others to small/* 
(which Aristotle handleth or ought to have 
handled by the name of magnanimity,) doth 
it not deserve as well to be considered, " that 
" there' are minds proportioned to intend 
" many matters, and others to few ?" So 
that some can divide themselves ; others can 
perchance do exactly well, but it must be but 



S3£ 



in few things at once : and so there cometh 
to be a narrowness of mind, as well as a pu- 
sillanimity. And again, " that some minds 
" are proportioned to that which may be dis- 
u patched at once, or within a short return 
" of time ; others to that which begins afar 
" of£ and is to be wofn with length of 
" pursuit," 

Jam turn tenditque fovetque. 
So that there may be fitly said to be a longa* 
nimity, which is commonly also ascribed to 
God as a magnanimity. So farther deserved 
it to be considered by Aristotle ; " that there 
<c is a disposition in conversation, (supposing 
" it in things which do in no sort touch or 
" concern a man's self,) to sooth and please; 
** and a disposition contrary to contradict 
" and cross:" and deserveth it not much 
better to be considered, " that there is a 
" disposition, not in conversation or talk 
< ( but in the matter of more serious nature, 
" (and supposing it still in things merely in- 
9 different,) to take pleasure in the good of 
" another, and a disposition contrariwise, to 
" take distaste at the good of another ?" 
which is that properly which we call good- 



340 



nature or ill-nature, benignity or malignity: 
and therefore I cannot sufficiently marvel 
that this part of knowledge, touching the 
several characters of natures and disposi- 
tions, should be omitted both in morality and 
policy, considering it is of so great ministry 
and suppeditation to them both. A man shall 
find in the traditions of astrology some pretty 
and apt divisions of men's natures, accord- 
ing to the predominances of the planets ; 
lovers of quiet, lovers of action, lovers of vic- 
tory, lovers of honour, lovers of pleasure, 
lovers of arts, lovers of change, and so forth. 
A man shall find in the wisest sort of these 
relations, which the Italians make touching 
conclaves, the natures of the several cardi- 
nals handsomely and lively painted forth: 
a man shall meet with, in every day's con- 
ference, the denominations of sensitive, dry, 
formal, real, humourous, certain, huomo di 
prima impressione, huomo di ultima impressione f 
and the like : and yet nevertheless this kind 
of observations wandereth in words, but is 
not fixed in enquiry. For the distinctions are 
found, many of them, but we conclude no 
precepts upon them : wherein our fault is the 



341 

greater, because both history, poesy, and 
daily experience are as goodly fields where 
these observations grow ; whereof we make a 
few posies to hold in our hands, but no man 
bringeth them to the confectionary, that re- 
ceipts might be made of them for the use 
of life. 

Of much like kind are those impressions of of inherent 

x and external 

nature, which are imposed upon the mind impressions. 
by the sex, by the age, by the region, by 
health and sickness, by beauty and deformity, 
and the like, which are inherent, and not ex- 
ternal ; and again, those which are caused 
by external fortune ; as sovereignty, nobility, 
obscure birth, riches, want, magistracy, pri- 
vateness, prosperity, adversity, constant for- 
tune, variable fortune, rising per saltum, per 
gradus, and the like. And therefore we see 
that Plautus maketh it a wonder to see an old 
man beneficent, benignitas Jaijiis ut adoles- 
centuli est. St. Paul concludeth, that severity 
of discipline was to be used to the Cretans, 
Increpa eos dure, upon the disposition of their 
country, Cretenses semper mendaces, malce bes- 
tice, ventres pigri. Sallust noteth, that it is 
usual with kings to desire contradictories ; 
Sed plerumque regicc voluntates, ut vehementes 



l 



342 

sunt, sic mobiles, scepeque ipsce sibi adverser 
Tacitus observeth how rarely raising of the 
fortune mendeth the disposition, Solus Vespa- 
sianus mutatus in melius, Pindarus maketh an 
observation, that great and sudden fortune 
for the most part defeateth men, Qui mag* 
nam felicitatem concoquere non possunt. So 
the Psalm sheweth it is more easy to keep a 
measure in the enjoying of fortune, than in 
the increase of fortune ; Divitia si affluant, 
nolite cor apponere. These observations, and 
the like, I deny not but are touched a little 
by Aristotle, as in passage, in his Rhetorics, 
and are handled in some scattered discourses : 
but they were never incorporated into moral 
philosophy, to which they do essentially ap- 
pertain ; as the knowledge of the diversity of 
grounds and moulds doth to agriculture, and 
the knowledge of the diversity of complexions 
and constitutions doth to the physician ; ex- 
cept we mean to follow the indiscretion of 
empirics, which administer the same medi- 
cines to all patients. 
of the affec- Another article of this knowledge is the 
enquiry touching the affections: for as in 
medicining of the body, it is in order first to 
know the divers complexions and constitu- 



343 

tions ; secondly, the diseases ; and lastly, 
the cures : so in medicining of the mind> 
after knowledge of the divers characters of 
men's natures, it followeth, in order, to know 
the diseases and infirmities of the mind, 
which are no other than the perturbations 
and distempers of the affections. For as the 
ancient politicians in popular states were 
wont to compare the people to the sea, and 
the orators to the winds, (because as the sea 
would of itself be calm and quiet, if the 
winds did not move and trouble it ; so the 
people would be peaceable and tractable, if 
the seditious orators did not set them in 
working and agitation;) so it may be fitly 
said, that the mind in the nature thereof 
would be temperate and stayed, if the affec- 
tions, as winds, did not put it into tumult 
and perturbation. 

And here again I find strange as before, Bad method 

b b of Aristotle; 

that Aristotle should have written divers 
volumes of Ethics, and never handled the 
affections, which is the principal subject 
thereof j and yet in his Rhetorics, where 
they are considered but collaterally, and in 
a second degree, as they may be moved 



344 



Poets and 
Historians 
the best 
teachers of 
this know- 
ledge. 



by speech, he fmdeth place for them, and 
handleth them well for the quantity ; but 
where their true place is, he pretermitteth 
them. For it is not his disputations about 
pleasure and pain that can satisfy this en- 
quiry, no more than he that should ge- 
nerally handle the nature of light can be 
said to handle the nature of colours ; for 
pleasure and pain are to the particular af- 
fections, as light is to particular colours. 
Better travels, I suppose, had the Stoics 
taken in this argument, as far as I can ga- 
ther by that which we have at second hand. 
But yet, it is like it was after their man- 
ner, rather in subtilty of definitions, (which, 
in a subject of this nature, are but curiosi- 
ties,) than in active and ample descriptions 
and observations. So likewise I find some 
particular writings of an elegant nature, 
touching some of the affections ; as of anger, 
of comfort upon adverse accidents, of ten- 
derness of countenance, and other. 

But the poets and writers of histories are 
the best doctors of this knowledge ; where 
we may find painted forth with great life 
how affections are kindled and incited; and 



i '■ 



345 

how pacified and refrained ; and how again 
contained from act and farther degree ; how 
they disclose themselves ; how they work ; 
how they vary, how they gather and fortify ; 
how they are inwrapped one within another; 
and how they do fight and encounter one 
with another ; and other the like particu- 
larities : amongst the which this last is of 
special use in moral and civil matters ; how, 
I say, to set affection against affection, and to 
master one by another ; even as we use to 
hunt beast with beast, and fly bird with 
bird, which otherwise perhaps we could not 
so easily recover : upon which foundation 
is erected that excellent use of pr&mium and 
pcena, whereby civil states consist ; employ- 
ing the predominant affections of fear and 
hope, for the suppressing and bridling the 
rest. For as in the government of states 
it is sometimes necessary to bridle one fac- 
tion with another, so it is in the govern- 
ment within. 

Now come we to those points which are °f things 

r within our 

within our own command, and have force j^^^tfi 
and operation upon the mind, to affect the and a PP etlte * 
will and appetite, and to alter manners: 



346 

wherein they ought to have handled cus- 
tom, exercise, habit, education, example, imi- 
tation, emulation, company, friends, praise, 
reproof, exhortation, fame, laws, books, stu- 
dies : these as they have determinate use 
in moralities, from these the mind suffereth ; 
and of these are such receipts and regimens 
compounded and described, as may serve to 
recover or preserve the health and good 
estate of the mind, as far as pertain eth to 
human medicine ; of which number we will 
insist upon some one or two, as an ex- 
ample of the rest, because it were too long 
to prosecute all ; and therefore we do re- 
sume custom and habit to speak of. 
Unsound I opi- The opinion of Aristotle seemeth to me 

nion of Aris-j r 

iotie. a negligent opinion, that of those things 

which consist by nature, nothing can be 
changed by custom ; using for example, 
that if a stone be thrown ten thousand 
times up, it will not learn to ascend ; and 
that by often seeing or hearing, we do not 
learn to hear or see the better. For though 
this principle be true in things wherein na- 
ture is peremptory, (the reason whereof 
we cannot now stand to discuss,) yet it is 



347 

otherwise in things wherein nature admitteth 
a latitude. For he might see that a straight 
glove will come more easily on with use > 
and that a wand will by use bend other- 
wise than it grew ; and that by use of the 
voice we speak louder and stronger ; and 
that by use of enduring heat or cold, we 
endure it the better, and the like : which 
latter sort have a nearer resemblance unto 
that subject of manners he handleth, than 
those instances which he alledgeth. But 
allowing his conclusion, that virtues and 
vices consist in habit, he ought so much 
the more to have taught the manner of 
superinducing that habit : for there be many 
precepts of the wise, ordering the exercises 
of the mind, as there is of ordering the 
exercises of the body ; whereof we will re- 
cite a few. 

The first shall be, that we beware we take Precepts ho^ 

to exercise 

not at the first either too high a strain, or the mind. 
too weak : for if too high, in a diffident 
nature you discourage ; in a confident na- 
ture you breed an opinion of facility, and 
so a sloth ; and in all natures you breed 
a farther expectation than can hold out, 



348 



and so an in satisfaction in the end : if too 
weak, of the other side, you may not look 
to perform and overcome any great task. 

Another precept is to practise all things 
chiefly at two several times, the one when 
the mind is best disposed, the other when 
it is worst disposed ; that by the one you 
may gain a great step, by the other you 
may work out the knots and stones of the 
mind, and make the middle times the more 
easy and pleasant. 

Another precept is that which Aristotle 
mentioneth by the way, which is, to bear 
ever towards the contrary extreme of that 
whereunto we are by nature inclined : like 
unto the rowing against the stream, or 
making a wand straight, by bending him 
contrary to his natural crookedness. 

Another precept is that the mind is 
brought to any thing better, and with more 
sweetness and happiness, if that whereunto 
you pretend be not first in the intention, 
but tanquam aliud agendo ; because of the 
natural hatred of the mind against neces- 
sity and constraint. Many other axioms 
there are touching the managing of exer- 



349 

cise and custom; which being so conduct- 
ed, doth prove indeed another nature ; but 
being governed by chance, doth commonly 
prove but an ape of nature, and bringeth 
forth that which is lame and counterfeit. 

So if we should handle books and studies, of Books 

. ... . and Studies. 

and what influence and operation they have 
upon manners, are there not divers precepts 
of great caution and direction appertaining 
thereunto ? Did not one of the fathers in 
great indignation call poesy vinum dcemo- 
num, because it increaseth temptations, per- 
turbations, and vain opinions ? Is not the 
opinion of Aristotle worthy to be regarded, 
wherein he saith, " That young men are 
no fit auditors of moral philosophy, be- 
cause they are not settled from the boil* 
ing heat of their affections, nor attemper- 
" ed with time and experience }" And 
doth it not hereof come, that those excel- 
lent books and discourses of the ancient 
•writers (whereby they have persuaded unto 
virtue most effectually, by representing her 
in state and majesty, and popular opinions 
against virtue in their parasites' coats, fit 
to be scorned and derided,) are of so little 



350 



effect towards honesty of life, because they 
are not read, and revolved by men in their 
mature and settled years, but confined almost 
to boys and beginners ? But is it not true 
also, that much less young men are fit 
auditors of matters of policy, till they have 
been thoroughly seasoned in religion and 
morality ; lest their judgments be corrupted, 
and made apt to think that there are no 
true differences of things, but according to 
utility and fortune, as the verse describes 
it? 

Prosperum et felix scelus virtus vocatur 
And again, 

Ille crucem pretium scekris tulit, hie 
diadema : 
which the poets do speak satirically, and 
in indignation on virtue's behalf; but books 
of policy do speak it seriously and posi- 
tively : for it so pleaseth Machiavel to say, 
" that if Caesar had been overthrown, he 
" would have been more odious than ever 
P was Catiline :" as if there had been no 
difference, but in fortune, between a very 
fury of lust and blood, and the most ex- 
cellent spirit (his ambition reserved) of the 



S51 

world ? Again, is there not a caution like- 
wise to be given of the doctrines of mora- 
lities themselves, some kinds of them, lest 
they make men too precise, arrogant, in- 
compatible, as Cicero saith of Cato In 
Marco Catone hcec bona quce videmus divina 
et egregia, ipsius scitote esse propria ; quce 
nonnunquam requirimus, ea sunt omnia non a 
natura> sed d magistro ? Many other axioms 
and advices there are touching those pro- 
prieties and effects, which studies do infuse 
and instil into manners. And so likewise 
is there touching the use of all those other 
points, of company, fame, laws, and the 
rest, which we recited in the beginning in 
the doctrine of morality. 

But there is a kind of culture of the The culture 

of the mind 

mind that seemeth yet more accurate and , to b f jegu- 

J lated by the 

elaborate than the rest, and is built upon st ^ of the 
this ground ; that the minds of all men are 
sometimes in a state more perfect, and at 
other times in a state more depraved. The 
purpose therefore of this practice is to fix and 
cherish the good hours of the mind, and 
to obliterate and take forth the evil. The 
fixing of the good hath been practised by 



352 

two means, vows or constant resolutions, and 
observances or exercises ; which are not to 
be regarded so much in themselves, as be- 
cause they keep the mind in continual 
obedience. The obliteration of the evil hath 
been practised by two means, some kind of 
redemption or expiation of that which is 
past, and an inception or account de novo, 
for the time to come : but this part seemeth 
sacred and religious, and justly ; for all good 
moral philosophy, as was said, is but an 
handmaid to religion. 
The shortest Wherefore we will conclude with that 

and most ef- 
fectual way last point, which is of all other means the 

of training x 

the mmd to m0 st compendious and summary, and again, 
the most noble and effectual to the reducing: 
of the mind unto virtue and good estate ; 
which is the electing and propounding unto 
a man's self good and virtuous ends of his 
life, such as may be in a reasonable sort 
within his compass to attain. For if these 
two things be supposed, that a man set 
before him honest and good ends, and again 
that he be resolute, constant, and true unto 
them, it will follow that he shall mould 
himself into all virtue at once. And this 



353 



is indeed like the work of nature ; whereas 
the other course is like the work of the hand : 
for as when a carver makes an image, he 
shapes only that part whereupon he worketh ; 
(as if he be upon the face, that part which 
shall be the body is but a rude stone still, 
till such time as he comes to it ;) but, con- 
trariwise, when nature makes a flower or 
living creature, she formeth rudiments of 
all the parts at one time : so in obtain- 
ing virtue by habit, while a man practise th 
temperance, he doth not profit much to for- 
titude, nor the like ; but when he dedicateth 
and applieth himself to good ends, look, 
what virtue soever the pursuit and passage 
towards those ends doth commend unto him, 
he is invested of a precedent disposition to 
conform himself thereunto. Which state of 
mind Aristotle doth excellently express him- 
self, that it ought not to be called virtuous 
but divine : his words are these ; Immanitati 
autem consentaneum est opponere earn, quce 
supra humanitatem est, heroicam sive divinam 
virtutem : and a little after, Nam ut fer<x 
neque vitium neque virtus est, sic neque Dei : 
sed hie quidem status altius quiddam virtute 

A A 



354 



est, ilk aliud quiddam a vitio. And there- 
fore we may see what celsitude of honour 
Plinius Secundus attributeth to Trajan in 
his funeral oration ; where he said, " that 
" men needed to make no other prayers 
" to the gods, but that they would con- 
" tinue ,as good lords to them as Trajan 
" had been '"■ as if he had not been only an 
imitation of divine nature, but a pattern 
of it. But these be heathen and profane 
passages, having but a shadow of that divine 
state of mind, which religion and the holy 
faith doth conduct men unto, by imprint- 
ing upon their souls charity, which is ex- 
cellently called the bond of perfection, be- 
cause it comprehendeth and fasteneth all 
virtues together. And as it is elegantly 
said by Menander of vain love, which is 
but a false imitation of divine love, Amor 
melior sophist a Ueoo ad hamanam vitam, that 
love teacheth a man to carry himself bet- 
ter than the sophist or preceptor ; which 
he calleth left-handed, because, with all his 
rules and precepts, he cannot form a man 
so dexterously, nor with that facility to 
prize himself and govern himself, as love 



355 



can do : so certainly, if a man's mind be 
truly inflamed with charity, it doth work 
him suddenly into greater perfection than 
all the doctrine of morality can do, which 
is but a sophist in comparison of the other. 
Nay farther, as Xenophon observed truly, 
that all other affections, though they raise 
the mind, yet they do it by distorting and 
uncomeliness of ecstasies or excesses ; but 
only love doth exalt the mind, and never- 
theless at the same instant doth settle and 
compose it : so in all other excellencies, 
though they advance nature, yet they are 
subject to excess ; only charity admitteth 
no excess : for so we see, by aspiring to be 
like God in power, the angels transgressed 
and fell ; Ascendam, et ero sijnilis Altissimo : 
by aspiring to be like God in knowledge, 
man transgressed and fell ; Eritis sicut Dii, 
scientes bonum et malum : but by aspiring to 
a similitude of God in goodness or love, 
neither man nor angel ever transgressed, or 
shall transgress. For unto that imitation we 
are called ; Diligite inimicos vestros, benefa- 
cite eis qui oderunt vos, et orate pro perse- 
quentibus et calumniantibus vos ; ut sit is filii 

A A 2 



336 

Patris vestri qui in ccelis est, qui solem suwn 
oriri facit super bonos et malos, et pluit super 
justos et injustos. So in the first platform 
of the divine nature itself, the heathen re- 
ligion speaketh thus, Optimus Maximus; and 
the sacred Scriptures thus, Misericordia ejus 
super omnia opera ejus. 
Conclusion. Wherefore I do conclude this part of moral 
knowledge, concerning the culture and re- 
gimen of the mind ; wherein if any man, 
considering the parts thereof, which I have 
enumerated, do judge that my labour is 
but to collect into an art or science that 
which hath been pretermitted by others, as 
matters of common sense and experience, 
he judgeth well : but as Philocrates sported 
with Demosthenes, " You may not marvel, 
" Athenians, that Demosthenes and I do 
(( differ ; for he drinketh water, and I drink 
" wine :" — and like as we read of an an- 
cient parable of the two gates of sleep, 
Sunt gemincB somni portce, quarum altera fertur 
Cornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris : 
Altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto, 
Sed falsa ad caelum mittunt insomnia manes. 
so if we put on sobriety and attention, we 



Vol 



shall find it a sure maxim in knowledge, 
that the more pleasant liquor of wine is 
the more vaporous, and the braver gate of 
ivory sendeth forth the falser dreams. 

But we have now concluded that gene- 
ral part of human philosophy, which con- 
templated! man segregate, and as he con- 
sisted! of body and spirit. Wherein we 
may farther note, that there seemeth to be 
a relation or conformity between the good 
of the mind and the good of the body. 
For as we divided the good of the body 
into health, beauty, strength, and pleasure ; 
so the good of the mind, inquired in ra- 
tional and moral knowledges, tendeth to this, 
to make the mind sound, and without per- 
turbation ; beautiful, and graced with de- 
cency ; and strong and agile for all duties 
of life. These three, as in the body, so 
in the mind, seldom meet, and commonly 
sever. For it is easy to observe, that many 
have strength of wit and courage ; but have 
neither health from perturbations, nor any 
beauty or decency in their doings : some 
again have an elegancy and fineness of car- 
riage ; which have neither soundness of 



358 



honesty, nor substance of sufficiency : and 
some again have honest and reformed minds ; 
that can neither become themselves, nor 
manage business. And sometimes two of 
them meet, and rarely all three. As for 
pleasure, we have likewise determined that 
the mind ought not to be reduced to stu- 
pidity, but to retain pleasure ; confined ra- 
ther in the subject of it, than in the strength 
and vigour of it. 



CIVIL KNOWLEDGE. 

Civil Knowledge is conversant about a 
subject which of all others is most immersed 
in matter, and hardliest reduced to axiom. 
Nevertheless, as Cato the censor said, " that 
" the Romans were like sheep, for that a 
" man might better drive a flock of them, 
" than one of them ; for in a flock, if you 
" could get but some few to go right, the rest 
" would follow :K so in that respect moral 
philosophy is more difficult than policy. 
Again, moral philosophy propoundeth to 



3.59 

itself the framing of internal goodness ; but 
civil knowledge requireth only an external 
goodness ; for that as to society sufficeth. 
And therefore it cometh oft to pass that 
there be evil times in good governments : 
for so we find in the holy story, when the 
kings were good ; yet it is added, Sed adhuc 
populus non direxerat cor suum ad Domimtm 
Deum patrum suorum. Again, states, as great 
engines, move slowly, and are not so soon 
put out of frame : for as in Egypt the seven 
good years sustained the seven bad ; so go- 
vernments, for a time well grounded, do 
bear out errors following : but the resolu- 
tion of particular persons is more sud- 
denly subverted. These respects do some- 
what qualify the extreme difficulty of civil 
knowledge. 

This knowledge hath three parts, accord- Ift three 
ing to the three summary actions of so- parts * 
ciety ; which are Conversation, Negotiation, 
and Government. For man seeketh in 
society comfort, use, and protection : and 
they be three wisdoms of divers natures, 
which do often sever ; wisdom of behavi- 
our, wisdom of business, and wisdom of 
state. 



360 

of conversa- The wisdom of Conversation ought not to 
be over much affected, but much less de- 
spised : for it hath not only an honor in 
itself, but an influence also into business 
and government. The poet saith, Nee vultu 
destrue verba tuo. A man may destroy the 
force of his words with his countenance : 
so may he of his deeds, saith Cicero, re- 
commending to his brother affability and 
easy access, Nil interest habere ostium aper- 
tum, vultum clausum. " It is nothing won 
(i to admit men with an open door, and 
" to receive them with a shut and reserved 
" countenance." So, we see, Atticus, be- 
fore the first interview between Caesar and 
Cicero, the war depending, did seriously 
advise Cicero touching the composing and 
ordering of his countenance and gesture. 
And if the government of the countenance 
be of such effect, much more is that of 
the speech, and other carriage appertaining 
to conversation ; the true model whereof 
seemeth to me well expressed by Livy, 
though not meant for this purpose ; Ne 
out arrogans videar, aut obnoxius ; quorum 
alterum est alienee libertatis obliti, alterum 
suce : " The sum of behaviour is to retain 



361 



" a man^s own dignity, without intruding 
" upon the liberty of others." On the other 
side, if behaviour and outward carriage be 
intended too much, first it may pass into 
affectation, and then Quid deformius qudm 
scenam in vitam transferre, to act a man's 
life ? But although it proceed not to that 
extreme, yet it consumeth time, and em- 
ployeth the mind too much. And there- 
fore as we use to advise young students from 
company keeping, by saying, Amid fures 
temporis ; so certainly the intending of the 
discretion of behaviour is a great thief of 
meditation. Again, such as are accomplished 
in that form of urbanity please themselves 
in it, and seldom aspire to higher virtue ; 
whereas those that have defect in it do seek 
comeliness by reputation ; for where repu- 
tation is, almost every thing becometh ; but 
where that is not, it must be supplied by 
punctilios and compliments. Again, there 
is no greater impediment of action than an 
over-curious observance of decency, and the 
guide of decency, which is time and season, 
For as Solomon saith, Qui respicit ad ventos, 
n on seminat ; et qui respicit ad nubes, non 



362 

metet : a man must make his opportunity as 
oft as find it. To conclude ; behaviour seemeth 
to me as a garment of the mind, and to 
have the conditions of a garment. For it 
ought to be made in fashion ; it ought not 
to be too curious ; it ought to be shaped so 
as to set forth any good making of the mind, 
and hide any deformity; and above all, it 
ought not to be too straight, or restrained for 
exercise or motion. But this part of civil 
knowledge hath been elegantly handled, and 
therefore I cannot report it for deficient. 
„ 2 - . The wisdom touching Negotiation or Bu- 

Of negotia- b & 

tionorbusi- s i n ess hath not been hitherto collected into 
writing, to the great derogation of learning, 
and the professors of learning. For from 
this root springeth chiefly that note or opi- 
nion, which by us is expressed in adage to 
this effect, '• that there is no great concur- 
\ rence between learning and wisdom/ For 
of the three wisdoms which we have set down 
to pertain to civil life, for wisdom of beha- 
viour, it is by learned men for the most 
part despised, as an inferior to virtue, and 
an enemy to mediation ; for wisdom of go- 
vernment, they acquit themselves well when 



a ess. 



363 

they are called to it, but that happeneth to 
few ; but for the wisdom of business, wherein 
man's life is most conversant, there be no 
books of it, except some few scattered adver- 
tisements, that have no proportion to the 
magnitude of this subject. For if books were 
written of this, as the other, I doubt not but 
learned men with mean experience, would far 
excel men of long experience without learn- 
ing, and outshoot them in theirown bow. 

Neither needeth it at all to be doubted Custom of 

the Romans. 

that this knowledge should be so variable 
as it falieth not under precept ; for it is 
much less infinite than science of govern- 
ment, which, we see, is laboured, and in 
some part reduced. Of this wisdom, it 
seemeth, some of the ancient Romans, in 
the sagest and wisest times, were professors ; 
for Cicero reporteth that it was then in 
use for senators that had name and opinion 
for general wise men, as Coruncanius, Cu- 
rius, Laelius, and many others, to walk at 
certain hours in the place, and to give au- 
dience to those that would use their advice ; 
and that the particular citizens would resort 
unto them, and consult with them of the 



■ 



364 

marriage of a daughter, or of the employ- 
ing of a son, or of a purchase or bargain, 
or of an accusation, and every other occa- 
sion incident to man's life. So as there is a 
wisdom of counsel and advice even in private 
cases, arising out of an universal insight 
into the affairs of the world ; which is used 
indeed upon particular cases propounded, 
but is gathered by general observation of 
cases of like nature. For so we see in the 
book which Q. Cicero writeth to his bro- 
ther, De petitione consulatus, (being the only 
book of business, that I know, written by 
the ancients,) although it concerned a par- 
ticular action then on foot, yet the sub- 
stance thereof consisteth of many wise and 
politic axioms, which contain not a tempo- 
rary, but a perpetual direction in the case 
of popular elections. 
Aphorisms But chiefly we may see in those apho- 

of Solomon. . , . •, «, i j . . 

risms which have place amongst divine 
writings, composed by Solomon the king, 
{of whom the scriptures testify that his heart 
was as the sands of the sea, encompassing 
the world and all worldly matters,) we see, 
I say, not a few profound and excellent 



365 



cautions, precepts, positions, extending to 
much variety of occasions ; whereupon we 
will stay awhile, offering to consideration 
some number of examples. 

Sed et cunctis sermonibus qui dicuntur ne 
accommodes aurem tuam, ne forte audias ser- 
vum tuum maledicentem tibi. 

Here is recommended the provident stay 
of enquiry of that which we would be loth 
to find : as it was judged great wisdom in 
Pompeius. Magnus that he burned Sertorius's 
papers unperused. 

Vir sapiens, si cum stulto contenderit-, she 
irascatur, sive rideat, non inveniet requiem. 

Here is described the great disadvantage 
which a wise man hath in undertaking a 
lighter person than himself; which is such 
an engagement as, whether a man turn the 
matter to jest, or turn it to heat, or how- 
soever he change copy, he can no ways quit 
himself well of it. 

Qui delicate d pueritia nutrit senium suum, 
postea sentiet eum contumacem. 

Here is signified that if a man begin too 
high a pitch in his favours, it doth commonly 
end in unkindness and unthankfulness. 



366 



Vidlsti virum velocem in opere suo ; coram 
regibus stabit, nee erit inter ignobiles. 

Here is observed that of all virtues for 
rising to honour quickness of dispatch is 
the best ; for superiors many times love not 
to have those they employ too deep or too 
sufficient, but ready and diligent. 

Vidi cunctos viventes qui ambulant sub sole, 
cum adolescent e secundo qui consurgit pro eo. 

Here is expressed that which was noted 
by Sylla first, and after him by Tiberius; 
Plures adorant solem orientem qudm occiden- 
tem vel meridianum. 

Si spiritus potestatem habentis ascendent 
super te, locum tuum ne dimiseris, quia cu- 
ratio faciei cessare peccata jnaxima. 

Here caution is given that upon displea- 
sure retiring is of all courses the unfittest ; fo>* 
a man leaveth things at worst, and depriveth 
himself of means to make them better, 

Erat civitas parva, et pauci in ea viri ; venit 
contra earn rex magnus, et vadavit earn, instruxit- 
que munitiones per gyrum, et perfect a est obsidio ; 
inventusque est in ea vir pauper et sapiens, et 
liber avit earn per sapientiam suam ; et nullus 
deinceps recordatus est hominis illius pauperis. 



367 



Here the corruption of states is set forth, 
that esteem not virtue or merit longer than 
they have use of it. 

Mollis responsio frangit iram. 

Here is noted that silence or rough answer 
exasperateth ; but an answer present and tem- 
perate pacifieth. 

Iter pigrorum quasi sepes spinarum. 

Here is lively represented how laborious 
sloth proveth in the end; for when things 
are deferred to the last instant, and nothing 
prepared beforehand, every step findeth a 
brier or an impediment, which catcheth or 
stoppeth. 

Melior est finis orationis qudm principium. 

Here is taxed the vanity of formal speakers, 
that study more about prefaces and induce- 
ments than upon the conclusions and issues 
of speech. 

Qui cognoscit injudiciofaciem, non benefacit; 
iste et pro buccella panis deseret veritatem. 

Here is noted that a judge were better be 
a briber than a respecter of persons ; for a 
corrupt judge offendeth not so lightly as a 
facile. 



368 



Vir pauper calumnians pauperes similis est 
imbri vehementi in quo par atur fames. 

Here is expressed the extremity of neces- 
sitous extortions, figured in the ancient fable 
of the full and the hungry horse -leech. 

Fons turbatus pede, et vena corrupt a, est Justus 
cadens coram impio, 

Here is noted that one judicial and ex- 
emplar iniquity in the face of the world 
doth trouble the fountains of justice more 
than many particular injuries passed over 
by connivance. 

Qui subtrahit aliquid a patre et a matre, et 
dicit hoc non esse peccaium, particeps est ho- 
micidii. 

Here is noted that whereas men in wrong - 
ing their best friends use to extenuate their 
fault, as if they might presume or be bold 
upon them, it doth contrariwise indeed ag- 
gravate their fault, and turneth it from in- 
jury to impiety. 

Noli esse amicus homini iracundo, nee ambu- 
lato cum homine furioso. 

Here caution is given that in the election 
of our friends we do principally avoid those 



y(k) 



which are impatient, as those that will 
espouse us to many factions and quarrels. 

Qui conturbat domwn suam, possidebit ventum. 

Here is noted that in domestical separa- 
tions and breaches men do promise to them- 
selves quieting of their mind and content- 
ment ; but still they are deceived of their ex- 
pectation, and it turneth to wind. 

Filius sapiens Icetificat pair em : films vero 
stultus mcestitia es matri suce. 

Here is distinguished that fathers have 
most comfort of the good proof of their sons, 
but mothers have most discomfort of their ill 
proof; because women have little discerning 
of virtue, but of fortune. 

Qui cdat delictum, qucerit amicitiam ; sed qui 
altere sermone repetit, separat fcederatos. 

Here caution is given that reconcilement 
is better managed by an amnesty, and pass- 
ing over that which is past, than by apologies 
and excusations. 

In omni opere bono erit abundantia ; ubi autem 
verba sunt plurima, ibi frequenter egestas. 

Here is noted that words and discourse 
abound most where there is idleness and 
want. 

B B 



370 



.Primus in sua causa Justus; sed venit altera 
pars, et inquirit in eum. 

Here is observed that in all causes the first 
tale possesseth much, in such sort, that the 
prejudice thereby wrought will be hardly re- 
moved, except some abuse or falsity in the 
information be detected. 

Verba bilinguis quasi simplicia, et ipsa per - 
veniunt ad interior a ventris. 

Here is distinguished that flattery and in- 
sinuation, which seemeth set and artifi- 
cial, si nketh not far; but that entereth deep 
which hath shew of nature, liberty, and sim- 
plicity. 

Qui erudit derisorem? ipse sibi injuriam facit ; 
et qui arguit impiiwi, sibi maculam general. 

Here caution is given how we tender re- 
prehension to arrogant and scornful natures, 
whose manner is to esteem it for contumely, 
and accordingly to return it. 
Da sapienti occasionem, et addetur et sapientia. 

Here is distinguished the wisdom brought 
into habit, and that which is verbal, and 
swimming only in conceit; for the one upon 
the occasion presented is quickened and re- 
doubled, the other is amazed and confused. 



37 1 



JZuomodo in aquis resplendent vultus prospi- 
cientium, sic corda hominum manifesto, sunt pru- 
dentibus. 

Here the mind of a wise man is compared 
to a glass, wherein the images of all diver- 
sity of natures and customs are represented, 
from which representation proceedeth that 
application, 

Qui sap it, innumeris moribus aptus erit. 

Thus have I staid somewhat longer upon 
these sentences politic of Solomon than is 
agreeable to the proportion of an example ; 
led with a desire to give authority to this 
part of knowledge, which I noted as deficient, 
by so excellent a precedent ; and have also 
attended them with brief observations, such 
as to my understanding offer no violence to 
the sense, though I know they may be ap- 
plied to a more divine use : but it is allowed 
even in divinity that some interpretations, 
yea and some writings, have more of the 
eagle than others ; but taking them as in- 
structions for life, they might have received 
large discourse, if I would have broken them 
and illustrated them by deducements and ex- 
amples. 

bb2 



372 
Antiquity Neither was this in use only with the He* 

and use of 

aphorisms, brews, but it is generally to be found in the 
wisdom of the more ancient times ; that as 
men found out any observation that they 
thought was good for life, they would gather 
it and express it in parable, or aphorism, or 
fable. But for fables, they were vicegerents 
and supplies where examples failed: now 
that the times abound with history, the aim 
is better when the mark is alive. And there- 
fore the form of writing, which of all others 
is the fittest for this variable argument of ne- 
gotiation and occasion, is that which Machia* 
vel chose wisely and aptly for government ; 
namely, discourse upon histories or exam- 
ples: for knowledge drawn freshly, and in 
our view, out of particulars, knoweth the way 
best to particulars again * and it hath much 
greater life for practice when the discourse 
attendeth upon the example, than when the 
example attendeth upon the discourse. For 
this is no point of order, as it seemeth at 
first, but of substance : for when the exam- 
ple is the ground, being set down in an his- 
tory at large, it is set down with all circum- 
stances, which may sometimes control the 



373 

discourse thereupon made, and sometimes 
supply it as a very pattern for action; 
whereas the examples alledged for the dis- 
course's sake are cited succinctly, and with- 
out particularity, and carry a servile aspect 
toward the discourse which they are brought 
in to make good. 

But this difference is not amiss to be re- Use of Let- 

ters above 

membered, that as history of times is the best either chr °- 

J nicies Qr 

ground for discourse of government, such as Lives » 
Machiavel handleth, so history of lives is the 
most proper for discourse of business, because 
it is more conversant in private actions. 
Nay, there is a ground of discourse for this 
purpose fitter than them both, which is dis- 
course upon letters; such as are wise and 
weighty, as many are of Cicero ad Atticum, 
and others. For letters have a great and 
more particular representation of business 
than either chronicles or lives. Thus have 
we spoken both of the matter and form of 
this part of civil knowledge, touching nego- 
tiation, which we note to be deficient. 

But yet there is another part of this part, Difference 

of wisdom in 

which dilFereth as much from that whereof counsel and 

in conduct, 

we have spoken as sapere and sibi say ere; 



>?4 



the one moving as it were to the circumfer- 
ence, the other to the centre: for there is a 
wisdom of counsel, and again there is a wis- 
dom of pressing a man's own fortune; and 
they do sometimes meet, and often sever: 
for many are wise in their own ways that 
are weak for government or counsel ; like 
ants, which are wise creatures for them- 
selves, but very hurtful for the garden. This 
wisdom the Romans did take much know- 
ledge of: Nam pol sapiens, saith the comical 
poet, fingit fortunam sibi; and it grew to an 
adage, Faber quisque fortunes proprice : and 
Livy attributeth it to Gato the first, in hoc 
viro tanta vis animi et ingenii incrat ut quocun- 
que loco natus esset, sibi ipse fortunam facturus 
videretur. 

This conceit or position, if it be too much 
declared and professed, hath been thought a 
thing impolitic and unlucky, as was observed 
in Timotheus the Athenian ; who having done 
many great services to the estate in his go- 
vernment, and giving an account thereof to 
the people, as the manner was, did conclude 
every particular with this clause, " and in 
this fortune had no part." And it came to 



37«5 



pass that he never prospered in any thing he 
took in hand afterwards ; for this is too high 
and too arrogant, savouring of that which 
Ezekiel saith of Pharaoh, Bids, Fluvius est 
meus, et ego feci memetipsum ; or of that which 
another prophet speaketh, that men offer-sacri- 
fices to their nets and snares; and that which 
the poet expresseth, 

Dextra mihi Deas,et telum, quod missile libro, 

Nunc ads hit : 
for these confidences were ever unhallowed, 
and unblessed : and therefore those that were 
great politicians indeed ever ascribed their 
successes to their felicity, and not to their 
skill or virtue. For so Sylla surnamed him^ 
self Felix not Magnus : so Ceesar said to the 
master of the ship, Ccesarem portas etfortunam 
ejus. ' 

But yet nevertheless these positions, Faber 
quisque fortune suaz : Sapiens dominabitur as* 
tris: Invia virtuti nulla est via, and the like, 
being taken and used as spurs to industry; 
and not as stirrups to insolency, rather for 
resolution than for presumption or outward 
declaration, have been ever thought sound 
and good; and are, no question, imprinted 



376 

in the greatest minds, who are so sensible of 
this opinion, as they can scarce contain it 
within : As we see in Augustus Caesar, (who 
was rather diverse from his uncle, than inferior 
in virtue,) how when he died, he desired his 
friends about him to give him a Plaudite, as if 
he were conscious to himself that he had 
played his part well upon the stage. 
o/pruden- This part of knowledge we do report also 

tial wisdom ° 

or the art of a s deficient ; not but that it is practised too 

rising in the. x 

world. much, but it hath not been reduced to writ* 

ing. And therefore lest it should seem to 
any that it is not comprehensible by axiom, 
it is requisite, as we did in the former, that 
we set down some heads or passages of it. 

Wherein it may appear at the first a new 
and unwonted argument to teach men how 
to raise and make their fortune ; a doctrine 
wherein every man perchance will be ready 
to yield himself a disciple, till he seeth diffi- 
culty : for fortune layeth as heavy imposi- 
tions as virtue ; and it is as hard and severe 
ft thing to be a true politician, as to be truly 
moral. But the handling thereof concerneth 
learning greatly, both in honour and in sub- 
stance : in honour, because pragmatical men 



377 

may wot go away with an opinion that learn- 
ing is like a lark, that can mount, and sing, 
and please herself, and nothing else ; but 
may know that she holdeth as well of the 
hawk, that can soar aloft, and can also de- 
scend and strike upon the prey : in sub- 
stance, because it is the perfect law of en- 
quiry of truth, " that nothing be in the globe 
" of matter, which should not be likewise 
in the globe of chrystal, or form;" that is, 
that there be not any thing in being and ac- 
tion, which should not be drawn and col- 
lected into contemplation and doctrine. Nei- 
ther doth learning admire or esteem of this 
architecture of fortune otherwise than as of 
an inferior work: for no man's fortune can 
be an end worthy of his being ; and many 
times the worthiest men do abandon their 
fortune willingly for better respects : but ne- 
vertheless fortune, as an organ of virtue and 
merit, deserveth the consideration. 

First therefore, the precept which I con- The highest 
ceive to be most summary towards the pre- ^aSt. ° f 
vailing in fortune, is to obtain that window 
which Momus did require ; who seeing in 
the frame of man's heart such angles and re- 



373 



cesses, found fault there was not a window 
to look into them; that is to procure good 
informations of particulars touching persons, 
their natures, their desires and ends, their 
customs and fashions, their helps and advan- 
tages, and whereby they chiefly stand; so 
again their weaknesses and disadvantages, 
and where they lie most open and obnoxious ; 
their friends, factions, and dependencies ; 
and again their opposites, enviers, competi- 
tors, their moods and times, Sola viri molles 
aditus et tempora noras ; their principles, rules, 
and observations, and the like ; and this not 
only of persons, but of actions ; what are on 
foot from time to time, and how they are 
conducted, favoured, opposed, and how they 
import, and the like. For the knowledge of 
present actions is not only material in itself, 
but without it also the knowledge of persons 
is very erroneous : for men change with the 
actions, and whilst they are in pursuit they 
are one, and when they return to their na- 
ture they are another. These informations 
of particulars, touching persons and actions, 
are as the minor propositions in every ac- 
tive syllogism ; for no excellency of obser- 



370 

vations, which are as the major propositions, 
can suffice to ground a conclusion, if there 
be error and mistaking in the minors. 

That this knowledge is possible Solomon is 
our surety ; who saith, Consilium in corde 
viri tanquam aqua profunda, sed vir prudens 
exhauriet Mud : And although the knowledge 
itself falleth not under precept, because it is 
of individuals, yet the instructions for the 
obtaining of it may. 

We will begin therefore with this pre- instructions 

for obtaining 

cent, according to the ancient opinion, that a knowledge 

1 3 ° .:•■'-. of men. 

the sinews of wisdom are slowness of belief 
"and distrust : that more trust be given to 
countenances and deeds than to words ; and 
in words, rather to sudden passages and 
surprised words than to set and purposed 
words. Neither let that be feared which is 
said, fronti nulla fides ; which is meant of a 
general outward behaviour, and not of the 
private and subtile motions and labours of 
the countenance and gesture ; which, as Q. 
Cicero elegantly saith, is animi janua, " the 
" gate of the mind." None more close than 
Tiberius, and yet Tacitus saith of Gallus, 
JEtenim vultu offensionem conjectaverat. So 



380 

again, noting the differing character and 
manner of his commending Germanicus and 
Drusus in the senate, he saith, touching his 
fashion wherein he carried his speech of 
Germanicus, thus ; Magis in speciem adorna* 
tis verbis, qudm ut peniius sentire videretur ; 
but of Drusus thus, Paucioribus, sed inten- 
tior, et fidd oratione : and in another place, 
speaking of his character of speech, when 
he did any thing that was gracious and po- 
pular, he saith, that in other things he was 
velut eluctantiiim verborum : but then again, 
solutius zero loquebatur quando subveniret. So 
that there is no such artificer of dissimu- 
lation, nor no such commanded countenance, 
vultus jussus, that can sever from a feigned 
tale some of these fashions, either a more 
slight and careless fashion, or more set and 
formal, or more tedious and wandering, or 
coming from a man more drily and hardly, 
of Deeds. Neither are deeds such assured pledges, 

as that they may be trusted without a ju- 
dicious consideration of their magnitude and 
nature : Fraus sibi in parvis Jidem prxstruit, 
ut majore emolumento fallat : and the Italian 
thinketh himself upon the point to be bought 



381 

and sold, when he is better used than he 
was wont to be, without manifest cause. For 
small favours, they do but lull men asleep, 
both as to caution and as to industry, and 
are, as Demosthenes calleth them, Alimeiita 
socordice. So again we see how false the nature 
of some deeds are, in that particular which 
Mutianus practised upon Antonius Primus, 
upon that hollow and unfaithful reconcile- 
ment which was made between them : where- 
upon Mutianus advanced many of the friends 
of Antonius : simul amicis ejus prctfecturas et 
tribunatus largitur : wherein, under pretence 
to strengthen him, he did desolate him, and 
won from him his dependences. 

As for words, though they be like waters of Words. 
to physicians, full of flattery and uncer- 
tainty, yet they are not to be despised, spe- 
cially with the advantage of passion and 
affection. For so we see Tiberius, upon a 
stinging and incensing speech of Agrippina, 
came a step forth of his dissimulation, when 
he said, " You are hurt, because you do 
" not reign ;" of which Tacitus saith, Audita 
hcec raram occulti pectoris vocem elicuere, cor- 
reptamque Grceco versu admonuit : ideo l<zdi, 



33% 

quia non regnaret. And therefore the poet 
doth elegantly call passions, tortures, that 
urge men to confess their secrets : 

Vino tortus et ira. 
And experience sheweth, there are few men 
so true to themselves and so settled, but that, 
sometimes upon heat, sometimes upon bra- 
very, sometimes upon kindness, sometimes 
upon trouble of mind and weakness, they 
open themselves ; specially if they be put 
to it with a counter-dissimulation, accord- 
ing to the proverb of Spain, Di mentira, 
y sacams verdad, " Tell a lie, and find a 
'{. truth;' 
or knowing As f or t ne knowing of men, which is at 

men by Re- ° ' 

port., secondhand from reports ; men's weaknesses 

and faults are best known from their ene- 
mies, their virtues and abilities from their 
friends, their customs and times from their 
servants, their conceits and opinions from their 
familiar friends, with whom they discourse 
rnost. General fame is light, and the opi- 
nions conceived by superiors or equals are 
deceitful ; for to such men are more masked, 
Verior fama e domesticis emanat. 
, But the soundest disclosing and expound- 



SS3 
ing\ of men is by their natures and ends ; Different 

. Tests to try 

wherein the weakest sort of men are best the wise and 

the weak. 

interpreted by their natures, and the wisest 
by their ends. For it was both pleasantly 
and wisely said, though I think very un- 
truly, by a nuncio of the pope, returning 
from a certain nation where he served as 
lieger ; whose opinion being asked touching 
the appointment of one to go in his place, 
he wished that in any case they did not 
send one that was too wise ; because no very 
wise man would ever imagine what they in 
that country were like to do : and certainly 
it is an error frequent for men to shoot over, 
and to suppose deeper ends, and more com- 
pass-reaches than are : the Italian proverb 
being elegant, and for the most part true, 
Di danari, di senno, e di fede, 
C'e ne manco che non credi : 
" There is commonly less money, less wis- 
" dom, and less good faith, than men do 
11 account upon." 

But princes, upon a far other reason, are Test of 
best interpreted by their natures, and pri- priVa^raen. 
vate persons by their ends: for princes be- 
ing at the top of human desires, they have 



384 

for the most part no particular ends whereto 
they aspire, by distance from which a man 
might take measure and scale of the rest 
of their actions and desires ; which is one 
of the causes that maketh their hearts more 
inscrutable. Neither is it sufficient to in- 
form ourselves in men's ends and natures, 
of the variety of them only, but also of the 
predominancy, what humour reigneth most, 
and what end is principally sought. For so we 
see, when Tigellinus saw himself out-stripped 
by Petronius Turpilianus in Nero's humors 
of pleasures, metus ejus rimatur, he wrought 
upon Nero's fears, whereby he broke the 
other's neck. 
Three Rules But to all this part of enquiry the most 
b^obierved. compendious way resteth in three things : 
the first, to have general acquaintance and 
inwardness with those which have general ac- 
quaintance and look most into the world; and 
especially according to the diversity of busi- 
ness, and the diversity of persons, to have pri- 
vacy and conversation with some one friend 
at least, which is perfect and well intelligenced 
in every several kind. The second is, to keep 
a good mediocrity in liberty of speech and 



385 



secrecy : in most things liberty ; secrecy 
where it importeth : for liberty of speech 
inviteth and provoketh liberty to be used 
again, and so bringeth much to a man's 
knowledge ; and secrecy, on the other side, 
nducetli trust and inwardness. The last is 
the reducing of a man's self to this watchful 
and serene habit, as to make account and 
purpose, in every conference and action, as 
well to observe as to act. For as Epicteius 
would have a philosopher in every particu- 
lar action to say to himself, Et hoc volo x 
et etiam institutum servare ; so a politic man 
in every thing should say to himself, Et 
hoc volo, ac etiam aliquid addiscere. I have 
stayed the longer upon this precept of ob- 
taining good information, because it is a 
main part by itself, which answereth to all 
the rest. But above all things caution must 
be taken that men have a good stay and hold 
of themselves, and that this much knowing 
do not draw on much meddling ; for nothing 
is more unfortunate than light and rash in- 
termeddling in many matters. So that this 
variety of knowledge tendeth in conclusion 
but only to this, to make a better and freer 
c c 



386 



How men 
should exa- 
mine and 
learn to un- 
derstand 
themselves* 



choice of those actions which may concern 
us, and to conduct them with the less error 
and the more dexterity. 

The second precept concerning this know- 
ledge, is for men to make good information 
touching their own persons, and well to 
understand themselves : knowing that, as 
St. James saith, though men look oft in 
a glass, yet they do suddenly forget them- 
selves ; wherein as the divine glass is the 
word of God, so the politic glass is the state 
of the world, or times wherein we live, in 
the which we are to behold ourselves. 

For men ought to take an impartial view 
of their own abilities and virtues ; and again 
of their wants and impediments; account- 
ing these with the most, and those other 
with the least ; and from this view and 
examination to frame the considerations 
following. 

First, to consider how the constitution 
of their nature sorteth with the general 
state of the times; which if they find agree- 
able and fit, then in all things to give them- 
selves more scope and liberty ; but if dif- 
fering and dissonant^ then in the whole 



387 



course of their life to be more close, re- 
tired, and reserved : as we see in Tiberius, 
who was never seen at a play, and came 
not into the senate in twelve of his last 
years ; whereas Augustus Csesar lived ever 
in men's eyes, which Tacitus observeth ; 
Alia Tiberio morum via. 

Secondly, to consider how their nature 
sorteth with professions and courses of life, 
and accordingly to make election, if they 
be free; and, if engaged, to make the de- 
parture at the first opportunity : as we see 
was done by duke Valentine, that was de- 
signed by his father to a sacerdotal pro- 
fession, but quitted it soon after in regard 
of his parts and inclination; being such 
nevertheless as a man cannot tell well whe- 
ther they were worse for a prince or for a 
priest. 

Thirdly, to consider how they sort with 
those whom they are like to have compe- 
titors and concurrents ; and to take that 
course wherein there is most solitude, and 
themselves like to be most eminent : as Julius 
Caesar did, who at first was an orator or 
pleader; but when he saw the excellency of 
c c 2 



38& 



Cicero, Hortensius, Catulus, and others, for 
eloquence, and saw there was no man of 
reputation for the wars but Pompeius, upon 
whom the state was forced to rely, he forsook 
his course began toward a civil and popu- 
lar greatness, and transferred his designs to 
a martial greatness. 

Fourthly, in the choice of their friends 
and dependences, to proceed according to 
the composition of their own nature ; as we 
may see in Caesar ; all whose friends and 
followers were men active and effectual, but 
not solemn, or of reputation. 

Fifthly, to take special heed how they guide 
themselves by examples, in thinking they can 
do as they see others do; whereas perhaps 
their natures and carriages are far differ- 
ing. In which error it seemeth Pompey 
was, of whom Cicero saith, that he was wont 
often to say, Sylla potuit, ego non potero f 
Wherein he was much abused ; the natures 
and proceedings of himself and his exam- 
ple being the unlikest in the world ; the one 
being fierce, violent, and pressing the fact j 
the other solemn, and full of majesty and cir- 
cumstance ; and therefore the less effectual. 



389 

But this precept touching the politic 
"knowledge of ourselves/ hath many other 
branches whereupon we cannot insist. 

Next to the well understanding and dis- How men 

should open 

cerning of a man's self, there followeth the and reveal 

# themselves, 

well opening and revealing a man's self; 
wherein we see nothing more usual than 
for the more able man to make the less 
shew. For there is a great advantage in 
the well setting forth of a man's virtues,, 
fortunes, merits ; and again, in the artificial 
covering of a man's weaknesses, defects, dis- 
graces ; staying upon the one, sliding from 
the other; cherishing the one by circum- 
stances, gracing the other by exposition, and 
the like ; wherein w T e see what Tacitus saith 
of Mutianus, who w 7 as the greatest politician 
of his time, Omnium quce dixerat feceratque 
arte quadam ostentator ; which requireth in- 
deed some art, lest it turn tedious and ar- 
rogant ; but yet so, as ostentation, though 
it be to the first degree of vanity, seemeth 
to me rather a vice in manners than in 
policy : for as it is said, Audacter calum- 
niarc, semper aliquid hceret ; so, except it be 
in a ridiculous degree of deformity, Audac* 



390 " 

ter te vendita, semper aliquid hasreU For it 
will stick with the more ignorant and in- 
ferior sort of men, though men of wisdom 
and rank do smile at it, and despise it; 
and yet the authority won with many doth 
countervail the disdain of a few. But if 
it be carried with decency and government, 
as with a natural, pleasant, and ingenuous 
fashion ; or at times when it is mixed with 
some peril and unsafety, as in military per- 
sons ; or at times when others are most 
envied ; or with easy and careless passage 
to it and from it, without dwelling too long* 
or being too serious; or with an equal 
freedom of taxing a man's self, as well as 
gracing himself; or by occasion of repelling 
or putting down others injury or insolence; 
it doth greatly add to reputation: and 
surely not a few solid natures that want 
this ventosity, and cannot sail in the height 
of the winds, are not without some prejudice 
and disadvantage by their moderation. 
•How Virtue But for these flourishes and enhancements 

is d is valued 

-and imbased. of virtue, as they are not perchance unne- 
cessary, so it is at least necessary that virtue 
be not disvalued and imbased under the just 



391 
price ; which is done in three manners : by 
offering and obtruding a man's self; wherein 
men think he is rewarded, when he is ac- 
cepted : by doing too much ; which will 
not give that which is well done leave to 
settle, and in the end induceth satiety : and 
by finding too soon the fruit of a man's 
virtue, in commendation, applause, honour, 
favour ; wherein if a man be pleased with 
a little, let him hear what is truly said; 
Cave ne insuetus rebus majoribus videaris, si 
hcec te res parva sicuti magna delectat. 

But the covering of defects is of no less How to co- 

ver Defects 

importance than the valuing of good parts : 
which may be done likewise in three man- 
ners, by caution, by colour, and by con- 
fidence. Caution is, when men do inge- 
niously and discreetly avoid to be put into 
those things for which they are not proper : 
whereas contrariwise, bold and unquiet spi- 
rits will thrust themselves into matters with- 
out difference, and so publish and proclaim 
all their wants: colour is, when men make 
a way for themselves, to have a construc- 
tion made of their faults or wants, as 
proceeding from a better cause, or intended 



392 



for some other purpose : for of the one it 
is well said, 

ScBpe latet vitium proximitate boni. 
and therefore whatsoever want a man hath, 
he must see that he pretend the virtue 
that shadoweth it; as if he be dull, he 
must affect gravity : if a coward, mildness ; 
and so the rest : for the second, a man must 
frame some probable cause why he should 
not do his best ; and why he should dissem- 
ble his abilities ; and for that purpose must 
use to dissemble those abilities which are 
notorious in him, to give colour that his 
true wants are but industries and dissi- 
mulations. For confidence, it is the last 
but surest remedy ; namely, to depress 
and seem to despise whatsoever a man 
cannot attain ; observing the good principle 
of the merchants, who endeavour to raise 
the price of their own commodities, and to 
beat down the price of others. But there 
is a confidence that passeth this other ; 
which is, to face out a man's own defects, 
in seeming to conceive that he is best in 
those things wherein he is failing ; and, 
to help that again, to seem on the other 



393 

side that he hath least opinion of himself 
in those things wherein he is best ; like 
as we shall see it commonly in poets, that 
if they shew their verses, and you except 
to any, they will say, " that that line cost 

them more labour than any of the rest ;" 
and presently will seem to disable and sus- 
pect rather some other line, which they know 
well enough to be the best in the number. 
But above all, in this righting and helping 
of a man's self in his own carriage, he 
must take heed he shew not himself dis- 
mantled, and exposed to scorn and injury, 
by too much sweetness, goodness, and faci- 
lity of nature ; but shew some sparkles of 
liberty, spirit, and edge : which kind of 
fortified carriage, with a ready rescuing of a 
man's self from scorns, is sometimes of ne- 
cessity imposed upon men by somewhat iri 
their person or fortune ; but it ever suc- 
ceedeth with good felicity. 

Another precept of this knowledge is, by of Pliancy 

r r & J and Versati. 

all possible endeavour to frame the mind lit; y« 
to be pliant and obedient to occasion ; for 
nothing hindereth men's fortunes so much 
as this ; Idem manebat, neque idem decebat ; 
men are where they were, when occasions 



394 



turn : and therefore to Cato, whom Livy 
maketh such an architect of fortune, he 
addeth, that he had versatile ingeniwn. And 
thereof it cometh that these grave solemn 
wits, which must be like themselves, and 
cannot make departures, have more dignity 
than felicity. But in some it is nature to 
be somewhat viscous and inwrapped, and 
not easy to turn : in some it is a conceit, 
that is almost a nature, which is, that men 
can hardly make themselves believe that 
they ought to change their course, when 
they have found good by it in former ex- 
perience. For Machiavel noteth wisely, how 
Fabius Maximus w r ould have been tempo- 
rizing still, according to his old bias, when 
the nature of the war was altered, and re- 
quired hot pursuit. In some other it is 
want of point and penetration in their judg- 
ment, that they do not discern when things 
have a period, but come in too late after 
the occasion ; as Demosthenes compareth 
the people of Athens to country fellows, 
when they play in a fence school that if 
they have a blow, then they remove the 
w r eapon to that ward, and not before. In 
some other it is a lothness to lose labours 



395 

passed, and a conceit that they can bring 
about occasions to their ply ; and yet in 
the end, when they see no other remedy, 
then they come to it with disadvantage : 
as Tarquinius, that gave for the third part 
of Sibylla's books the treble price, when he 
might at first have had all three for the 
simple. But from whatsoever root or cause 
this restiveness of mind proceedeth, it is a 
thing most prejudicial ; and nothing is more 
politic than to make the wheels of our mind 
concentric and voluble with the wheels of 
fortune. 

Another precept of this knowledge, which of the mode. 
hath some affinity with that we last spoke of, occasions. 
but with difference, is that which is well ex- 
pressed, fatis accede deisque; that men do not 
only turn with the occasions, but also run 
with the occasions, and not strain their cre- 
dit or strength to over-hard or extreme 
points; but choose in their actions that 
which is most passable : for this will preserve 
men from foil, not occupy them too much 
about one matter, win opinion of modera- 
tion, please the most, and make a shew of a 
perpetual felicity in all they undertake ; 



Of making 
and follow- 
ing occa- 
sions. 



S96 

which cannot but mightily increase reputa* 
tion. 

Another part of this knowledge seemeth to 
have some repugnancy with the former two, 
but not as I understand it; and it is that 
which Demosthenes uttereth in high terms; 
Et quemadmodum receptum est, ut exercitum 
ducat imperator, sic et a cordatis viris res ipsce 
ducendce; ut qua, ipsis videntur, ea gerantur, et 
nan ipsi eventus tantum persequi cogantur. For, 
if we observe, we shall find two differing 
kinds of sufficiency in managing of business : 
some can make use of occasions aptly and 
dextrously, but plot little ; some can urge 
and pursue their own plots well, but cannot 
accommodate nor take in; either of which is 
very imperfect without the other. 

Another part of this knowledge is the ob- 
and openness. servm g a good mediocrity in the declaring, 
or not declaring a man's self: for although 
depth of secrecy, and making way, qualis est 
via navis in mari, (which the French calleth 
gourdes menees, when men set things in work 
without opening themselves at all,) be some- 
times both prosperous and admirable, yet 



Of reserve 



397: 



many times Dissimuldtio errores parit, qui dis~ 
simulatorem ipsum illaqueant. And therefore> 
we see the greatest politicians have in a na- 
tural and free manner professed their desires, 
rather than been reserved and disguised in 
them : for so we see that Lucius Sylla made 
a kind of profession, " that he wished all 
men happy or unhappy, as they stood his 
<c friends or enemies." So Caesar, when he 
first went into Gaul, made no scruple to pro- 
fess, " that he had rather be first in a village, 
" than second at Rome," So again, as soon 
as he had begun the war, we see what Cicero 
saith of him, Alter (meaning of Caesar) non 
recusat, sed quodammodo postulat ut, ut est, sic 
appelletur tyrannies. So we may see in a letter 
of Cicero to Atticus, that Augustus Caesar., 
in his very entrance into affairs, when he 
was a darling of the senate, yet in his ha- 
rangues to the people would swear, — Ita pa- 
rends honores consequi liceat, which was no 
less than the tyranny ; save that, to help it, 
he would stretch forth his hand towards a 
statue of Caesar's, that was erected in the 
place : and men laughed, and wondered, and 
said, — Is it possible, or did you ever hear 



593 



the like ? and yet thought he meant no hurt ; 
he did it so handsomely and ingenuously. 
And all these were prosperous : whereas Pom- 
pey, who tended to the same end, but in a 
more dark and dissembling 1 manner, (as Ta- 
citus saith of him, Occultior, non melior, 
wherein Sallust concurreth, ore probo, ammo 
inverecundo,) made it his design, by infinite 
secret engines, to cast the state into an abso- 
lute anarchy and confusion that the state 
might cast itself into his arms for necessity 
and protection, and so the sovereign power 
be put upon him, and he never seen in it : 
and when he had brought it, as he thought, 
to that point when he was chosen consul 
alone, as never any was, yet he could make 
no great matter of it, because men under- 
stood him not ; but was fain in the end to go 
the beaten track of getting arms into his 
hands, by colour of the doubt of Csesar's de- 
signs: so tedious, casual, and unfortunate 
are these deep dissimulations; whereof, it 
seemeth, Tacitus made this judgment, that 
they were a cunning of an inferior form in 
regard of true policy ; attributing the one to 
Augustus, the other to Tiberius, where, 



399 

speaking of Li via, he saith, Et cum artibus 
mariti simulatione filii bene composita ; for 
surely the continual habit of dissimulation is 
but a weak and sluggish cunning, and not 
greatly politic. 

Another precept of this architecture of of the pro. 

A portion and 

fortune is to accustom our minds to iud^e of valueof 

& things to par- 

the proportion or value of things, as they ticuiar ends. 
eonduce and are material to our particular 
ends ; and that to do substantially and not 
superficially. For we shall find the logical 
part, as I may term it, of some men's minds 
good, but the mathematical part erroneous ; 
that is, they can well judge of consequences, 
but not of porportions and comparisons, 
preferring things of shew and sense before 
things of substance and effect. So some fall 
in love with access to princes, others with 
popular fame and applause, supposing they 
are things of great purchase ; when in many 
cases they are but matters of envy, peril, and 
impediment. 

So some measure things according to the 
labor and difficulty, or assiduity, which are 
spent about them ; and think if they be ever 
moving, that they must needs advance and 






400 

proceed : as Caesar saith in a despising man* 
ner of Cato the second, when he describeth 
how laborious and indefatigable he was to no 
great purpose ; Htfc omnia magno studio age* 
bat. So in most things men are ready to 
abuse themselves in thinking the greatest 
means to be best, when it should be the 
fittest. 
of marshal- As for the true marshalling of men's pur- 
pursuits. suits towards their fortune, as they are more 
or less material, I hold them to stand 
thus : first, the amendment of their own 
minds ; for the remove of the impediments 
of the mind will sooner clear the pas- 
sages of fortune, than the obtaining for- 
tune will remove the impediments of the 
mind, In the second place I set down wealth 
and means; which I know most men would 
have placed first, because of the general use 
which it beareth towards all variety of occa- 
sions : but that opinion I may condemn with 
like reason as Machiavel doth that other, that 
moneys were the sinews of the wars; where- 
as, saith he, the true sinews of the wars are 
the sinews of men's arms, that is, a valiant* 
populous, and military nation : and he vouch., 



401 



eth aptly the authority of Solon who, when 
Croesus shewed him his treasury of gold, said 
to him, that if another came that had better 
iron, he would be master of his gold. In 
like manner it may be truly affirmed that it 
is not moneys that are the sinews of fortune, 
but it is the sinews and steel of men's minds, 
wit, courage, audacity, resolution, temper, 
industry, and the like. In the third place I 
set down reputation, because of the peremp- 
tory tides and currents it hath; which, if 
they be not taken in their due time, are sel- 
dom recovered, it being extreme hard to 
play an after-game of reputation. And lastly 
I place honour, which is more easily won 
by any of the other three, much more by 
all, than any of them can be purchased by 
honour. 

To conclude this precept, as there is order 
and priority in matter, so is there in time, 
the preposterous placing whereof is one of 
the commonest errors ; while men fly to their 
ends when they should intend their begin- 
nings, and do not take things in order of 
time as they come on, but marshal them ac- 
cording to greatness, and not according to 
p p 



402 

instance ; not observing the good preeept, 
Quod nunc instat agamus. 

Another precept of this knowledge is not 
to embrace any matters which do occupy 
too great a quantity of time, but to have 
that sounding in a man's ears, Sedfugit in- 
terea,fugit irreparabile tempus: and that is the 
cause why those which take their course of 
rising by professions of burden, as lawyers, 
orators, painful divines, and the like, are 
not commonly so politic for their own for- 
tune, otherwise than in their ordinary way, 
because they want time to learn particulars, 
to wait occasions, and to devise plots. 
To interlace Another precept of this knowledge is to 
no? mind To imitate nature, which doth nothing in vain ; 
^ons seve- ^y c |i sure ly a man may do if he do well in- 
terlace his business, and bend not his mind 
too much upon that which he principally in- 
tendeth. For a man ought in every particu- 
lar action so to carry the motions of his mind, 
and so to have one thing under another, as if 
he cannot have that he seeketh in the best de- 
gree, yet to have it in a second, or so in a 
third : and if he can have no part of that 
which he purposed, yet to turn the use of 



403 

it to somewhat else ; and if he cannot make 
any thing of it for the present, yet to make 
it as a seed of somewhat in time to come ; 
and if he can contrive no effect or substance 
from it, yet to win some good opinion by it, 
or the like. So that he should exact an ac- 
count of himself of every action, to reap 
somewhat, and not to stand amazed and con- 
fused, if he fail of that he chiefly meant : 
for nothing is more impolitic than to mind 
actions wholly one by one ; for he that doth 
so loseth infinite occasions which intervene, 
and are many times more proper and propi- 
tious for somewhat that he shall need after- 
wards than for that which he urgeth for the 
present; and therefore men must be perfect 
in that rule, Hcec oportet facere, et ilia non 
omittere. 

Another precept of this knowledge is not To keep a re- 
to engage a man's self peremptorily in any 
thing, though it seem not liable to accident, 
but ever to have a window to fly out at, or a 
way to retire; following the wisdom in the 
ancient fable of the two frogs, which consult- 
ed when their plash was dry whither they 
should go ; and the one moved to go down 
pd2 



404 

into a pit, because it was not likely the water 
would dry there ; but the other answered, 
" True, but if it do, how shall we get out 
li again?" 
To be cauti- Another precept of this knowledge is that 
derate in " ancient precept of Bias, construed not to any 

friendship. . n „ , . . . 

point oi pertidiousness, but only to caution 
and moderation, Et ama tanquam inimicus 
futurus, et odi tanquam amaturus: for it utter- 
ly betrayeth all utility for men to embark 
themselves too far in unfortunate friendships, 
troublesome spleens, and childish and hu- 
morous envies or emulations. 
importance But I continue this beyond the measure of 

of these pre- 
cepts, an example ; led, because I would not have 

such knowledges, which I note as deficient, 
to be thought things imaginative, or in the 
air, or an observation or two much made of, 
but things of bulk and mass, whereof an end 
is hardlier made than a beginning. It must 
be likewise conceived that in those points 
which I mention and set down, they are far 
from complete tractates of them, but only as 
small pieces for patterns: and lastly, no 
man, I suppose, will think that I mean for- 
tunes are not obtained without all this ado ; 



405 

for I know they come tumbling into some 
men's laps ; and a number obtain good for- 
tunes by diligence in a plain way, little in- 
termeddling, and keeping themselves from 
gross errors. 

But as Cicero, when he setteth down an 
idea of a perfect orator, doth not mean that 
every pleader should be such ; and so like- 
wise, when a prince or a courtier hath been 
described by such as have handled those sub- 
jects, the mould hath used to be made ac- 
cording to the perfection of the art and not 
according to common practice; so I under- 
stand it, that it ought to be done in the de- 
scription of a politic man, I mean politic for 
his own fortune. 

But it must be remembered all this while, of dishonest 
that the precepts which we have set down are Arts ' 
of that kind which may be counted and called 
bonce artes. As for evil arts, if a man would 
set down for himself that principle of Ma- 
chiavel ; " that a man seek not to attain vir- 
" tue itself, but the appearance only thereof; 
" because the credit of virtue is a help, but 
<* the use of it is cumber :" or that other of 
his principles; " that he presuppose that 



406 



i€ men are not filly to be wrought otherwise 
iC but by fear ; and therefore that he seek to 
ff have every man obnoxious, low, and in 
" strait," which the Italians call seminar 
spine, to sow thorns : or that other principle, 
contained in the verse which Cicero citeth, 
Cadant amici, dummodo inimici iutercidant, 
as the Triumvirs, which sold, every one to 
other, the lives of their friends for the deaths 
of their enemies : or that other protestation 
of L. Catilina, to set on fire and trouble 
states, to the end to fish in droumy waters, 
and to unwrap their fortunes, Ego, si quid in 
fortunis meis excitatum sit incendium, id non 
aqua, sed ruind restinguam: or that other 
principle of Lysander, ci that children are 
" to be deceived with comfits, and men with 
(C oaths :" and the like evil and corrupt posi- 
tions, whereof, as in all things, there are 
more in number than of the good : certainly, 
with these dispensations from the laws of 
charity and integrity, the pressing of a man's 
fortune may be more hasty and compendi- 
ous. But it is in life as it is in ways, the 
shortest way is commonly the foulest, and 
surely the fairer way is not much about. 



407 
But men, if they be in their own power, To observe 
and do bear and sustain themselves, and be general' plan, 

. -, . . , . ! but particular 

not carried away with a whirlwind or tern- directions. 
pest of ambition, ought, in the pursuit of 
their own fortune, to set before their eyes 
not only that general map of the world, that 
all things are 'vanity and vexation of spirit, but 
many other more particular cards and direc- 
tions : chiefly that, — -that being, without 
well-being, is a curse, — and the greater be- 
ing the greater curse ; and that all virtue is 
most rewarded, and all wickedness most 
punished in itself: according as the poet 
saith excellently : 

Quce vobis, quce digna, viri, pro laudibus istis 
Pmmia posse rear solvi f pulcherrima pri* 

mum 
Di moresque dabunt vestri. 
And so of the contrary. And, secondly, To look up 

, iii i i • to Provi- 

they ought to look up to the eternal provi- dence. 
dence and divine judgment, which often sub- 
verteth the wisdom of evil plots and imagi- 
nations, according to that Scripture, He hath 
conceived mischief, and shall bring forth a vain 
thing. And although men should refrain 
themselves from injury and evil arts, yet this 



408 

incessant and Sabbathless pursuit of a man J s 
fortune leaveth not that tribute which we owe 
to God of our time ; who we see, demandeth 
a tenth of our substance, and a seventh, 
which is more strict, of our time : and it is 
to small purpose to have an erected face to- 
wards heaven, and a perpetual groveling 
spirit upon earth, eating dust, as doth the 
serpent, Atque affigit humo divince particulam 
aura. And if any man flatter himself that 
he will employ his fortune well, though he 
should obtain it ill, as was said concerning 
Augustus Ceesar, and after of Septimius Seve- 
rus, " that either they should never have 
" been born, or else they should never have 
" died," they did so much mischief in the 
pursuit and ascent of their greatness, and 
so much good when they were established; 
yet these compensations and satisfactions 
are good to be used, but never good to be 
purposed. 
Kot to court And lastly, it is not amiss for men, in 

Fortune too J 

assiduously, their race towards their fortune, to cool 
themselves a little with that conceit which is 
elegantly expressed by the emperor Charles 
the fifth, in his instructions to the king his 



409 

son, i€ that fortune hath somewhat of th€ 
u nature of a woman, that if she be too 
<e much wooed, she is the farther off*" But 
this last is but a remedy for those whose 
tastes are corrupted : let men rather build 
upon that foundation which is as a corner- 
stone of divinity and philosophy, wherein 
they join close, namely, that same Primum 
qucerite. For divinity saith, Primum qu&rite 
regnum Dei, et ista omnia adjicientur vobis : 
and philosophy saith, Primum qucerite bona 
animi, ccetera aut aderunt, aut non oberunt. 
And although the human foundation hath 
somewhat of the sands, as we see in M. 
Brutus, when he brake forth in that speech, 

Te colui, virtus, ut rem ; ast tu nomen 
inane es : 
yet the divine foundation is upon the rock. 
But this may serve for a taste of that know- 
ledge which I noted as deficient. 

Concerning Government, it is a part of of Govern- 

° . merit. 

knowledge secret and retired, in both these 
respects in which things are deemed secret ; 
for some things are secret because they are 
hard to know, and some because they are 



410 

not fit to utter : we see all governments are 
obscure and invisible : 

Totamque infusa per artus 

Mens agitat molem,et magno se corpore miscet. 

such is the description of governments. We 
see the government of God over the world is 
hidden, insomuch as it seemeth to parti- 
cipate of much irregularity and confusion : 
the government of the soul in moving the 
body is inward and profound, and the pas- 
sages thereof hardly to be reduced to demon- 
stration. Again, the wisdom of antiquity, 
(the shadows whereof are in the poets,) in 
the description of torments and pains, next 
unto the crime of rebellion, which was tire 
giants' offence, doth detest the offence of fa- 
cility, as in Sisyphus and Tantalus. But 
this was meant of particulars : nevertheless 
even unto the general rules and discourses 
of policy and government there is due a 
reverent and reserved handling. 
How Gover- But contrariwise, in the governors towards 
demeaJTtiJem- the governed, all things ought, as far as the 
wards the frailty of man permitteth, to be manifest 
and revealed, For so it is expressed in the 



411 



Scriptures touching the government of God, 
that this globe, which seemeth to us a dark 
and shady body, is in the view of God as 
crystal, Et in conspectu sedis tanquam mare 
vitreum simile crystallo. So unto princes and 
states, specially towards wise senates and 
councils, the natures and dispositions of the 
people, their conditions and necessities, their 
factions and combinations, their animosities 
and discontents, ought to be, in regard of 
the variety of their intelligences, the wis- 
dom of their observations, and the height 
of the station where they keep centinel, in 
great part clear and transparent. Where- 
fore, considering that I write to a king that 
is a master of this science, and is so well 
assisted, I think it decent to pass over this 
part in silence, as willing to obtain the cer- 
tificate which one of the ancient philoso- 
phers aspired unto ; who being silent, when 
others contended to make demonstration of 
their abilities by speech, desired it might 
be certified for his part, " that there was 
<c one that knew how to hold his peace." 

Notwithstanding, for the more public part of Laws. 
of government, which is laws, I think good 
to note only one deficiency ; which is that 



412 



all those which have written of laws, hav£ 
written either as philosophers or as lawyers* 
and none as statesmen* As for the philoso- 
phers, they make imaginary laws for imagi- 
nary commonwealths, and their discourses 
are as the stars, which give little light, because 
they are so high. For the lawyers, they 
write according to the states where they 
live, what is received law, and not what 
ought to be law : for the wisdom of a law- 
maker is one, and of a lawyer is another* 
For there are in nature certain fountains 
of justice, whence all civil laws are derived 
but as streams : and like as waters do take 
tinctures and tastes from the soils through 
which they run, so do civil laws vary ac- 
cording to the regions and governments 
where they are planted, though they proceed 
from the same fountains. Again, the wis- 
dom of a lawmaker consisteth not only in 
a platform of justice, but in the applica- 
tion thereof ; taking into consideration by 
what means laws may be made certain, and 
what are the causes and remedies of the 
doubtfulness and incertainty of law ; by 
what means laws may be made apt and 
easy to be executed, and what are the im- 



413 



pediments and remedies in the execution 
of laws ; what influence laws touching pri- 
vate right of meum and tuum have into the 
public state, and how they may be made apt 
and agreeable ; how laws are to be penned 
and delivered, whether in texts or in acts, brief 
or large, with preambles, or without ; how 
they are to be pruned and reformed from 
time to time, and what is the best means to 
keep them from being too vast in volumes, or 
too full of multiplicity and crossness ; how 
they are to be expounded, when upon causes 
emergent and judicially discussed, and when 
upon responses and conferences touching ge- 
neral points or questions ; how they are to be 
pressed rigorously or tenderly ; how they 
are to be mitigated by equity and good 
conscience, and whether discretion and strict 
law are to be mingled in the same courts, 
or kept apart in several courts; again, how 
the practice, profession, and erudition of 
law is to be censured and governed ; and 
many other points touching the administra- 
tion, and, as I may term it, animation of 
laws. Upon which I insist the less, because 
I purpose, if God give me leave, (having 



414 

begun a g mt work of this nature in apho- 
risms,) to propound it hereafter, noting it 
in the mean time for deficient. 
of the Laws And for your majesty's laws of England, I 

of England. J J J & 

could say much of their dignity, and some- 
what of their defect ; but they cannot but 
excel the civil laws in fitness for the govern- 
ment : for the civil law was Non hos qucesitum 
munus in usus ; it was not made for the coun- 
tries which it governeth : hereof I cease to 
speak, because I will not intermingle matter 
of action with matter of general learning. 

General con. Thus I have concluded this portion of 

elusion, 

learning touching civil knowledge; and with 
civil kn6wledge have concluded human phi- 
losophy • and with human philosophy, phi- 
losophy in general. And being now at 
some pause, looking back into that I have 
passed through, this writing seemeth to 
me, (si nunquam fallit imago) as far as 
a man can judge of his own work, not 
much better than that noise or sound 
which musicians make while they are in 
tuning their instruments; which is nothing 
pleasant to hear, but yet is a cause why 



415 

the music is sweeter afterwards : so have I 
been content to tune the instruments of the 
muses, that they may play that have better 
hands. 

And surely, when I set before me the Advantages 

^ of model a 

condition of these times, in which learning times. 
hath made her third visitation or circuit in 
all the qualities thereof— as the excellency 
and vivacity of the wits of this age ; the 
noble helps and lights which we have by 
the travels of ancient writers ; the art of 
printing, which communicateth books to 
men of all fortunes ; the openness of the 
world by navigation, which hath disclosed 
multitudes of experiments, and a mass of 
natural history ; the leisure wherewith these 
times abound, not employing men so gene- 
rally in civil business, as the states of Grsecia 
did, in respect of their popularity, and the 
state of Rome in respect of the greatness 
of their monarchy ; the present disposition 
of these times at this instant to peace ; the 
consumption of all that ever can be said 
in controversies of religion, which have so 
much diverted men from other sciences ; the 
perfection of your majesty's learning, which 



416 



as a phoenix may call whole vollies of wits 
to follow you ; and the inseparable pro- 
priety of time, which is ever more and more 
to disclose truth — I cannot but be raised to 
this persuasion, that this third period of time 
will far- surpass that of the Graecian and 
Roman learning : only if men will know 
their own strength, and their own weak- 
ness both ; and take one from the other 
light of invention, and not fire of contra- 
diction ; and esteem of the inquisition of 
truth as of an enterprise, and not as of a 
quality or ornament ; and employ wit and 
magnificence to things of worth and excel- 
lency, and not to things vulgar and of po- 
pular estimation. 

As for my labours, if any man shall please 
himself or others in the reprehension of them, 
they shall make that ancient and patient 
request, Verbera, sed audi; Let men repre- 
hend them, so they observe and weigh them : 
for the appeal is lawful, though it may be it 
shall not be needful, from the first cogitations 
of men to their second, and from the nearer 
times to the times farther off. Now let 
us come to that learning, which both the 



417 



former times were not so blessed as to 
know, sacred and inspired Divinity, the 
sabbath and port of all men's labours and 
peregrinations. 



DIVINITY. 

The prerogative of God extendeth as well 
to the reason as to the will of man ; so 
that as we are to obey his law, though 
we find a reluctation in our will, so we 
are to believe his word, though we find a 
reluctation in our reason. For if we be- 
lieve only that which is agreeable to our 
sense, we give consent to the matter, and 
not to the author; which is no more than 
w r e would do towards a suspected and dis- 
credited witness : but that faith which was 
accounted to Abraham for righteousness was 
of such a point as whereat Sarah laughed, 
who therein was an image of natural reason. 

How r beit, if we will truly consider it, more 
w r orthy it is to believe than to know as we 
now know. For in knowledge man's mind 
sufFereth from sense ; but in belief it suf- 

E E 



418 

fereth from spirit, such one as it holdeth 
for more authorised than itself; and so suf- 
fereth from the worthier agent. Otherwise 
it is of the state of man glorified ; for then 
faith shall cease, and xve shall know as ice 
are knoivn. 
what sacred Wherefore we conclude that sacred tlieo- 

-Tbeology 

strictly is. logy, (which in our idiom we call divinity,) 
is grounded only upon the word and oracle 
of God, and not upon the light of nature : 
for it is written, Cceli enarrant gloriam 
Dei; but it is not written, Cceli enarrant 
voluntatem Dei: but of that it is said, Ad 
legem et testimonium, si non fecerint secundum 
verbum istud, etc. This holdeth not only in 
those points of faith which concern the great 
mysteries of the Deity, of the creation, of 
the redemption, but likewise those which 
concern the law y moral truly interpreted ; 
Love your enemies : do good to them that 
hate you : be like to your heavenly Father, 
that svffereth his rain to fall upon the just and 
unjust. To this it ought to be applauded; 
Nee vox hominem sonat, it is a voice beyond 
the light of nature. So we see the heathen 
poets, when they fall upon a libertine pas- 



419 



8ion, do still expostulate with laws and mo- 
ralities, as if they were opposite and ma* 
lignant to nature ; Et quod natura remittit, 
Invida jura negant. So said Dendamis the 
Indian unto Alexander's messengers ; " That 
u he had heard somewhat of Pythagoras, 
u and some other of the wise men of Grae- 
" cia, and that he held them for excellent 
ff men : but that they had a fault, which 
" was, that they had in too great reve- 
" rence and veneration a thing called law 
" and manners." So it must be confessed that 
a great part of the law moral is of that 
perfection, whereunto the light of nature 
cannot aspire : how then is it that man is 
said to have, by the light and law of nature, 
some notions and conceits of virtue and vice, 
justice and wrong, good and evil ? Thus, 
because the light of nature is used in two 
several senses ; the one, that which springeth 
from reason, sense, induction, argument, ac- 
cording to the laws of heaven and earth ; 
the other, that which is imprinted upon the 
spirit of man by an inward instinct, according 
to the law of conscience, which is a sparkle 
of the purity of his first estate : in which 
e e 2 



420 

latter sense only he is participant of some 
light and discerning touching the perfec- 
tion of the moral law : but how ? sufficient 
to check the vice, but not to inform the 
duty. So then the doctrine of religion, as 
well moral as mystical, is not to be attained 
but by inspiration and revelation of God. 
The use of The use, notwithstanding, of reason in 

Reason in 

Religion. spiritual things, and the latitude thereof, is 
very great and general : for it is not for 
nothing that the apostle calleth religion our 
reasonable service of God ; insomuch as the 
very ceremonies and figures of the old law 
were full of reason and signification, much 
more than the ceremonies of idolatry and 
magic, that are full of non-significants and 
surd characters. But most especially the 
Christian Faith, as in all things so in this, de- 
serveth to be highly magnified, holding and 
preserving mediocrity in this point between 
the law of the heathen and the law of Maho- 
met, which have embraced the two extremes. 
For the religion of the heathen had no constant 
belief or confession, but left all to the liberty 
of argument ; and the religion of Mahomet, 
on the other side, interdicteth argument al- 



421 



together : the one having the very face of 
error, and the other of imposture ; whereas 
the faith doth both admit and reject dis- 
putation with difference. 

The use of human reason in religion is 
of two sorts : the former, in the concep- 
tion and apprehension of the mysteries of 
God to us revealed ; the other, in the in- 
ferring and deriving of doctrine and direc- 
tion thereupon. The former extendeth to 
the mysteries themselves ; but how ? by way 
of illustration, and not by way of argument : 
the latter consisteth indeed of probation 
and argument. In the former, we see, God 
vouchsafed! to descend to our capacity, in 
the expressing of his mysteries in such sort 
as may be sensible unto us ; and doth graft 
his revelations and holy doctrine upon the 
notions of our reason, and applieth his inspi- 
rations to open our understanding, as the 
form of the key to the ward of the lock : 
for the latter, there is allowed us an use 
of reason and argument, secondary and re- 
spective, although not original and absolute. 
For after the articles and principles of reli- 
gion are placed and exempted from exami*- 



422 



nation of reason, it is then permitted unto 
us to make derivations and inferences from, 
and according to the analogy of them, for 
our better direction* In nature this holdeth 
not; for both the principles are examinable 
by induction, though not by a medium or 
syllogism ; and besides, those principles or 
first positions have no discordance with that 
reason which draweth down and deduceth 
the inferior positions. But yet it holdeth 
not in religion alone, but in many know- 
ledges, both of greater and smaller nature, 
namely, wherein there are not only posita 
but placita ; for in such there can be no 
use of absolute reason : we see it familiarly 
in games of wit, as chess, or the like : the 
draughts and first laws of the game are posi- 
tive, but how ? merely ad placitum, and not 
examinable by reason ; but then how to 
direct our play thereupon with best advan- 
tage to win the game, is artificial and rational. 
So in human laws, there A may -be grounds 
and maxims which are placita juris, posi- 
tive upon authority, and not upon reason, 
and therefore not to be disputed: but what 
is most just, not absolutely but relatively, 



423 



and according to those maxima that afford- 
<eth a long field of disputation. Such there- 
fore is that secondary reason/ which hath 
place in divinity, which is grounded upon 
-the placets of God. 

Here therefore I note this deficiency, that 
there hath not been, to my understanding, 
sufficiently enquired and handled the true 
limits and use of reason in spiritual things, 
as a kind of divine dialectic : which for 
that it is not done, it seemeth to me a thing 
.usual, by pretext of true conceiving that 
which is revealed, to search and mine into 
that which is not revealed; and by pretext 
of enucleating inferences and contradicto- 
ries, to examine that which is positive : the 
one sort falling into the error of Nicode- 
mus, demanding to have things made more 
sensible than it pleaseth God to reveal them, 
Quoinodo possit homo nasci, cum sit senex<? 
the other into the error of the disciples, 
which were scandalized at a shew of con- 
tradiction, Quid est hoc, quod dicit nobis ? 
Modicum et non videbitis me, et iterum mor 
dicum, et videbitis me, etc. 

Upon this I have insisted the more, in 



424 

regard of the great and blessed use thereof; 
for this point, well laboured and defined of, 
would in my judgment be an opiate to stay 
and bridle not only the vanity of curious 
speculations, w T herewith the schools labor, 
but the fury of controversies, wherewith the 
church laboureth. For it cannot but open 
men's eyes, to see that many controversies 
do merely pertain to that which is either 
not revealed, or positive ; and that many 
others do grow upon weak and obscure in- 
ferences or derivations : which latter sort, 
if men would revive the blessed stile of that 
great doctor of the Gentiles, would be car- 
ried thus ; Ego, non Dominus ; and again, 
Secundum consilium meum ; in opinions and 
counsels, and not in positions and opposi- 
tions. But men are now over-ready to usurp 
the stile, Non ego, sed Dominus; and not so 
only, but to bind it with the thunder and 
denunciation of curses and anathemas, to 
the terror of those which have not suffi- 
ciently learned out of Solomon, that the 
causeless curse shall not come. 
Two princi- Divinity hath two principal parts ; the 
Divinity. matter informed or revealed, and the nature of 



425 

the information or revelation: and with the 
latter we will begin, because it hath most 
coherence with that which we have now 
last handled. 

The nature of the information consisteth The Nature 
of three branches ; the limits of the infor- Tation? 
mation, the sufficiency of the information, 
and the acquiring or obtaining' the informa- 
tion. Unto the Limits of the information 
belong these considerations ; how far forth 
particular persons continue to be inspired ; 
how far forth the church is inspired; and 
how far forth reason may be used : the 
last point whereof I have noted as deficient. 
Unto the Sufficiency of the information be- 
long two considerations ; what points of re- 
ligion are fundamental, and what perfective, 
being matter of farther building and perfec- 
tion upon one and the same foundation ; and 
again, how the gradations of light, accord- 
ing to the dispensation of times, are mate- 
rial to the sufficiency of belief. 

Here again I may rather give it in advice 
than note it as deficient, that the points fun* 
damental, and the points of farther perfec- 
tion only, ought to be with piety and wisdom 



426 



distinguished ; a subject tending to much 
like end as that I noted before ; for as that 
other were likely to abate the number of 
controversies, so this is like to abate the 
heat of many of them. We see Moses when 
he saw the Israelite and the ^Egyptian fight, 
he did not say, Why strive you ? but drew 
his sword and slew the ^Egyptian : but when 
he saw the two Israelites fight, he said, You 
are brethren, why strive you ? If the point 
of doctrine be an Egyptian, it must be 
slain by the sword of the Spirit, and not 
reconciled : but if it be an Israelite, though 
in the wrong, then, Why strive you ? We 
see of the fundamental points, our Saviour 
penneth the league thus, He that is not with 
us, is against us; but of points not funda- 
mental, thus ; He that is not against us, is 
with us. So we see the coat of our Saviour 
was in tire without seam, and so is the doc- 
trine of the Scriptures in itself; but the 
garment of the church was of divers colours, 
and yet not divided : we see the chaff may 
and ought to be severed from the corn in 
the ear, but the tares may not be pulled 
yp from the corn in the field. So as it 



427 

is a thing of great use well to define what, 
and of what latitude those points are, which 
do make men merely aliens and disincor- 
porate from the church of God. 

For the obtaining of the information, it Two kinds 

* J J of Interpret 

resteth upon the true and sound interpre- tat ion of 

1 Scripture ; 

tation of the Scriptures, which are the foun- 
tains of the water of life. The interpreta- 
tions of the Scriptures are of two sorts ; 
methodical, and solute or at large. For this 
divine water, which excelleth so much that 
of Jacob's well, is drawn forth much in the 
same kind as natural water useth to be out 
of wells and fountains ; either it is first 
forced up into a cistern, and from thence 
fetched and derived for use ; or else it is 
drawn and received in buckets and vessels 
immediately where it springeth : the for- 
mer sort whereof, though it seem to be the 
more ready, yet in my judgment is more 
subject to corrupt. This is that method 
which hath exhibited unto us the scholas- 
tical divinity ; whereby divinity hath been 
reduced into an art, as into a cistern, and the 
streams of doctrine or positions fetched and 
derived from thence. 



423 

The methodi- In this men sought three things, a sum- 
mary brevity, a compacted strength, and 
a complete perfection ; whereof the two 
first they fail to find, and the last they 
ought not to seek. For as to brevity, we 
see, in all summary methods, while men 
purpose to abridge, they give cause to dilate. 
For the sum or abridgment by contraction 
becometh obscure ; the obscurity requireth 
exposition, and the exposition is deduced 
into large commentaries, or into common 
places and titles, which grow to be more 
vast than the original writings, whence the 
sum was at first extracted. So, we see, the 
volumes of the schoolmen are greater much 
than the first writings of the fathers, whence 
the master of the sentences made his sum or 
collection. So, in like manner, the volumes 
of the modern doctors of the civil law exceed 
those of the ancient jurisconsults, of which 
Tribonian compiled the digest. So as this 
course of sums and commentaries is that 
which doth infallibly make the body of 
sciences more immense in quantity and 
more base in substance. 

And for strength, it is true that know* 



429 



ledges reduced into exact methods have a 
shew of strength, in that each part seemeth 
to support and sustain the other ; but this 
is more satisfactory than substantial : like 
unto buildings which stand by architecture 
and compaction, which are more subject to 
ruin than those that are built more strong 
in their several parts, though less compacted. 
But it is plain that the more you recede 
from your grounds, the weaker do you con- 
clude : and as in nature, the more you re- 
move yourself from particulars, the greater 
peril of error you do incur ; so much more 
in divinity, the more you recede from the 
Scriptures by inferences and consequences, 
the more weak and dilute are your positions. 
And as for perfection or completeness in 
divinity, it is not to be sought ; which makes 
this course of artificial divinity the more 
suspect. For he that will reduce a know- 
ledge into an art, will make it round and 
uniform : but in divinity many things must 
be left abrupt, and concluded with this ; 
altitudo sapientice et scientice Dei ! qudm 
incomprehensibilia sunt judicia ejus, et non in- 
vestigabiles vies ejus! So again the apostle 



430 

saith Ex parte scimus: and to have the form 
of a total, where there is but matter for a 
part, cannot be without supplies by suppo- 
sition and presumption. And therefore I 
conclude that the true use of these sums 
and methods hath place in institutions or 
introductions preparatory unto knowledge ; 
but in them, or by deducement from them, 
to handle the main body and substance of 
a knowledge, is in all sciences prejudicial, 
and in divinity dangerous. 
The solute. As to the interpretation of the Scriptures 
solute and at large, there have been divers 
kinds introduced and devised ; some of them 
rather curious and unsafe than sober and 
warranted. Notwithstanding, thus much 
must be confessed, that the Scriptures be- 
ing given by inspiration, and not by human 
reason, do differ from all other books in 
the author ; which by consequence doth 
draw on some difference to be used by the 
expositor. For the inditer of them did know 
four things which no man attains to know ; 
which are the mysteries of the kingdom of 
glory, the perfection of the laws of nature, 
the secrets of the heart of man, and the 



431 



future succession of all ages. For as to the 
first, it is said, He that presseth into the 
light . shall be oppressed of the glory. And 
again, No man shall see my face and live. 
To the second, When he prepared the heavens, 
I was present, when by law and compass he 
inclosed the deep. To the third, Neither was 
it needful that any should bear witness to him 
of man, for he knew well what was in man. 
And to the last, Vrom the beginning are known 
to the Lord all his ivorks. 

From the former of these two have been 
drawn certain senses and expositions of 
Scriptures, which had need be contained 
within the bounds of sobriety ; the one ana- 
gogical, and the other philosophical. But as to 
the former, man is not to prevent his time ; 
Videmus nunc per speculum in mnigmate, tunc 
autem facie ad faciem ; wherein, nevertheless, 
there seemeth to be a liberty granted, as far 
forth as the polishing of this glass, or some 
moderate explication of this enigma. But 
to press too far into it, cannot but cause 
a dissolution and overthrow of the spirit of 
man : for in the body there are three de- 
grees of that we receive into it, aliment, 



432 



medicine, and poison ; whereof aliment is 
that which the nature of man can perfectly 
alter and overcome ; medicine is that ^hi cn 
is partly converted by nature, and partly 
converteth nature ; and poison is that which 
worketh wholly upon nature, without that, 
that nature can in any part work upon it : 
so in the mind, whatsoever knowledge rea- 
son cannot at all work upon and convert, 
is a mere intoxication, and endangereth a 
dissolution of the mind and understanding. 

But for the latter, it hath been extremely 
set on foot of late time by the school of Pa- 
racelsus, and some others, that have pre- 
tended to find the truth of all natural phi- 
losophy in the Scriptures ; scandalizing and 
traducing all other philosophy as heathenish 
and profane. But there is no such enmity 
between God's word and his works ; neither 
do they give honour to the Scriptures, as 
they suppose, but much imbase them. For 
to seek heaven and earth in the word of 
God, (whereof it is said, heaven and earth 
shall pass but my ivord shall not pass,) is to 
seek temporary things amongst eternal ; and 
as to seek divinity in philosophy is to seek 



433 



the living amongst the dead, so to seek phi- 
losophy in divinity is to seek the dead 
amongst the living : neither are the pots 
or lavers, whose place is in the outward 
part of the temple, to be sought in the 
holiest place of all, where the ark of the 
testimony was seated. And again, the scope 
or purpose of the Spirit of God is not to ex- 
press matters of nature in the Scriptures, 
otherwise than in passage, and for appli- 
cation to man's capacity, and to matters 
moral or divine. And it is a true rule, 
Auctoris aliud agentis parva auctoritas : for it 
were a strange conclusion, if a man should 
use a similitude for ornament or illustration 
sake, borrowed from nature or history ac- 
cording to vulgar conceit, as of a basilisk, 
an unicorn, a centaur, a Briareus, an Hydra, 
or the like, that therefore he must needs be 
thought to affirm the matter thereof posi- 
tively to be true. To conclude therefore, 
these two interpretations, the one by re- 
duction or enigmatical, the other philoso- 
phical or physical, which have been received 
and pursued in imitation of the rabbins and 

FF 



434 

cabalists, are to be confined with a noli 
ahum sapere, seel time. 
True ground But the two latter points, known to God. 

of difference 

in interpret- and unknown to man, touching- the secrets 

mg Scripture 

and profane f the heart, and the successions of time, do 

books. v 

make a just and sound difference between 
the manner of the exposition of the Scrip- 
tures and all other books. For it is an ex- 
cellent observation which hath been made 
upon the answers of our Saviour Christ to 
many of the questions which were pro- 
pounded to him, how that they are imper- 
tinent to the state of the question demanded : 
ed : the reason whereof is because, not being 
like man, which knows man's thoughts by 
his words, but knowing man's thoughts im- 
mediately, he never answered their words, 
but their thoughts : much in the like man- 
ner it is with the Scriptures, which being 
written to the thoughts of men, and to the 
succession of all ages, with a foresight of all 
heresies, contradictions, differing estates of 
the church, yea and particularly of the elect, 
are not to be interpreted only according to 
the latitude of the proper sense of the place, 



435 



and respectively towards that present occa- 
sion, whereupon the words were uttered, or 
in precise congruity or contexture with the 
w r ords before or after, or in contemplation 
of the principal scope of the place ; but 
have in themselves, not only totally or col- 
lectively, but distributively in clauses and 
words, infinite springs and streams of doc- 
trine to water the church in every part. 
And therefore as the literal sense is, as it 
were, the main stream or river, so the moral 
sense chiefly, and sometimes the allegorical 
or typical are they whereof the church hath 
most use : not that I wish men to be bold 
in allegories, or indulgent or light in allu- 
sions ; but that I do much condemn that in- 
terpretation of the Scripture which is only 
after the manner as men use to interpret a 
profane book. 

In this part, touching the exposition of the 
Scriptures I can report no deficience ; but by 
way of remembrance, this I will add, in 
perusing books of divinity ; I find many 
books of controversies, and many of common 
places and treatises, a mass of positive divi- 
nity, as it is made an art, a number of ser- 

F F 2 



436 



mons and lectures, and many prolix com- 
mentaries upon the Scriptures, with harmo- 
nies and concordances : but that form of 
writing in divinity, which in my judgment 
is of all others most rich and precious, is po- 
sitive divinity, collected upon particular texts 
of Scriptures in brief observations ; not di- 
lated into common places, not chasing after 
controversies, not reduced into method of 
art ; a thing abounding in sermons, which 
will vanish, but defective in books which 
will remain 5 and a thing wherein this age 
excelleth. For I am persuaded, (and I may 
speak it with an Absit invidia verbo, and no 
ways in derogation of antiquity, but as in a 
good emulation between the vine and the 
olive,) that if the choice and best of those 
observations upon texts of Scriptures, which 
have been made dispersedly in sermons with- 
in this your majesty's island of Britain by the 
space of these forty years and more, leaving 
out the largeness of exhortations and appli- 
cations thereupon, had been set down in a 
continuance, it had been the best work in 
divinity which had been written since the 
apostles' times. 



437 
The matter informed by divinity is of two The matter 
kinds; matter of belief and truth of opinion ; 
and matter of service and adoration ; which is 
also judged and directed by the former ; the 
one being as the internal soul of religion, 
and the other as the external body thereof. 
And therefore the heathen religion was not 
only a worship of idols, but the whole reli- 
gion was an idol in itself; for it had no soul, 
that is, no certainty of belief or confession; 
as a man may well think, considering the 
chief doctors of their church were the poets : 
and the reason was, because the heathen gods 
were no jealous gods, but were glad to be ad- 
mitted into part, as they had reason. Nei- 
ther did they respect the pureness of heart, 
so they might have external honor and rites. 

But OUt Of these tWO do result and issue Four main 

four main branches of divinity ; faith, man- Divinity. 
ners, liturgy, and government. Faith con- 
taineth the doctrine of the nature of God, of 
the attributes of God, and of the works of 
God. The nature of God consisteth of three 
persons in unity of Godhead. The attributes 
of God are either common to the Deity, or 
respective to the persons. The works of God 



438 



summary are two, that of the creation, and 
that of the redemption ; and both these 
works, as in total they appertain to the unity 
of the Godhead, so in their parts they refer 
to the three persons: that of the creation, 
in the mass of the matter, to the Father \ in 
the disposition of the form, to the Son ; and 
in the continuance and conservation of the 
being, to the Holy Spirit: so that of the re- 
demption, in the election and counsel, to the 
Father ; in the whole act and consummation, 
to the Son ; and in the application, to the 
Holy Spirit : for by the Holy Ghost was 
Christ conceived in flesh, and by the Holy 
Ghost are the elect regenerated in spirit, 
This work likewise we consider either effect 
tually, in the elect ; or privately, in the re^ 
probate ; or according to appearance in the 
visible church. 

For Manners, the doctrine thereof is con^ 
tained in the Law, which discloseth sin. The 
Law itself is divided, according to the edition 
thereof, into the law of nature, the law moral, 
and the law positive ; and according to the 
stile, into negative and affirmative, prohibi- 
tions and commandments. Sin, in the mat*- 



4sg 



ter and subject thereof, is divided according 
to the commandments ; in the form thereof, 
it referreth to the three persons in Deity : 
Sins of infirmity against the Father, whose 
more special attribute is power ; sins of ig- 
norance against the Son, whose attribute is 
wisdom ; and sins of malice against the Holy 
Ghost, whose attribute is grace or love. In 
the motions of it, it either moveth to the 
right hand or to the left ; either to blind de- 
votion, or to profane and libertine transgres- 
sion ; either in imposing restraint where God 
granteth liberty, or in taking liberty where 
God imposeth restraint. In the degrees and 
progress of it, it divideth itself into thought, 
word, or act. And in this part I commend 
much the deducing of the law of God to cases 
of conscience ; for that I take indeed to be a 
breaking, and not exhibiting whole of the 
bread of life. But that which quickeneth 
both these doctrines of faith and manners, is 
the elevation and consent of the heart; 
whereunto appertain books of exhortation, 
holy meditation, christian resolution, and the 
like. 

For the Liturgy or service, it consisteth of 



440 



the reciprocal acts between God and man ; 
which, on the part of God, are the preaching 
of the word, and the sacraments, which are 
seals to the covenant, or as the visible word ; 
and on the part of man, invocation of the 
name of God; and, under the law, sacri- 
fices ; which were as visible prayers or con- 
fessions : but now the adoration being in 
spiritu et veritate, there remaineth only vituli 
labiorum; although the use of holy vows of 
thankfulness and retribution may be account- 
ed also as sealed petitions. 

And for the government of the church, it 
consisteth of the patrimony of the church, 
the franchises of the church, and the offices 
and jurisdictions of the church, and the laws 
of the church directing the whole ; all which 
have two considerations, the one in them- 
selves, the other how they stand compatible 
and agreeable to the civil estate. 

This matter of divinity is handled either in 
form of instruction of truth, or in form of 
confutation of falsehood. The declinations 
from religion, besides the primitive, which 
is atheism, and the branches thereof, are 
three j heresies, idolatry, and witchcraft : He- 



441 

resies, when we serve the true God with a 
false worship ; Idolatry, when we worship 
false gods, supposing them to be true ; and 
Witchcraft, when we adore false gods, know- 
ing them to be wicked and false : for so your 
majesty doth excellently well observe, that 
witchcraft is the height of idolatry. And 
yet we see though these be true degrees, 
Samuel teacheth us that they are all of a na- 
ture, when there is once a receding from the 
word of God : for so he saith, Quasi peccatum 
ariolandi est repugnare, et quasi scelus idolola- 
trice nolle acquiescere. 

These things I have passed over so briefly 
because I can report no deficiency concern- 
ing them : for I can find no space or ground 
that lieth vacant and unsown in the matter 
of divinity; so diligent have men been, 
either in sowing of good seed, or in sowing 
of tares. 



Thus have I made as it were a small Globe Conclusion 
of the Intellectual world, as truly and faith- rai surteylf 
fully as I could discover ; with a note and 

G G 



442 



description of those parts which seem to me 
not constantly occupate, or not well converted 
by the labour of man. In which, if I have in 
any point receded from that which is com- 
monly received, it hath been with a purpose 
of proceeding in melius, and not in aliud ; a 
mind of amendment and proficience, and 
not of change and difference. For I could 
not be true and constant to the argument I 
handle, if I were not willing to go beyond 
others ; but yet not more willing than to have 
others go beyond me again : which may the 
better appear by this, that I have propound- 
ed my opinions naked and unarmed, not 
seeking to preoccupate the liberty of men's 
judgments by confutations. For in any thing 
which is well set down, I am in good hope, 
that if the first reading move an objection, 
the second reading will make an answer- 
And in those things wherein I have erred, I 
am sure, I have not prejudiced the right by 
litigious arguments ; which certainly have 
this contrary effect and operation, that they 
add authority to error, and destroy the autho- 
rity of that which is well invented : for ques- 
tion is an honor and preferment to falsehood. 



44S 



tis oil the other side it is a repulse to truth. 
But tie errors I claim and challenge to my- 
self $ my own : the good, if any be, is due 
tanqipm adeps sacrificii, to be incensed to the 
honour first of the Divine Majesty, and next 
of y<ur majesty, to whom on earth I am 
mostbounden. 



THE END. 



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